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Abstract
One remarkable feature of social interactions is spontaneous mimicry.
People have a tendency to unconsciously imitate other’s behaviours. This
mimicry increases liking and affiliation between individuals and plays an
important role in social cognition. Though mimicry is not normally consciously
controlled, past research suggests that people mimic differently across social
situations. In order to better understand the flexibility of mimicry in socal
contexts, this thesis examined how social signals impact on mimicry by using
a cognitive approach. Four behavioural studies consistently suggest that
mimicry is subtly and strategically controlled by social signals. Specifically, in
the first study we found that eye gaze is a powerful controlling signal on
mimicry. Direct gaze rapidly and specifically enhances mimicry of intransitive
hand movements. In the second study, we clarified that this eye contact effect
on mimicry is not due to any arousal or attentional effect, but is driven by the
social cue of direct gaze. In the third study, we found a joint effect of likeability
and social status on mimicry. These two features interact in driving mimicry
and optimize the affiliative function of mimicry in social interaction. Finally in
the fourth study, we found that mimicry is sensitive to social primes. Prosocial
and antisocial primes subtly modulate mimicry according to the self-
relatedness of the primes.
To further investigate the neural mechanism of the sutble control of
mimicry by social signals, functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to
examine the effect of eye contact on mimicry. The results showed that two key
brain systems for social cognition—medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and
mirror neuron system (MNS)—work together to control mimicry on line in
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social contexts. In particular, dynamic causal modelling analysis revealed that
mPFC is the originator of the eye contact effect on mimicry and this region
modulates the sensory inputs to the MNS according to gaze directions. These
findings suggest that mPFC plays a key role in the strategic control of mimicry
in social contexts.
All experiments are then discussed in relation to current theories of
mimicry. We suggest that this subtle and strategic control of mimicry is
essential to human competence in social interactions and is important for our
understanding of why and how people mimic.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
“Each of us is in fact what he is almost exclusively by virtue of his imitativeness” —
William James (1890, p. 741)
One striking phenomenon of human social interactions is spontaneous
mimicry. People have a tendency to unconsciously copy other’s actions,
mannerisms, facial expressions, languages and other behaviours (Chartrand
and Bargh, 1999). We start to yawn upon seeing someone else yawning and
start to frown when seeing others frowning. We whisper to someone who is
whispering and speak much louder when others do so. We walk slower in the
presence of the elderly but scurry when centered by busy people in the
London underground. Apparently, human mimicry is ubiquitous.
In the past 20 years, this spontaneous mimicry becomes the key focus of
research in social psychology and cognitive neuroscience (Heyes, 2009).
Investigations on the causes, consequences and underlying mechanisms of
mimicry have been widely carried out in these two disciplines, but with
different perspectives. Specifically, by using naturalistic paradigms, social
psychology focuses on the visible mimicry behaviours during social interaction
and how these mimicry behaviours change across different social contexts;
whereas in cognitive neuroscience, researchers primarily adopt simple, well-
controlled lab tasks to examine the underlying mirroring mechanism and to
establish cognitive models of mimicry process. Here in the first chapter, I will
systematically review past research on mimicry in these two disciplines and
then give an overview of the questions the thesis will address.
Introduction: Mimicry in Social Psychology
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1.1 Mimicry in Social Psychology
As William James noted in the opening quote, the phenomenon that
individuals imitate the behaviours of others has long been of interest to
psychologists (e.g., James, 1890). The past thirty years, in particular in social
psychology, has seen a surge of research exploring the unconscious side of
imitation in which people subtly and spontaneously imitate their social
interaction partners, including mimicry of physical movements, speech
patterns, facial expressions and emotions. This unconscious side of imitation
is defined as mimicry, and is suggested to be essential for social
communication and affiliation. It is notably different from the conscious
imitation, which is often regarded as an important part of social learning theory
and culture inheritance (Heyes, 2009).
To better understand what we mimic, how we mimic and why we mimic,
systematic investigations into the wide ranging consequences of mimicry have
been conducted in social psychology, as well as investigations into social
factors that facilitate and inhibit mimicry. In light of these trends, the current
section will unfold in the following manner: first, I will introduce the close link
between perception and behaviour (see 1.1.2) and briefly review
representative evidence of mimicry behaviour in the literature of social
psychology (see 1.1.3); next, I will discuss the social importance of mimicry by
reviewing the consequences and moderators of it (see 1.1.4 and 1.1.5); finally,
I will discuss different theoretical approaches to the question of why we mimic.
(see 1.1.6)
Introduction: Methodologies
11
1.1.1 Methodologies
At the beginning of the review, it is necessary to overview the
methodologies that have been commonly used in the investigation of mimicry
behaviour. Generally speaking, social psychologists adopt naturalistic
paradigms to investigate visible mimicry behaviours. Participants are often
asked to complete a social task with an unknown confederate in a natural
setting. The social task is usually simple but very interactive, for example,
participant are required to describe the features of some photos in magazines
(the ‘photo description task’, Chartrand and Bargh, 1999), which aims to make
participants fully engaging in the interaction with the confederate and being
unaware of their own behaviours. Crucially, the confederate’s behavioural
patterns during the interaction were manipulated by the researchers and
hidden video cameras were used to record participant’s corresponding
behaviours throughout the whole interaction. For example, in Chartrand and
Bargh (1999, experiment 1), confederates were trained to subtly perform or
not perform a featured action during interaction with the participant (e.g. face
touch or foot shake) and the whole interactions were recorded. Then coders
blind to the experimental condition and hypotheses later watched these
recordings and counted the amount of face touching and foot shaking that the
participant engaged in. By comparing manipulations with or without featured
actions performed by the confederates, researchers revealed that the featured
action was substantially mimicked by the participants.
Similarly, in studies of investigating consequences of mimicry (e.g.
Chartrand and Bargh, 1999, experiment 2), confederates were trained to
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subtly copy or not copy the postures and mannerisms of the participant
throughout the interaction. Participants were then asked to rate the
smoothness of the social interaction and the likeability of the confederate by a
questionnaire. Again, by comparing the ratings between manipulations with
and without mimicry, researchers found that mimicry significantly enhances
liking between participants and confederates and facilitate the social
interaction.
When it comes to the investigations of modulators of mimicry, another
naturalistic approach called ‘subliminal priming’ is used when introducing
social modulators. Subliminal priming is an implicit memory effect in which
exposure to a pre-stimulus influences response to a later stimulus. It can
occur following perceptual, semantic, or conceptual stimulus repetition. It
happens, for example, that if a person observe prosocial behaviour, or read a
list of prosocial words (e.g. ‘helping’, ‘together’, ‘cooperation’) or complete
scrambled sentences including prosoical words (i.e. the ‘scrambled sentence
task’, Srull and Wyer, 1979), the probability that they later behave in a
prosocial way is greater than if not so primed (Over and Carpenter, 2009b;
Lakin and Chartrand, 2003; Leighton et al., 2010). Another example is when
people experienced a social exclusion in a virtual video game or watched
someone being ostracized, they later behave like being ostracized in real
social interactions (Lakin et al., 2008; Over and Carpenter, 2009a). By using
subliminal priming, researchers are able to examine whether a motive, an
attitude or some features of a person can modulate one’s tendency to mimic.
Back to the main topic of the thesis, in the next section I will introduce a
close link between perception and behaviour on which mimicry is grounded. I
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will present evidence suggesting that one’s own behaviour is profoundly
influenced by the contexts, conspecifics and others’ behaviours. I will stress
the notion that perception is for behaviour—it is the best guidance and control
device for one’s social behaviour.
1.1.2 Perception-Behaviour Link
Perception and behaviour are two interdependent components of
cognition. Psychology used to believe that the most important function of
perception is to understand the world: we perceive because we want to know
what is going on around us. Although this answer is straight-forward, it is also
largely incomplete, and to some extent wrong. Certainly, perception is
essential for us to comprehend our environment, but that does not mean that
this understanding is the reason that we are evolved to obtain this function.
Rather, understanding is a means by which we act effectively (Dijksterhuis
and Bargh, 2001). Adaptive perception is ultimately in the service of functional
behavioural responding to the environment, and comprehension and
understanding are only important means to that end (Milner and Goodale,
1995). Therefore, perception is for doing: it is our best action guidance and
control device.
This perspective on action and perception has been widely supported by
biological research in non-primate animals where there are multiple direct
one-to-one relations between a specific perceptual process and a specific
from of action. Frogs, for instance, have two different perceptual systems
(Ingle, 1973). One system is responsible for detecting and hunting small prey
objects whereas the other is responsible for avoiding large objects. Thus for a
Introduction: Perception-Behaviour Link
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frog, a large object above the surface means “flight”, while a small, irregularly
moving object on the surface means “go for it”. There are no exceptions: the
perception of a small object on the surface always prompts hunting behaviour
and the perception of a large object always prompts avoidance. Further
animal evidence for the direct relation between perception and action comes
from studies of the group behaviour of fish and birds. Fish in shoals (and also
migrating birds) often display impressive synchrony of movement: they all
move in the same direction and then change direction at the same time.
Substantial evidence suggests that if a fish perceives the fellow fish in front of
it change direction, it can do nothing but the same (Pitcher, 1979).
For humans, we have a behavioural repertoire that is more flexible than
that of frogs, fish and birds. However, this primitive perception-behaviour link
is still preserved in humans’ more complex social behaviour. What people are
about to do is profoundly influenced by what they just perceived. This
guidance of perception on behaviour helps individuals conform to the rules of
the society and coordinate with other members of the society. Before I review
this evidence, it is necessary to raise another important issue at first: what
does a human perceiver perceive? First of all, human perceivers perceive the
environment surrounding them and context information at that time point: we
know when and where we are. Second, we perceive our conspecifics: we
meet elders and youths, men and women, strangers and acquaintances and
ingroups and outgroups. Finally, we perceive ‘specific observable behaviours’.
It involves behaviours that we can literally perceive. We perceive gestures and
movements of others: we can see someone wave, yawn, scratch the head or
shake the foot. We can perceive various facial expressions and emotions: we
Introduction: Perception-Behaviour Link
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see people smile, angry or fear. Also, we hear people speak: we perceive the
contents of speech (words and syntax) as well as accents and tone of voice.
Social psychologists have demonstrated that behaviour can be automatically
influenced by all three forms of perception.
For the context information, researchers found that the mere perception
of social settings affects one’s actual behaviour. Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003)
primed participants with locations that were associated with situational norms.
For example, some participants were primed with stimuli related to libraries, a
location for which the norm is quiet behaviour. They found that those who
were primed with the location or a goal to visit the location later behaved in
ways that were consistent with the norm for that location. For instance, those
who were exposed to photos of library subsequently recited a text passage in
a significantly softer voice than non-primed participants. They explained that
behavioural information can be activated from the mere perception of social
settings or contexts and subsequently guide actual behaviour in the absence
of people’s intentions and awareness.
The evidence that behaviour can be influenced by the perception of our
conspecifics is also abundant. We spontaneously generate trait inferences
based on easily detectable identifying features of a person and meanwhile
activate social stereotypes of the group that person belongs to (Gilbert, 1989;
Winter and Uleman, 1984). These trait concepts and social stereotypes can
dominate the perceiver’s mindset and lead him/her to behave in a consistent
way. Bargh et al. (1996) were the first to report the direct effects of trait
concept and stereotype activation on behaviour. In one of their studies,
participants were primed with trait concepts of either rudeness or politeness
Introduction: Perception-Behaviour Link
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by completing a ‘scrambled sentence task’ (see 1.1.1). Participants were
requested to meet the experimenter in a different office upon finishing the task.
When participants approached the experimenter, the experimenter was talking
to a confederate. The confederate surreptitiously measured the time it took for
participants likely to interrupt the conversation. They found that participants
who were primed with rudeness were more likely to interrupt than were control
participants, whereas participants primed with politeness were least likely to
interrupt. This result suggests that activation of trait concepts elicits
corresponding behaviour; activation of the trait rude makes us rude and
activation of the trait polite makes us polite. In the next study, they replicated a
consistent result on social stereotypes. Participants were seated behind a
computer and were asked to engage in a very boring and tedious task. While
engaging in this task, some participants were subliminally presented with
photographs of male African-Americans whereas others were subliminally
presented with male Caucasian faces. After participants had been performing
the boring task for a while, the computer program beeped and displayed an
error message of data saving. Subsequently the experimenter came to
require participants to do the task again. The participants were videotaped
during these moments and the dependent variable was the level of hostility
participants displayed upon hearing that they had to start all over again. As the
stereotype of African-Americans is often associated with hostility, researchers
found that the reaction of the participants primed with the stereotype of
African-Americans were rated as more hostile than the reaction of the
participants primed with Caucasian faces. These findings demonstrate that the
perception of members of a stereotyped group lead to corresponding
Introduction: Perception-Behaviour Link
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stereotypic behaviour.
Similar behavioural effects by trait and stereotype activation can also be
found when participants perceive elderly people. For example, Bargh et al.
(1996) used the scrambled sentence task to prime participants with words
related to elderly people and then recorded the time it took participants to walk
from the experimental room to the nearest elevator. As elderly are often
associated with slowness, they found that participants primed with the elderly
stereotype walked significantly slower than control participants. This result has
later on been replicated by several other groups. In the experiment of
Kawakami et al. (2002), some participants were exposed to various
photographs of elderly people, whereas others were exposed to photographs
of university students. The photographs were presented in a lexical decision
task: each photograph was accompanied by a personality trait and the task of
the participant was to decide whether the presented traits were descriptive of
the social category displayed on the photograph (elderly vs. student). The
data clearly showed that reaction latencies on decision task were longer when
the words were preceded by a photograph of an elderly person than when the
words were preceded by photographs of younger people. Dijksterhuis et al.,
(2001) obtained compatible results in a different paradigm. In their study,
some participants were instructed to form an impression of various elderly
individuals while looking at the photographs of these individuals. The second
task, which was ostensibly unrelated to the first task, was a lexical decision
task where participants were asked to decide as fast as possible whether
words presented on the screen were existing words (car, shop) or random
letter strings (ikn, geru). As expected, the results showed that participants
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primed with the elderly stereotype showed reaction times that were
considerably slower than participants who were not primed. In sum, these
results suggest that people displayed behaviour (slowness or hostility)
corresponding to the activated trait or stereotype of a group (elderly or African-
Americans) and this perception-behaviour is totally out of awareness.
1.1.3 Evidence of Mimicry—the ‘Chameleon Effect’
The main topic of this thesis comes from the direct link between
behaviour and the third type of perception—the ‘specific observable
behaviours’. This link is often termed as ‘Chameleon Effect’, which first
appeared in a seminal paper by Chartrand and Bargh (1999). In that paper,
they defined mimicry as unconscious copying of the postures, mannerisms,
facial expressions, speech style and other behaviours of one’s interaction
partners, such that one’s behaviour passively and unintentionally changes to
match that of others in one’s current social environment. They suggested such
a “chameleon effect” may manifest itself in three different ways—‘motor
mimicry’ (e.g. crossing one’s arms while talking with someone else who has
his or her arms crossed), ‘facial mimicry’’ (e.g. starting yawning when seeing
other people yawning) and ‘speech mimicry’ (e.g. using the idiosyncratic
verbal expressions or speech inflections of a friend). Common to all three
cases is that one typically does not notice doing these things-if at all-until after
the fact.
Motor mimicry
Motor mimicry refers to the adoption of the postures, gestures, and motor
movements of one’s interaction partner. The evidence of motor mimicry can
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be traced back to early anecdotes. For example, in Eidelberg’s experiment
(1929), participants played a game where they were instructed to point at their
nose upon hearing the word “nose” and to point at a lamp upon hearing the
word “lamp.” The experimenter, who was clearly visible to the participants,
also pointed at his or her nose or at the lamp upon hearing the corresponding
instruction. After a while, the experimenter started to make “mistakes,” in that
he or she pointed at the lamp upon hearing the word nose and vice versa.
Interestingly, participants started to make the same mistakes as well. They
spontaneously imitated the gestures made by the experimenter, despite the
instruction to follow the verbal cues (i.e., the words “nose” and “lamp”) and not
the behaviour of the experimenter.
Early studies by Bernieri and colleagues (1988) tested whether naive
judges rated ‘‘real’’ interactions as more synchronous than interactions that
never actually took place. To do this, researchers videotaped several mother–
infant interactions, always with the mother on the right part of the screen and
the infant on the left. They then created different versions of the videos in
which mothers were sometimes paired with their own infants and sometimes
with other infants. Participants watched these videos and rated how physically
in synchronization the pairs were. Results clearly showed that mothers were
judged to be more in sync with their own infants than with other infants. This
finding suggests that a high level synchrony between interaction partners is a
key feature of human social interaction.
Chartrand and Bargh (1999) were the first to systematically test the
automaticity and specificity of motor mimicry in dyadic communication where
two individuals reciprocally interact with each other. Participants engaged in a
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‘photo description task’ (see 1.1.1) with two confederates one after another.
The first confederate either moved her foot or touched her face throughout the
session. The second confederate performed the behaviour the first did not do
(for example, if the first confederate performed a foot shaking, then the
second one performed a face touching). Hidden video cameras were used to
record these sessions. Results revealed that participants changed their motor
behaviours to match the actions they perceived in their current environment.
That is, they moved their foot more when they were with the foot moving
confederate than the face touching confederate, and they touched their face
more when with the face toucher than the foot mover. Participants reported no
awareness of either the confederates’ actions or their own mimicry of those
motor behaviours, providing evidence that motor mimicry is a spontaneous
and unconscious process.
Facial mimicry
Facial mimicry is another recognizable form of human mimicry where
people have the tendency to adopt the facial expressions (and corresponding
elicited emotions) of others. Early investigators have studied facial mimicry
among newborns and their mothers (Field et al., 1982; Meltzoff and Moore,
1977, 1983, 1989; Meltzoff, 1985, 1988; O’Toole and Dubin, 1968). Meltzoff
and Moore (1977, 1983) showed that even one-month-old babies imitate facial
expressions. If a mother looks at a baby and opens her mouth, the baby will
open its mouth. If a mother sticks out her tongue, the baby will often do the
same. However, this evidence is highly controversial (Jones, 2009; see 1.1.6 ).
Interestingly, researchers also found that it is not always the baby who mimics
the mother during the infant-mother interaction, facial mimicry can also be
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observed from the mother side when they feed their infants a spoonful of food.
O’Toole and Dubin (1968) reported that mothers tend to open their mouths in
response to their infants opening their mouths to feed.
Another example of facial mimicry in adults is contagious yawning. If,
after a long journey, a person starts to yawn, usually his or her travel
companions start to yawn within a few minutes. This tendency to yawn
triggered by perceiving others’ yawning has been well documented in the
literature (Platek et al., 2003; Provine, 1986, 1989; Senju et al., 2007). Provine
(1986) asked participants to watch a five minute videotape. In one condition,
participants watched a video with yawning people, whereas in a control
condition participants watched a video with smiling people. As expected, 55%
of the participants in the experimental (i.e., yawn) condition started to yawn
while watching the video, as opposed to only 21% in the control (i.e., smile)
condition.
Other evidence of facial mimicry comes from psychophysiological studies
by Dimberg and colleagues. They used facial electromyography (EMG) to
indicate that facial expressions elicit facial muscular activity congruent with the
presented facial expressions. For example, Dimberg (1982) showed that mere
photographic presentations of angry and happy facial expressions induced
spontaneous corrugator supercilii muscle activity (brow lowering actions,
prototypical in angry facial expressions) and zygomatic major muscle activity
(lip corner pulling actions, prototypical in happy facial expressions),
respectively. He claimed that this facial muscular activity may be interpretable
as mimicry behaviour. Later, Dimberg, et al. (2000) reported that facial EMG
activity occurred even without awareness of the specific facial expression,
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confirming the spontaneous nature of the responses. In addition, facial
mimicry occurs rapidly; Dimberg and Thunberg (1998) showed that facial
EMG activity occurred after only 500ms of exposure to the facial pictures.
These studies imply that facial muscle activity that may relate to facial mimicry
occurs spontaneously and rapidly in response to facial expressions.
An interesting study recently conducted by Bailey and Henry (2009)
suggests that facial mimicry is still preserved in older adulthood. Although old
people have explicit visual recognition difficulties and cannot consciously
perceive the facial emotion stimuli, facial EMG activity suggests that they still
have intact facial mimicry to the angry and happy facial expression. This
finding supports the pervasiveness and unconsciousness of facial mimicry,
ranging from newborns to elders.
Speech mimicry
Finally, there is evidence of mimicry of speech related variables. Simner
(1971) conducted research with infants and demonstrated that newborns as
young as 2 to 4 days old will cry in response to another infant’s crying. What is
fascinating about Simner’s research is the finding that infants do not mimic
synthetic cries, suggesting that newborn infants can actually discriminate
between real and artificial cries.
Research on mimicry of speech patterns conducted with adult
participants has shown that speakers tend to adopt each other’s accents,
latency to speak, speech rate, and utterance duration (Cappella and Planalp,
1981; Giles and Powesland, 1975; Matarazzo and Wiens, 1972; Webb, 1969).
Speakers also use the same syntax as their conversation partners. For
example, in a study by Bock (1986; 1989), participants would hear and repeat
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a sentence such as “The corrupt inspector offered a deal to the bar owner.”
Later, participants would see a picture of, for instance, a boy handing a
valentine to a girl. This picture can be described as “The boy is handing a
valentine to a girl” or as “The boy is handing the girl a valentine.” As the first
sentence has a similar syntactic form as the priming sentence, this is the
description participants most often gave. Syntactic structures appear to carry
over from one sentence to another.
Whereas in the studies conducted by Bock (1986) participants activated a
particular syntax themselves, Levelt and Kelter (1982; also Schenkein, 1980)
investigated syntactic persistence in a social context. In one of their
experiments, the experimenter called various shops and either asked “What
time does your shop close?” or “At what time does your shop close?”. If the
former question was asked, shopkeepers more often answered with “Five
o’clock”, whereas the answer to the latter question was “At five o’clock” in the
majority of cases. Importantly, Levelt and Kelter (1982) as well as Schenkein
(1980) obtained such effects of speech mimicry for single words, for clauses
as well as for the structural format of entire sentences. Finally, Levelt and
Kelter showed that cognitive load did not decrease these speech imitation
effects, suggesting that these effects were automatic in nature.
1.1.4 Impacts of Behavioural mimicry
Examples in the last section remarkably demonstrate that mimicry
behaviour is pervasive in our daily life. However, is this spontaneous mimicry
just a funny tendency we (human) have and something we should leave to the
realm of entertaining dinner conversation? Or is it an advanced behavioural
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pattern that is critical to one’s social survival? There is now strong evidence
for the latter. Mimicry serves a critical function in our social interaction and
social affiliation. In this section, I will review both the social and non-social
impacts of mimicry.
Social Impacts of Mimicry
Liking and rapport within dyad. Early research on behavioural
mimicry found a correlational relationship between mimicry and rapport.
Charney (1966) examined postural congruence in the context of
psychotherapy sessions and found that mimicry correlated with an increase in
rapport between the therapist and client. LaFrance and Broadbent (1976)
hypothesized that nonverbal behavioural mimicry could be a good index of
group rapport. They assessed this hypothesis in college seminar classrooms
and indeed found that students rated rapport as higher in classroom in which
there was greater congruence between the body and arm positions of
teachers and students. Other research also shows a strong link between
mimicry and rapport. For example, a meta-analysis conducted by Tickle-
Degnen and Rosenthal (1990) showed that the three facets of rapport—
mutual attention, coordination, and positivity—are associated with particular
nonverbal behaviours, with the coordination element of rapport being highly
linked with mimicry.
Although these correlational data did not allow for the conclusion that
mimicry leads to liking and rapport, several experimental studies did support
this conclusion. Early studies by Maurer and Tindall (1983) suggested that
adolescents who were mimicked by a school counsellor thought that
counsellor was more empathic and likable than did those who were not
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mimicked by the counsellor. Chartrand and Bargh (1999, experiment 2)
manipulated mimicry in the context of dyadic interactions to provide the first
solid evidence that rapport is a consequence of mimicry. The dyad partners
were complete strangers who presumably had no pre-existing rapport. One
member of each dyad was a research confederate who was instructed to
either mimic or not mimic the postures and mannerisms of the research
participants while they completed a ‘photo description task’. When questioned
after the interaction, participants who were mimicked liked the confederate
more and perceived their interactions as having run more smoothly than
participants who were not mimicked. Hove and Risen (2009) have recently
found similar effects for interpersonal synchrony. Specifically, they found that
when one person synchronizes his or her movements in time with another,
that other person (the mimickee) feels more affiliative (i.e. a positive and
intimate feeling) with the synchronizer (mimicker). Bailenson and Yee (2005)
even reported the rapport and affiliative effect of mimicry toward a virtual
nonhuman, nonverbal mimicker. These findings provide firm evidence that
mimicking the behaviours of interaction partners enhances rapport and
facilitates social interaction.
Prosociality beyond dyad. The effect that mimicry leads to liking,
affiliation and rapport between interaction partners suggests that it serves to
bring people together emotionally. Does it also bring people together
psychologically? Experimental research confirms this idea and suggests
mimicry increases one’s general prosocial orientation. Van Baaren et al.
(2003a) conducted a study looking at tips given to waitresses in a restaurant.
Waitresses were instructed to either recite back verbatim a customer’s order
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(verbal mimicry), or to paraphrase that order (indicating an understanding of
the order without verbal mimicry). Tips given to the waitresses were used as
the measure of prosociality. Results indicated that the waitresses received
more substantial tips from customers whom they mimicked than from
customers whom they did not mimic.
Mimicry increases one’s prosociality not only within the dyad, but also
towards the stranger they confront afterwards. In a study testing whether the
rapport and affiliative feelings induced by mimicry would extend beyond the
dyad, Ashton-James et al. (2007) found that participants who were mimicked
on an earlier task reported on a questionnaire that they felt closer to others in
general, compared to those participants who were not mimicked during the
earlier task. In a second study, an implicit measure of feeling close to others
was used—seating distance. Participants were either mimicked or not, and
then asked to take a seat in a hallway where several chairs had been placed
side by side. Several items were placed on one of the end chairs such that it
looked like another participant was sitting there (but had stepped away). The
implicit measure of feeling close to an unknown other was how close to the
‘‘occupied’’ chair the participant sat. The researchers found that participants
who had earlier been mimicked sat closer to the occupied seat than
participants who had not been mimicked. This suggests that mimicked
participants were feeling closer to others, and again supports the notion that
being mimicked increases one’s general prosocial orientation.
In a study examining helping behaviour, participants were either
mimicked or not by an experimenter (van Baaren et al., 2004). The
experimenter then ‘‘accidentally’’ dropped a bunch of pens, and the amount of
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pens picked up was the unobtrusive measure of helping behaviour.
Participants who were mimicked picked up more pens for the experimenter
than those who were not mimicked. In a follow-up study, researchers
demonstrated that helping behaviour is not only limited to the mimicker. They
found that mimicked participants also donated more generously to a charity
than non-mimicked participants. Thus, individuals are more willing to help
others after being mimicked than after not being mimicked. This effect was
recently replicated with very young children (Carpenter et al., 2011). Eighteen-
month olds were mimicked or not by an experimenter and subsequently
observed the experimenter ‘‘accidentally’’ drop pens on the floor. The results
revealed that mimicked children helped the experimenter pick up more pens
than non-mimicked children.
It is not just the recipient of the mimicry (mimickee) who is influenced by
mimicry—so does the mimicker. Stel et al. (2008a) have found evidence that
mimicking others makes individuals more prosocial. Participants either
mimicked the facial expressions of a person shown on a video or not. They
were then asked to donate money to a charity, which was either related to the
person on the video or unrelated. Consistent with results on mimickee,
participants who were instructed to mimic (and who then in fact mimicked
more) donated more to the charity (either related or unrelated) than those who
did not mimic.
Nonsocial Impacts of Mimicry
Thus mimicry impacts individuals in a prosocial way, both within and
beyond the mimicry dyad. It brings people together emotionally and
cognitively. However, recently research suggests that mimicry also has non-
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social impacts on interaction partners. Specifically, being mimicked or
mimicking other can affect individuals’ attitudes and creativity.
Attitudes. In consumer science, researchers found that when
consumers are mimicked by a person, they show more positive attitude
toward products presented by that person. In a series of studies by Tanner et
al. (2008), a ‘facilitator’ told participants about a new snack product that was
soon to be launched. The facilitator either mimicked the participants during the
interaction or did not. After learning about the product and answering some
questions about the product category, participants were asked to taste the
product and rate how much they liked it, whether they planned to purchase it
themselves and whether they would recommend it to friends. An index of
favorability toward the product was computed from the responses to these
questions. The results revealed that participants who had been mimicked by
the facilitator had more favorable attitudes toward the product than those who
had not been mimicked, although none of the participants attributed their
attitude to the facilitator’s behaviour. The authors argued that when
consumers are mimicked, they feel more prosocial toward the mimicker, which
in turn enhances the persuasion by the mimicker.
Creativity. There are two types of creativity: convergent creativity
(‘‘connecting the dots’’) and divergent creativity (‘‘thinking outside the box’’).
Both are important skills that people use in their daily lives. Because mimicry
brings people together and leads to a convergence in attitudes, Ashton-James
and Chartrand (2008) hypothesized that mimicry would facilitate convergent
creativity, whereas a lack of mimicry would facilitate divergent creativity. To
test this theory, they manipulated whether individuals were subtly mimicked or
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not by an experimenter during a five minutes social interaction, and
subsequently measured participants’ capacity for convergent thinking and
divergent thinking. The results were just as predicted that the convergent
creativity is significantly enhanced when being mimicked versus not being
mimicked. They argued that being mimicked by an interaction partner cues
convergent thinking by signaling a social opportunity for collaboration while
not being mimicked cues divergent thinking by signaling a social demand for
improvisation and innovation.
1.1.5 Social Modulators of Behavioural Mimicry
The Chameleon Effect (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999) did show that
observing other’s behaviour automatically activates one’s tendency to copy
that behaviour. However, subsequent research in social psychology revealed
that we do not display the same extent of mimicry to everyone. Mimicry can
be modulated by characteristics of the mimicker and mimickee.
Modulators from the Mimicker
Prosociality. Substantial evidence demonstrates that prosociality is a
critical individual difference that modulates one’s tendency to mimic. Long-
term parameters of prosociality such as perspective-taking fundamentally
gauge one’s mimicry behaviour during social interation. For example,
Chartrand and Bargh (1999, experiment 3) found that participants with high
perspective-taking score mimicked the behaviour of a confederate to a greater
extent than those with low perspective-taking score. Self-construal is another
long-term index of prosociality that influences mimicry. Independent self-
construal individuals tend to construe the self as separate from their social
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context and thus emphasize autonomy and independence. In contrast,
interdependent self-construal individuals tend to construe the self as a
constituent of a broader social context and thus emphasize the
interdepdendence and impact of social environment. van Baaren et al. (2003b)
found that people with interdependent self-construals (e.g., Japanese)
exhibited more unconscious mimicry than people with independent self-
construals (e.g., Americans), regardless of the ethnicity of their confederate
interaction partner.
Short-term characteristics of prosociality such as an affiliative goal also
impact mimicry. Lakin and Chartrand (2003) found that having a goal to
affiliate with others increases mimicry. In their experiment, they used two
means to have participants with an affiliation goal, either by giving explicit
instructions to require participants to get along with the confederate, or by
implicitly priming participants with affiliation-related words such as affiliate,
friend, partner, and together. They found that regardless of whether the
affiliation goal was consciously instructed or unconsciously primed, mimicry is
enhanced as long as one holds an affiliation goal. Leighton et al. (2010) found
a similar effect of prosociality on mimicry. They exposed participants with
scrambled sentences of prosocial attitude (e.g. ‘Let us be together’) or
antisocial attitude (e.g. ‘I am now single’). They found that participants primed
with a prosoical attitude displayed more mimicry than ones primed with an
antisocial attitude. These findings consistently suggest that temporarily
increasing one’s prosociality enhances one’s tendency to mimic other.
Desire for belongingness. Another way to temporarily increase
mimicry is to induce a desire for belongingness. As humans have a
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fundamental and pervasive drive to affiliate with conspecifics (Baumeister and
Leary, 1995; Lakin, et al., 2003), some studies suggest that inducing such
need to belong to a group enhances mimicry. For example, Uldall et al. (2011)
required students to complete a ‘personality test’ where some students were
primed with a feeling of distinctiveness. Students were given a bogus
feedback on the test which indicated they either had a common personality
profile similar to most others or an extremely unusual one at their university.
After they received the false feedback, they engaged in a task with a
confederate who was shaking the foot throughout the interaction. Researchers
found that those who had earlier been told that they were very different from
others mimicked the confederate’s foot shaking more than those who had
been told they were similar to others. This suggests that people mimic more
when they feel the need to belong to the majority.
Negative social experiences such as failure to affiliate with others or
social ostracism can also induce a desire for belongingness and thus increase
mimicry. For example, in the study by Lakin and Chartrand (2003), participants
were asked to affiliate with a stranger in an online chat task. When
researchers manipulated the stranger’s response and made participants feel
either a success or a failure in affiliating with the stranger, they found that
those with a recent failure to affiliate with others showed more mimicry to
others in a following social interaction. Similarly, in Lakin et al (2008),
participants involved an online ball-tossing game called ‘Cyberball’ where
ostracism was manipulated. Each participant played this online game with
three other “participants” who were actually computer controlled to include or
exclude the participant from the game. The results suggest that experiencing
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ostracism does in fact increase participants’ tendency to mimic others in a
following social interaction. Similar effects of ostracism priming were later
replicated in children (Over and Carpenter, 2009a).
Mood. It has been suggested that mood serves as a signal conveying
information about the friendliness and dangerousness of our environment. A
negative mood is assumed to indicate that something might be wrong and
hence more self-focus attention and effortful analytic processes are adapted;
in contrast, a positive mood is supposed to signal that the environment poses
no threat, which leads to engage in more automatic and effortless stimuli-
driven processes (Schwarz and Clore 1996). Based on the assumption that
mimicry is an automatic process, it should become more easily engaged in a
positive than in a negative mood. This prediction is in line with findings by van
Baaren et al. (2006) who examined the effects of a happy and a sad mood on
the mimicry of pen-playing. The authors found that individuals in a negative
mood state hardly mimicked pen-playing, while individuals in a positive mood
state did. Likowski et al. (2011) found similar effects on facial mimicry. They
investigated whether a happy or sad mood influences facial muscular
reactions to emotional facial expressions. Participants were induced into
happy or sad mood states by watching an amusing or sorrowful movie. After
that, they observed faces with happy, sad, angry and neutral expressions
while their facial muscular reactions were recorded by EMG. Their results
suggest that after watching the happy movie participants showed stronger
facial mimicry to all emotional expressions, whereas watching the sad movie
led to a general reduction of facial mimicry.
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Modulators from the Mimickee
Likeability. Likeability is a key factor that influences how much a target
would be mimicked. The more we like someone the more we mimic them (Stel
et al., 2010a, 2010b). The likeability of a target, however, can be determined
by many parameters. It can depend either on the most salient feature such as
attractiveness or on the deep-rooted mindset such as stereotypes.
Researchers have tested several parameters of likeability on mimicry. For
example, van Leeuwen et al. (2009) found that when drawing a picture,
participants are more prone to mimic the coloring mannerism of attractive
people comparing to unattractive people. In contrast, Johnston (2002)
provided the evidence that participants inhibit mimicry of the food
consumption of the confederate if the confederate had a social stigma (being
obesity, or having a facial scar).
Stel et al. (2010b) explored the relationship between mimicry and the
stereotype of ethnic attitude. In their study, Dutch participants’ ethnic attitude
towards Moroccans was firstly measured by an ‘implicit association test’ (IAT,
Greenwald et al. 1998). Participants then saw a video where a Moroccan or a
Dutch person was talking and performing some subtle behaviour such as
face/hair touching and pen-playing. They found that the more negative the
participant’s implicit attitude was toward Moroccans, the less Moroccans was
mimicked compared to the Dutch confederate. This result means that when a
mimicker holds a stereotype of dislike for a target, automatic mimicry is
reduced.
Membership. Group membership is another feature that modulates
mimicry. Several studies suggest that greater mimicry occurs to ingroup
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members than outgroup members. For example, McHugo et al. (1991)
demonstrated that facial mimicry to political leaders’ photos was influenced by
the observer’s political membership. Supporters of Ronald Reagan showed
more mimicry to his photos than towards his opponent’s. This finding was later
replicated by a well-controlled EMG study where the level of facial mimicry
varies as a function of political membership (Bourgeois and Hess, 2008).
Religion and ethnic membership can also impact mimicry (Chartrand and van
Baaren, 2009). For example, Yabar et al. (2006) found that after identifying
the religion belief of the targets, non-Christian participants displayed more
mimicry towards non-Christian targets than Christian targets.
Social status. Most mimicry research to date examined situations in
which people were of equal status (e.g. peers, friends). Only a few studies on
mimicry included a manipulation of status by role. These studies suggested
that people display more mimicry to higher status people than to lower status
people (Brody and Stoneman, 1981; Cheng and Chartrand, 2003; Mastop et
al., 2011). For example, in Cheng and Chartrand’s study (2003), students
were required to interact with a confederate in a role-playing task. Each
student was randomly assigned to be a ‘leader’ or a ‘worker’ of the
confederate (who took the opposite role). During the interaction, the
confederate touched her face continuously. Results showed that those
students who had been assigned the ‘worker’ mimicked the confederate’s face
touching much more than those who had been assigned to the ‘leader’ role,
which suggests that lower status people tend to mimic more than people with
high status. However, it is important to note that the increased mimicry to high
status people is only limited to status-unrelated behaviour (e.g. face-touching,
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pen-playing); for status-related behaviour (e.g. expanded posture), lower
status people show increased complementary response instead of mimicry
(Mastop et al., 2011).
1.1.6 Theories of Behavioural Mimicry
Previous sections reviewed the modulators and consequences of mimicry
and suggested that mimicry can both impact and be impacted by multiple
social factors. However, there is still a mystery for the purpose of mimicry—
why people mimic each other. In social psychology, there are mainly two
theories that address why people display overt mimicry behaviour.
Mimicry as an innate system
The ‘nature and nurture’ debate has already been taken in the research
of mimicry. Here in social psychology, dominant theories seem to favor the
nativist side (Meltzoff, 1993; Lakin et al., 2003; Chartrand and van Baaren,
2009). These theories are profoundly influenced by the longitudinal evidence
of direct link between perception and behaviour in the evolution history (see
the example of migrating fish and birds in 1.1.1) and the adaptive
consequences that mimicry engenders (see 1.1.3). For example, Lakin et al.
(2003) suggest that as mimicry has important survival value and social
function, evolution selects mimicry as a social glue to help humans
communicate and affiliate. Similarly, Meltzoff and Moore (1997) proposed that
mimicry is a critical survival function which is acquired through natural
selection and stored in the genome. They believed that humans are born with
a tendency to mirror certain stimuli, or with foundational mechanisms that will
support mimicry response after minimal environmental input. In particular, they
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proposed that mimicry is based on an innate and specialized super-intermodal
mechanism through which visual input from observed actions is matched to
proprioceptive feedback from self-produced actions. This innate mechanism is
important for infants’ social learning and understanding.
The strongest support for nativist comes from the evidence that
human/monkey neonates can mimic a range of facial gestures (Meltzoff and
Moore, 1983; Ferrari et al., 2009). For example, Meltzoff and Moore (1977)
showed that very young infants, even one infant of only 42 min, displayed
facial mimicry (e.g. tongue protruding, mouth opening, pouting and sequential
finger movements). These authors argued that if infants are able to mimic
within hours or days of entering the world, their mimicry could not be based on
learning; if they can mimic a range of behaviours, the innate endowment must
be something more complex than a couple of reflexes. However, later meta-
analysis of all the evidence in favor of neonate mimicry came to the
conclusion that the only reliable mirroring effect across different studies and
different laboratories is tongue protrusion (Anisfeld, 1996). Recent research
even failed to find mimicry of tongue protrusion in infants (see a review from
Jones, 2009). Jones (2006) described how other arousal stimuli increased the
tongue protrusion response in very young infants, suggesting that tongue
protrusion may not be an effect of mimicry per se, but an arousal response of
oral exploration. Therefore, the weak evidence of neonate mimicry cannot
support a nativist account of mimicry.
Finally, a strong formulation of nativist account is also incompatible with
recent findings suggesting that mimicry is experience dependent, changing
both with development (Perra and Gattis, 2008) and with relatively brief
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training (Gillmeister, et al., 2008). I will present the evidence in a later section
(see 1.2.5 and 1.2.6)
Mimicry as a Strategic Communication Tool
That mimicry behaviour occurs unconsciously does not preclude it from
serving some higher functions. Nonverbal behaviour has long been thought to
serve a communicative function (e.g., Scheflen, 1964). For instance, Kraut
and Johnston (1979) found that people were more likely to smile in response
to happy situations when there was another person around than when alone,
which suggested that the smile served a communicative function. As a
nonverbal behaviour, mimicry has also been thought of as a communication
tool. Early theories suggest that mimicry is a way to ingratiate oneself to the
other person (Piaget, 1946) and communicates understanding and
togetherness between interaction partners (Bavelas et al., 1988; Bernieri,
1988; Condon and Ogston, 1966; Condon and Sander, 1974).
From an evolutionary perspective, it is not difficult to see that mimicry has
adaptive communicative value. First, as mentioned in the beginning of this
thesis, perception is the best guidance and control device of action (see 1.1.1).
The perception of the behaviours by other members of our species
communicate to us important features of the environment, such as the
presence of predators, prey, and potential mates (Chartrand et al., 2005). If
everyone is running away from a grizzly bear, it is not in one's best interest to
find the bear, analyse the situation and determine that it is dangerous, and
then run. Rather, upon seeing others run, running should come first,
automatically and immediately, and then analysing the situation should come.
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Therefore, coordination and mimicry have been argued to be necessary
prerequisites for social survival (Condon and Sander, 1974; Kendon, 1970).
Second, recent studies suggest that mimicry is a strategic communication
skill that helps people to get along with others. Group living has become the
most influential factor in one’s ability to survive and reproduce (Caporael and
Brewer, 1991). Anthropology suggests individuals who were able to maintain
successful harmonious relationships with others were at an evolutionary
advantage (Caporael, 1997, 2001a, 2001b). Because mimicry enhances liking,
affiliation and rapport between individuals (see 1.1.4), Lakin et al. (2003)
proposed that mimicry acts as a communication tool to help people affiliate
with others. They conducted two studies to test this idea.
First, Lakin and Chartrand (2003) examined whether people strategically
increase mimicry when they have a goal to affiliate with others. Participants
either had an unconscious affiliation goal, a conscious affiliation goal, or no
goal while watching a “live feed of another participant in the next room”
(actually a videotape of a confederate) who completed some tasks while
continuously touching her face. The researchers found that having a goal to
get along with someone, regardless of whether it was a conscious or a
unconscious goal, led to an increase in mimicry (i.e., more face touching). In a
second study, Lakin and Chartrand found that participants who had a goal to
affiliate but failed to accomplish their goal were more likely to mimic another
person in a subsequent task. This finding further demonstrates that people
use mimicry as a strategy for affiliation (i.e., a means to an end), rather than
simply an expressive display.
In another study, Lakin et al (2008) examined whether people
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strategically increase mimicry when social relations collapse. Half of the
participants experienced social ostracism by playing the ‘Cyberball’ game (see
1.1.6 for detail) while half did not. The results suggested that those who
experienced ostracism showed more mimicry in a following social interaction
than those who did not experience. Over and Carpenter (2009a) replicated
this results in children and further suggested that the mere hint of ostracism
enhances mimicry. In their study, children first watched a cartoon where a
character was ostracized by others and then interacted with a human model.
Results suggest that this third-party ostracism was sufficient to increase
children’s mimicry towards the human model. These findings suggest that
people increase their mimicry when they sense a hint of disharmony, which
supports mimicry as a strategy to keep oneself affiliated with others.
It is important to note here that the ‘strategic nature’ of mimicry means
that people implement mimicry as an intervention to change the social world
for self-advancement. It assumes that if I mimic Anna, she unconsciously
detects the mimicry and changes her attitude towards me. Thus, I can use
mimicry as a tool to make Anna like me, and will do this more if ‘Anna liking
me’ is to my social advantage. From this point of view, the word ‘strategic’ no
longer refers to any conscious decision-making process, but only describes
that mimicry is driven by its affiliative consequence.
In summary, substantial evidence suggests that mimicry acts as a
strategic communication tool. People increase mimicry when they want to
affiliate with others (e.g. an affiliation goal) or they have to affiliate with others
(e.g. social ostracism). This function has evolutionary roots because mimicry
facilitates coordinate and affiliate in group living, which increases individuals’
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survival rate. Therefore, it has been suggested that mimicry is like a weapon
in people’s unconscious arsenals, a tool in their behavioural repertoire used to
keep successful relationships with others (Lakin et al., 2003).
1.1.7 Summary of Behavioural Mimicry Research in
Social Psychology
Until now, we have reviewed the research of behavioural mimicry in social
psychology. Past research used naturalistic paradigms to investigate what,
how and why people mimic. Specifically, a large battery of studies
demonstrated that people unconsciously copy the body movements, facial
expressions, speech style of the interaction partner and this behavioural
mimicry is grounded on a primitive close link between perception and
behaviour. Research on the consequences and modulators of behavioural
mimicry suggests that mimicry has positive social impacts on both mimickers
and mimickers. It enhances liking and rapport between interaction partners
and increases mimickee’s general prosocial orientation. Although behavioural
mimicry is spontaneous and unconscious, it is sensitive to social contexts and
can be modulated by a series of characteristics from the mimicker (e.g.
prosociality, belongingness and mood) and the mimickee (e.g. likeability,
membership and social status) (Figure 1-1). Theories of why people mimic
suggest that mimicry functions as a strategic communicative tool to maintain a
successful interpersonal relationship with others.
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Figure 1-1. The consequences and modulators of behavioural
mimicry (modified from Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009)
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1.2 Mimicry in Cognitive Neuroscience
Different from above-mentioned studies in social psychology that focuses
on the visible mimicry behaviour during interactions, research in cognitive
neuroscience primarily investigate the underlying mechanism of mimicry. This
perspective can date back to Descartes’ time where scientists and
philosophers debated on the origin of action (Descartes, 1664). Also, William
James discussed about the relationship between perception and action and
claimed that ‘every mental representation of a movement awakens to some
degree that actual movement which is its object’ (James, 1890). In
contemporary cognitive neuroscience, researchers use a series of cognitive-
behavioural, neurophysiological and neuroimaging techniques to study
mimicry, thus a variety of names have been given to describe one’s tendency
to mimic, including ‘motor priming’ (Liepelt et al., 2008), ‘social mirroring’
(Iacoboni, 2005) and ‘automatic imitation’(Heyes, 2011). In this thesis, I will
use a more general term ‘mimicry effect’ to describe this tendency.
Here in the second half of the introduction chapter, I will present an
overview of studies that investigated the mechanism of mimicry in cognitive
neuroscience. I will first introduce the findings that point to a tight interplay of
perception and action (see 1.2.2) and the evidence that supports the
existence of mimicry effect (see 1.2.3). Then I will provide findings showing
that mimicry has impacts to other cognitive functions (see 1.2.4) and it can be
flexibly modulated by other cognitive factors (see 1.2.5). Finally, I will outline
theories and empirical studies which address how the mimicry effect happens
in the cognitive and neural level.
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1.2.1 Methodologies
Different from studies in social psychology where researchers use natural
paradigms to investigate human social behaviour, cognitive psychologists use
several simple but reaction-time based stimulus-response compatibility (SRC)
paradigms to investigate action and perception. In most SRC paradigms,
action comes about as re-actions to certain stimuli, and they do so by virtue of
assignment rules as fixed in the experimental instructions. For example, in the
famous ‘Simon effect’ task, participants are instructed to respond to a green
object by pressing a left key and to a red object by pressing a right key. In
each trial, the objects would be randomized presented either at the left side or
the right side of the screen. Results suggest a substantial spatial compatibility
effect between action and perception, where responses are usually faster and
more accurate when the stimulus occurs in the same relative location as the
response (e.g. green object presented on the left side), even if the stimulus
location is irrelevant to the task (Simon 1990; Hommel and Prinz, 1997).
Two special types of stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) paradigm
have been widely used to measure mimicry in cognitive neuroscience: action
selection paradigm (e.g. the ‘finger tapping task’) (Brass et al., 2000, 2005;
Bertenthal et al., 2006) and action initiation paradigm (e.g. the ‘hand
opening/closing task’) (Heyes et al., 2005; Press et al., 2008) (see 1.2.3).
Different from the ‘Simon effect’ task where compatibility is based on spatial
location, these two paradigms use action congruency as the compatibility
dimension: they set photos or videos of hand/finger movements as stimuli and
require participants to perform congruent/incongruent movement as response.
For example, in the ‘finger tapping task’ where action selection paradigm was
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adopted (Brass et al. 2000) (Figure 1-2), participants were instructed to select
a finger to press in response to a cue appeared in a box (+: index finger, x:
middle finger) while viewing incongruent or congruent finger movements
around the box. In congruent trials, the hand in the video frame executed an
identical finger movement to the selected movement (e.g. ‘+’ appeared while
the index finger was moving in the video), while in incongruent trials the
movement executed by the hand on the screen was different from the
selected movement (e.g. ‘X’ appeared while the index finger was moving in
the video) (Figure 1-2). In baseline trials, the hand on the screen did not
perform any hand movement, left only the cue appearing. Participants were
asked to respond to the cue as quickly as possible and to disregard the
moving finger in the background. Because in congruent trials participants
were facilitated by the mimicry of observed action and in incongruent trials
participants had to enforce the intended action against the mimicry of
observed action, mimicry is measured by calculating the reaction time
difference between congruent trials and incongruent trials (Brass et al., 2000)
Figure 1-2. Illustration of the ‘Finger tapping task’ used by Brass et al.
(2000). In each trial, participants have to press a button by using
either index finger or middle finger in response to a symbolic cue (+ :
index; X: middle), while observing a congruent or incongruent finger
movements around the symbolic cue.
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The action initiation paradigm adopts a similar way to measure mimicry,
but pre-specifies the response of each block. In the ‘hand opening/closing
task’ created by Heyes et al. (2005) (Figure 1-3), participants were required to
make the same pre-specified response (to open or close their right hand) in
every trial of a block, as quickly as possible after the hand in video clips began
to move. On some trials, the stimulus hand opened and on others it closed.
Therefore, within a block, the hand movement stimulus was either the same
as the pre-specified response (congruent trials, e.g. close stimulus and close
response) or the opposite of the pre-specified response (incongruent trials,
e.g. open stimulus and close response) (Figure 1-3). Participants’ response
movement direction was orthogonal to stimulus movement direction (to avoid
spatial compatibility confounds, see why in 1.2.3) and were instructed to
respond as quickly as possible in all trials.). Again, mimicry is measured by
calculating the reaction time difference between congruent trials and
incongruent trials (Heyes et al., 2005).
Five pairs of action types other than index/middle finger tapping and hand
opening/closing have also been used in these two paradigms: power/precision
grip (Chong et al., 2009), index finger lifting/tapping (Brass et al., 2001a),
index/little finger abduction (Catmur and Heyes, 2011), mouth opening/closing
(Leighton and Heyes, 2010), hand/mouth movement (Leighton and Heyes,
2010). In the experimental chapters of this thesis, we adopted the ‘finger
tapping task’ and ‘hand opening/closing task’ to measure mimicry.
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Figure 1-3. Illustration of the ‘hand opening/closing task’ used by
Heyes et al. (2005). In the beginning of each trial, participants have
to keep a neutral hand position. As soon as the hand in the video
starts to move, participants are required to perform a pre-specified
hand movement (hand open or hand close) as quickly as possible.
The pre-specified reponse could either be congruent or incongruent
with the observed action.
1.2.2 Perception-Action Link
For a long time, perception and action have been considered as
separated and peripheral processes. For example, influenced by the
developments in the computer sciences of the 1950s, traditional approaches
within the field of cognitive science views the mind as an analogy of computer,
which is a symbol manipulator. It usually has three units: perception, cognition
and action. Perception involves the translation of physical stimuli into symbolic
representations. Once stimuli are perceived, cognition unit can integrate and
analyze them for decision-making or store them in memory as symbolic codes.
If the decision involves physical response, then these symbolic codes would
be passed on to the motor system for action generation. Therefore, perception
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and action are two isolated processes and action execution is merely one
option of cognition. Perception and cognition drive action, but action does not
influence perception and cognition.
Recent developments cast doubt on the feasibility of this approach as a
general framework for understanding human mind. Substantial evidence in
cognitive psychology suggests that perception and action are inseparable.
Here I will review two lines of research supporting this close link: first, action
planning and control can modulate perception (‘action modulates perception’);
second, mere perception of an action would affect the way in which an
observer plans or executes actions which resemble the observed action
(‘perception modulates action’).
Action modulates perception
Blindness effect for response compatible stimuli. Musseler and
colleagues conducted several studies where they explicitly addressed the
question of whether planning an action modulates the concurrent perception
of events in the environment (Musseler and Hommel, 1997; Musseler et al.,
2000). In their studies, participants were first presented an arrow cue (arrow 1)
indicating which key they had to press (e.g. when seeing a left pointing arrow
they had to press a left key and when seeing a right pointing arrow they had to
press a right key). However, instead of immediately executing the left or right
key press, they had to press both the left and right key simultaneously (double
key press) to initiate the response time recording. The double key press would
immediately initiate a presentation of a left or right pointing arrow (arrow 2),
which was masked immediately afterwards. The participants’ task was first to
carry out the key press they had planned in advance (in response to arrow 1)
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as fast as possible, and then to identify the direction of the arrow 2 as
accurately as possible (without time pressure). Results showed that the
identification rates for the arrow 2 were lower when the planned action (arrow
1) and the masked stimulus (arrow 2) were the same direction. For example,
arrows pointing to the right were often less correctly identified while planning a
right action than while planning a left action. The authors suggest that this
disadvantage is due to the fact that event representations that are currently
needed in order to plan an action are shielded from further perceptual input
(Musseler et al., 2000).
Weight judgement. Hamilton et al. (2004) investigated whether actually
performing an action influences the concurrent perception of an observed
action. Participants were asked to judge the weight of a box lifted by an actor
while either lifting or passively holding a light or heavy box. They found that
holding a box systematically biases observers’ judgments of the weight of a
box lifted by another person. For example, if an observer holds a light box
while judging the weight of a box lifted by another person, the observer judges
the other’s box to be heavier, and vice versa when the observer holds a heavy
box. Similar to Musseler et al (2000)’s explanation for the blindness effect for
response compatible stimuli, the authors interpreted the results in terms of a
functional overlap between perception and action systems where this overlap
could not contribute to both the action task and perceptual task simultaneously,
so participants who are lifting a heavy box will shield from a judgment of heavy
weight and participants who are lifting a light box will shield from a judgment of
light weight.
Ambiguous motion display. Wohlschlager (2000) conducted a study
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that convincingly demonstrates that action modulates perception. In his
experiments, participants observed an ambiguous motion display. The display
consisted of a number of disks in a circular arrangement which were shifted
by a constant angle about 6 times/s. When this display is observed under
neutral conditions, one would get an impression that the disks could move
either in a clockwise or a counterclockwise manner. In other words, the
movement direction experienced in the display is ambiguous. In the first
experiment, Wohlschlager instructed participants to rotate a knob clockwise or
counterclockwise in the same plane as the motion display. The motion display
came on as soon as they started their movement. As expected, the movement
direction clearly affected the perceived direction of the ambiguous motion. For
example, when the participants rotated the knob in a clockwise direction, the
ambiguous motion display was more often perceived as rotating clockwise.
A following experiment further demonstrates that it is not necessary
actually to execute a movement to obtain such effects. Participants were
asked to either plan a clockwise or counterclockwise movement before the
ambiguous motion display came on and to carry out the movement only after
reporting the perceived direction of the ambiguous motion. The results were
basically the same as for the experiment in which the participants concurrently
carried out a movement. For example, when they planned a clockwise
movement they were more likely to perceive a clockwise movement in the
ambiguous motion display. These results provide clear support for the claim
that action and perception are inseparable.
Perception modulates action
Action induction. Action induction refers to the phenomenon that the
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mere observation of others’ actions can spontaneously induce actions on the
part of the observer. It is often referred in the literature as ‘ideomotor
movements’ (Prinz, 1987). For example, when watching an actor in a film who
walks along the edge of a plunging precipice, people are often unable to sit
still and watch quietly. They will move their legs and their arms or displace
their body weight from one side to the other.
Action induction used to be understood as a result of mimicry: when the
actor bends toward a precipice on the right, people in the audience would also
incline to bends toward right (Carpenter 1874; James, 1890). However, recent
studies suggest that action induction results from intentional induction (Knuf et
al. 2001; de Maeght and Prinz, 2004). They claimed that people realize (or
fulfill) what they would like to see happening in the scene through their
induced movements. Therefore, in the film example they would predict that
when the actor bends towards a precipice on the right, people in the audience
should bend to the left (to avoid falling down). Although it is still controversial
whether action induction is based on a mimicry or an intentional assumption,
the phenomenon per se suggests that perception can profoundly influence the
observer’s action.
Interference by human movements. Kilner and his colleagues (2003)
conducted a study where they found a strong interference effect of observed
human movements on action. Participants made vertical or horizontal
sinusoidal movements with their right arm while observing either a robot or an
actor making congruent (same direction) or incongruent (tangential direction)
sinusoidal arm movements. Variance in the executed movement was
measured as an index of interference to the movement. The results
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demonstrate a significant interference effect on executed movements when
observing an actor making incongruent movements, whereas no such
interference effect occurred when subjects observed a robotic arm making
incongruent movements. These results suggest that observing an action
made by a human, but not by a robot, interferes with executed actions.
1.2.3 Evidence of Mimicry Effect
The last section reviewed studies suggesting that action and perception
are intrinsically linked. However, the direct evidence of mimicry effect comes
from two special biological effects—Fadiga’s effect in motor evoked potentials
(MEPs) and Congruency Effect (CE) in action initiation and selection.
Fadiga’s effect in MEPs
The first demonstration of mimicry effect comes from the “mirror” MEPs
elicited during action observation by Fadiga and his colleagues (1995;
Strafella and Paus, 2000). They applied transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) to the primary motor cortex during passive action observation and
found that the amplitude of the MEPs, as evoked by TMS, was specifically
and significantly modulated by the observed actions. The MEPs recorded from
the muscles required to execute that action is greater than the amplitude of
the MEPs recorded from task-irrelevant muscles. For example, observing
handwriting and arm movement stimuli selectively facilitated the amplitude of
MEPs recorded from the first dorsal interosseus (responsible for handwriting
movements) and biceps brachii (responsible for arm movements), respectively
(Strafella and Paus, 2000). Therefore, the Fadiga’s effect suggests that the
passive observation of actions may activate associated motor representations.
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CE in action selection and initiation
Sturmer et al. (2000) is one of the earliest studies to investigate whether
selecting a simple hand movement is affected by the concurrent perception of
a related finger action. In their study, participants observed one of two hand
movements after a neutral starting posture hand been displayed: either the
fingers were extended to spread the hand apart or the fingers were flexed to
form a grasping movement. With the onset of the movement a color cue was
superimposed on the hand observed. Participants were instructed to perform
a spreading action or a grasping action with their right hand in response to the
color cue. For instance, they performed the spreading action when the color
cue was red and the grasping action when the color cue was blue. Thus the
hand action observed was completely irrelevant for selecting the action to be
performed. Nevertheless, the authors observed substantial CE between the
observed irrelevant hand action and the hand action to be performed. For
example, when participants were instructed to perform a spreading action in
response to a red color cue, they selected the action faster when the
observed hand also performed a spreading action. This CE on action
selection was later replicated in the finger tapping tasks by Brass et al (2000)
(see 1.2.1).
Brass et al. (2001b) investigated whether initiating a simple finger action
is affected by the concurrent perception of a related finger action. They
adopted an action initiation paradigm similar to the ‘hand opening/closing task’
(see 1.2.1), but used index finger lifting/tapping as action type. In each trial of
their study, participants observed one of two stimulus sequences in random
order. Both started with a static picture of a hand where the index finger was
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at the center. After a variable and therefore unpredictable amount of time, the
finger started moving upward in one sequence or downward in the other
sequence. Participants were instructed to move their own index finger either
upward or downward as soon as the observed finger started moving.
Importantly, during a given block of trials the movement conducted by the
participant remained the same. In other words, participants would see a
randomized sequence of up and down movements of an index finger, but they
always carried out the same action (e.g. moved their index finger downward).
Accordingly, the action to be performed was pre-specified throughout, and the
identity of the triggering stimulus (moving up versus down) was completely
irrelevant. The question was whether the irrelevant stimulus gesture would still
affect the time needed to initiate the action.
The results demonstrated that it took the participants longer to initiate a
simple action when the observed action had a different direction than the
observed one had the same direction. For example, upward movements were
initiated slower when triggered by downward-moving stimulus gestures, and
downward movements were initiated slower when triggered by upward-
moving stimuli. This pattern of results was in nature different from the CE on
‘Simon effect’ task or the effect on action selection tasks I just discussed,
because participants in those tasks need to select between two different
actions. Hence the most surprising aspect of the study by Brass et al., (2001b)
is that a CE was observed for a simple and completely pre-specified action.
These results provide strong evidence of the existence of mimicry effect that
contributes to the CE; otherwise, the time it takes to initiate a simple action
should not be affected by the action observed.
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The CE on action initiation and selection has been reported in several
many effector systems, including finger movements (Brass et al., 2000, 2001b;
Catmur et al., 2007; Catmur and Heyes, 2011), whole hand gestures (Sturmer
et al. 2000; Heyes et al, 2005), mouth movements (Leighton and Heyes,
2010), and facial expressions (Dimberg et al, 2002). The effects happen to
both transitive (object-directed) actions (e.g., Brass et al., 2001a) and
intransitive actions (e.g., Press et al, 2008) and can be dissociated from the
spatial compatibility seen on ‘Simon effect’ task. For example, a recent review
by Heyes (2011) presented seven mimicry studies where left-right, up-down,
and/or orthogonal spatial compatibility have been controlled. These studies
provided clear evidence that the CE on action initiation and selection are
mainly contributed by mimicry effect, but not solely to spatial compatibility.
1.2.4 Impacts of Mimicry Effect on other Cognition
Mimicry effect has been suggested as a reflection of ‘embodied
simulation’ (Gallese, 2009). It claims that mimicry directly bridges other’s
behaviour with one’s own and facilitates the understanding of perceived
behaviour. Researcher have attempted to link mimicry to a wide variety of
social functions, such as action understanding, theory of mind, empathy and
language comprehension; however sparse evidence has been found. Here I
will only review some solid evidence of the impacts of mimicry effect in
emotion recognition and person perception.
Emotion Recognition. Traditional embodied cognition theory
suggests that mimicry contributes to the recognition of affect experienced by
others (Barsalou et al., 2003; Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2010;
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Gallese, 2009). Specifically, by mimicking another’s emotional expression,
one experiences the corresponding emotions him-or herself (i.e., experiences
empathy), which in turn facilitates instantaneous emotion recognition.
Oberman et al. (2007) and Stel and van Knippenberg (2008) used a similar
paradigm to test this idea. Participants in their studies were asked to indicate
quickly and accurately whether briefly displayed facial emotions were positive
or negative. The emotions were shown on a computer screen for a short (but
not subliminal) amount of time. While doing this task, half of the participants
had facial constraints (e.g. clench teeth) that prevented them from engaging in
natural mimicry. Results revealed that when participants were constrained and
could not mimic, the speed of their recognition of affective valence was
slowed down. These studies suggest that mimicry plays an important role in
understanding the emotions of others; it facilitates the speed of affect
recognition.
Person Perception. Coordinated behaviours are essential
components of social interaction. Macrae et al., (2008) hypothesized that this
synchronization of movements during a dyadic interaction may prompt
increased attention to be directed to an interaction partner, hence facilitate the
cognitive process of person perception. To test this, they asked participants to
make hand movements (hand-up-hand-down) in response to the beat of a
metronome. Participants were told that they should only concentrate on
moving in time with the metronome and ignore any distractions from the
experimenter where the experiment would either synchronized her right hand
movements with those of the participant (i.e., participant hand-up,
experimenter hand-up) or de-synchronized the movements (i.e., participant
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hand-up, experimenter hand-down). The experimenter would also utter a
series of potentially distracting words during the hand movements. When the
task was over, the experimenter left the room and participants were tested on
some incidental memories of the previous experimenter’s behaviour. The
results showed that when the experimenter provided synchronized
movements with the participant, participants demonstrated enhanced memory
for the experimenter’s utterances and facial appearance. This suggests that
synchronized behaviour enhances the acquisition of person knowledge.
1.2.5 Cognitive Modulators of Mimicry Effect
As a direct link between action and perception, mimicry is vulnerable to
factors that can affect either perceptual processes or motor processes. These
factors include arousal, attention, animacy and sensorimotor experience.
Arousal. Fujimura et al. (2010) investigated the effect of facial
expression arousal level on facial mimicry. High- and low-arousal facial
expressions indicating pleasant and unpleasant emotions were presented to
participants where their facial electromyographic (EMG) reactions were
recorded from the zyogmatic major (key muscle for pleasant expression) and
corrugators supercilii muscles (key muscle for unpleasant expression).
Results showed that stronger zygomatic major muscle activity was evoked for
high- compared to low-arousal pleasant expressions; but for unpleasant
expression, comparable activity was induced in the corrugators supercilii
muscle in response to both high- and low-arousal level. These results suggest
that the arousal levels of pleasant, but not unpleasant, facial expressions can
enhance facial mimicry.
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Attention. Early research suggests that natural imitation behaviour can
be induced by joint attention in monkeys (Kumashiro et al., 2003, 2008).
Chong et al. (2009) examined the effect of selective attention on mimicry. In
their experiment, participants were presented with go/no go stimuli consisting
of a color cue (red or blue) or a hand movement cue (a power or precision
grip). They had to perform a hand movement (a power or precision grip) as
soon as they saw the cue. There was a congruent effect when participants
were instructed to use stimulus grip as the go-no go signal, simply because
participants mimic the observed congruent/incongruent movement. However,
when participants were instructed to use color cue as the go/no signal, the
congruency effect disappeared. This finding demonstrates the importance of
selective mechanism in the limiting the mimicry of irrelevant observed actions.
Animacy. Several studies suggested that mimicry can be modulated by
high-level cognitive processes, such as the animacy of a movement (Liepelt
and Brass, 2010; Longo and Bertenthal, 2009; Longo et al., 2008; Press et al.,
2007). They claimed that mimicry has a biological bias toward the perception
of intentional agents and pointing one’s attention to the animacy of a
movement (whether the movement is performed by human or the movement
is ‘artificial’, ’robotic’, ’biomechanically impossible’) can modulate the mimicry
of that movement. For example, Press et al. (2007) found that compared to
robotic action stimuli (both natural and schematic), participants have a
stronger mimicry effect to human action stimuli. Longo et al. (2008) tested the
mimicry of observed finger actions while manipulating whether the movements
were biomechanically possible or impossible. When no mention was made of
this difference, comparable mimicry was induced from both possible and
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impossible actions. When attention was drawn to the difference of animacy,
however, only possible movements induced the mimicry effects. Similarly,
Longo and Bertenthal (2009) displayed both photographic and computer-
generated hand stimuli to each participant and instructed that some of the
stimuli were computer-generated. They found that the magnitude of mimicry
induced by the computer-generated stimuli was much smaller than by the
photographic stimuli; it was also smaller than the mimicry observed in another
group of participants who only saw computer-generated stimuli and were
never told about their origins.
Other animacy studies have shown that, even identical natural human
movement stimuli was presented, participants’ beliefs about the origin of those
stimuli or the efforts to execute the stimuli can modulate mimicry. For example,
Liepelt and Brass (2010) tested the magnitude of mimicry induced by finger
movements of a hand in a leather glove. Before running the experiment, they
presented either a human hand or a wooden analog hand wearing the leather
glove. They found that the group that believed the finger movement was
generated by a wooden hand showed a smaller magnitude of mimicry than
the group that believed they were observing human movements. In another
study examining beliefs about the efforts involved in making stimulus
movements, Liepelt et al. (2008) presented finger movements either inside an
open or a closed metal clamp. The design of finger movements in a closed
metal clamp aimed to give the impression that the hand tries hard to do the
finger movement against the clamp. Although only tiny movements were
visible in both conditions, they found a larger mimicry effect when finger
movements were presented inside a closed metal clamp. They argued that
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this finding, along with previous animacy studies, suggests that mimicry can
be top-down modulated by intentional attribution.
Sensorimotor Experience. Empiricist theories (see 1.1.6) have a
strong claim that mimicry comes from sensorimotor learning. Several studies
using a stimulus-response compatibility paradigm support this claim and
showed that sensorimotor experience can enhance, abolish and even reverse
mimicry. For example, Press et al.(2007) found the classic animacy effect on
mimicry in a pre-test where participants showed stronger mimicry to human
action stimuli than robotic action stimuli. However, twenty-four hours after a
relatively brief period of congruent sensorimotor training with the robotic action
stimuli—where participants responded to robot hand-opening stimuli by
opening their hands and to robot hand-closing stimuli by closing their hands—
the animacy bias in the pre-test was abolished and the robotic action stimuli
elicited as much mimicry as the human action stimuli. In a complementary
way, Heyes et al. (2005) showed that incongruent sensorimotor training with
human stimuli—in which participants responded to human hand opening by
closing their hands and to human hand closing by opening their hands—
abolished mimicry effects. Twenty-four hours after training of this kind,
responding in incongruent trials was as fast as responding in congruent trials.
Similarly, Catmur et al. (2007) showed that, in the case of little- and index-
finger abduction movements, incompatible sensorimotor experience can
reverse mimicry effects, producing a systematic, involuntary tendency to
counter-mimic the observed action.
It important to note that in all of the above-mentioned training studies,
participants were exposed to and executed each stimulus action (e.g. hand
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open/close) equally often during congruent (e.g. open stimulus—open
response) and incongruent (e.g. open stimulus—close response) training. The
fact that only incongruent training abolished or reversed mimicry effects
provides the solid evidence that it is the sensorimotor experience—not
sensory experience or motor experience—that modulates mimicry.
1.2.6 Theories of Mimicry Effect
Although mimicry has been investigated for decades, the underlying
mechanism is still poorly understood. In this section, I will review five popular
theories of mimicry effect in cognitive neuroscience. Although these theories
are grounded on different empirical evidence from behavioural,
neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies, they all aim to address how
information is processed in the brain during mimicry.
Sensorimotor theory
The first framework is ‘sensorimotor theory’, which can be traced back to
Descartes’ analysis of the relationship between action and perception
(Descartes, 1664). Basically, this theory proposed that human actions must be
understood as responses to the external stimulation. In other words, it treats
actions as re-actions, that is, as responses triggered by stimuli. For example,
Gibson proposed a notion of “affordances” where the environment stimuli
directly suggest the appropriate behavioural response to them – the grilled
lobster says “eat me” and the cold glass of beer says “drink me” (Gibson,
1979; McArthur and Baron, 1983). In sensorimoter framework, action and
perception have independent representational formats: perceptual
representations code patterns of stimulations in the sense organs and certain
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properties that are derived from these patterns whereas action
representations represent patterns of excitations in muscles or certain
regularities occurring in these patterns. External stimuli must be translated
into motor responses by arbitrary stimulus -response mapping mechanisms,
or called S-R bonds (e.g. Skinner, 1938; Watson, 1913).
The sensorimotor perspectives on action and perception used to be
predominant in both modern physiology and cognitive sciences. It helped to
found a number of experimental methodologies such as reaction time
measurement (Helmholtz, 1852; Donders, 1862) and behaviourist programme
(Watson, 1913; Hull, 1943). However, this perspective has several limitations.
First, it cannot explain the process of voluntary actions where the external
stimuli can be reduced into its least form (Lotze, 1852). Second, these
“affordance ”responses to stimuli are not imitations of the perceived event but
are stamped in as a habit based on one’s past reinforcement history. Third,
the sensorimotor framework introduces another fundamental question to
mimicry, known as ‘correspondence problem’: how is the sensory input from
somebody else’s action transformed into a matching motor output by the
mimicker (Brass and Heyes, 2005; Nehaniv and Dautenhahn 2002)?
Ideomotor theory
The second view on action is ‘ideomotor theory’, which mainly postulates
that actions are caused by intentions (Greenwald, 1970, 1972). Its origin can
date back to William Carpenter and William James more than hundred years
ago with the argument that thinking about an action is sufficient to lead to the
performance of that action (Carpenter, 1874; James, 1890; Wegner, 2002).
Unlike sensorimotor views, ideomotor views stress the role of internal
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(volitional) causes of action and disregard the role of external (sensory)
causes. On this view, actions are considered creations of the will—events that
come into being by virtue of the fact that people pursue goals and entertain
intentions to realize them. The evidence on which ideomotor theories are
grounded does not come from stimulus-constrained reaction tasks but rather
from more open situations where individuals pursue certain goals and from
time to time, perform certain actions in an attempt to approach, or achieve
them, such as action induction (Prinz, 1990, 1997, Hommel et al., 2001; see
1.2.2).
The core assumption of ideomotor theory could be called the goal-trigger
hypothesis. It holds that goal representations, which are perceptual
anticipations of action effects, play a crucial role in action control. Actions are
represented neither in terms of stimuli nor responses but in terms of the
perceptual consequences. This point of view significantly advances people’s
understanding of action and perception and provides an attractive answer to
the question of how voluntary actions are prompted and guided through
internally generated anticipations of the perceptual consequences of an action.
However, the traditional ideomotor theory emphasizes too much on the
internal, voluntary part of actions but neglects the influences from the external
environment. It sets up the link between cognition (goal or planning) and
action, but not exactly the link between perception and action. It also has
limitations in explaining how human unconscious and spontaneous behaviour
comes about.
Common coding theory
As mentioned above, the sensorimotor theory stresses the crucial role of
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perception on action and the ideomotor theory elaborates how actions are
represented and prompted by goals. However, neither of them can fully
explain the relationship between action and perception and the mechanism of
mimicry. Recently, Prinz (1990, 1997, 2002, 2005a, b) proposed a ‘common
coding theory’, which assumes a common representational format for
perception and action. This is a novel framework that blends elements from
the sensorimotor and the ideomotor stance. Specifically, it suggests that on
top of separate coding for action and perception, there are domains of
representation in which afferent and efferent information share the same
format and dimensionality of representation, and this shared representation is
the perceptual consequences of that action. As long as the perceptual
consequence is accessed, both the afferent and efferent part of the action can
be influenced. Such a claim suggests that observed and executed actions are
represented in a commensurate manner: seeing an event activates the action
associated with that event, and performing an action activates the associated
perceptual event. It also permits interference effects when action and
perception attempt to access the shared representations simultaneously.
Moreover, this claim predicts that action and perception can reciprocally
modulate each other: action planning and control can modulate perception
and perception can modulate action planning and control. These three
predictions have been supported by multiple studies (Knoblich and Prinz,
2005)
The common coding framework fundamentally solves the corresponding
problem of mimicry and makes translational processes between stimuli and
responses rather unnecessary. Since action and perception are commonly
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and commensurately represented, perceiving other’s movements
automatically activates the corresponding motor representations of one’s own.
It makes the process of mimicry a very simple story: perceiving is for doing.
However, where is the neural substrate of this shared representation in the
brain? The discovery of the mirror neurons tackles with this question.
Mirror Neuron theory
The remarkable discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys supports the
common coding theory and provides the first direct evidence that action
observation and action execution are commonly coded at the same neural
level. Mirror neurons are visuomotor neurons that fire both when an action is
performed, and when a similar or identical action is passively observed
(Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Mirror neurons were first identified using
microelectrode recordings of single neurons in area F5 of the monkey
premotor cortex (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et
al., 1996) and later also in the PF/PFG complex within the inferior parietal
cortex (Gallese et al., 2002; Fogassi et al., 1998; Fogassi and Luppino, 2005).
The function of mirror neurons in monkeys is believed to mediate the action
understanding (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). For example, a mirror neuron
which fires when the monkey rips a piece of paper would also fire when the
monkey sees a person rip paper, or hears paper ripping (auditory cues)
(Keysers et al. 2003). These properties have led researchers to believe that
mirror neurons encode abstract concepts of actions like 'ripping paper',
whether the action is performed by the observer itself or other monkeys.
It is not normally possible to study single neurons in the human brain, so
most evidence for mirror neurons in humans is indirect (see an exception of a
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recent single-neuron recording study by Mukamel et al., 2010). Brain imaging
experiments using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have shown
that the human inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and superior parietal lobe is active
when the person performs an action and also when the person sees another
individual performing an action. Because these two regions are homologue of
monkey area F5 and PF/PFG in anatomy, they are believed to contain mirror
neurons and defined as the human mirror neuron system (MNS) (Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004). However, more recent experiments have shown that
the regions with mirroring property are present in various cortical areas,
including superior temporal sulcus, human Broca’s area, supplementary motor
areas, primary somatosensory cortex, insula and anterior cingulate cortex
(Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro, 2008).
The function of the human MNS is a subject of much speculation. Many
researchers consider that this system may be important for understanding the
actions of other people, and for learning new skills by imitation (Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004). Some researchers also speculate that mirror systems may
simulate observed actions, and thus contribute to theory of mind skills
(Gallese and Goldman, 1998) while others relate mirror neurons to language
abilities (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998). It has also been proposed that problems
with the mirror system may underlie social function disorders, particularly
autism (Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006; Ramachandran and Oberman, 2006;
Williams, et al., 2001). However, except for action understanding and imitation
(Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), the connections between MNS and other
social functions are tentative.
The discovery of mirror neurons not only provides a physiological
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mechanism that action observation and action execution are coded at the
same neural level, but also support other claims of common coding theory.
For example, common coding theory suggests that the shared representation
is coded by action’s perceptual consequences, which includes kinematics,
targets and physical outcomes of an action. Neuroimaging studies support this
coding principle on MNS. By using an elegant repetition suppression
paradigm, Hamilton and Grafton (2006, 2007, 2008) demonstrated that MNS
specifically codes the kinematics, targets and physical outcomes of an action.
For example, they found that the anterior intraparietal sulcus, part of the
parietal node of the MNS, codes the targets of an action (e.g. taking a cookie
or a disk) (Hamilton and Grafton, 2006); inferior frontal gyrus codes the
kinematics of an action (e.g. a precision grip or a power grip) (Hamilton and
Grafton, 2007) and both frontal and parietal nodes code the physical outcome
of an action (e.g. open or close a box) (Hamilton and Grafton, 2008).
In summary, the studies of mirror neurons in both monkeys and humans
suggest that action observation and execution are commonly coded in the
neural level, and the coder is the perceptual consequences of that action.
However, several important questions regarding development arise: are action
observation and execution commonly coded from the birth? Where do mirror
neurons come from? Are we born to have mirror neurons? Associative
sequence learning theory (ASL) suggests not.
Associative Sequence Learning theory
ASL theory explains the origin of the common coding framework, how
mirror neurons are able to match observed and performed actions, and how
individuals are able to mimic others’ actions. It was proposed by Cecilia Heyes
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(2001, 2010) and emphasizes the importance of learning and experience in
generating the potential for mimicry.
As I mentioned in section 1.1.6, nativists believe that mimicry and its
underlying mechanism (i.e. mirror neurons) have important survival value and
social function; therefore they are innate and stored in the species’ genome.
As one of the famous empiricist theories, the ASL theory suggests that
mimicry and mirroring mechanism are not evolutionarily selected for a specific
function; instead it is a byproduct of the operation of domain-general
associative learning, the same mechanisms that produce Pavlovian
conditioning (Heyes, 2001; Bird and Heyes, 2005). Specifically, it claims that
associations between sensory and motor representations are acquired
through correlated sensorimotor experience—concurrent observation and
execution of the same actions (with contiguity and contingency, see Cook et
al., 2010). For example, when an individual is clenching his fist, the activation
of the motor representation (the motor plan to clench fist) is always paired with
the corresponding perceptual representation (the sight of a closed fist). The
ASL theory proposes that, over time, a bidirectional associative link is formed
such that activation of one representation excites the other (Heyes, 2010).
The above example illustrates the sensorimotor experience in a self-
observation fashion. However, this does not apply to the development of
sensorimotor associations for so-called ‘perceptually opaque’ actions such as
facial expressions and whole body actions (e.g. dancing), because these
opaque actions cannot be fully observed by self. The ASL theory proposes
three other sources of sensorimotor experience to account for the emergence
of associations for opaque actions: experience of using optical mirror
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reflections, the experience of being imitated by others, and synchronous
activities involved in sports and dance training (Ray and Heyes, 2010). For
example, when an individual is taking a dancing class in front of a large gym
mirror, she can see her own body movements either from the mirror or from
synchronous movements performed by her classmates. Consequently, the
motor representation of a dance is paired with the corresponding sensory
representation (the sight of the dance from the mirror or others).
The most important characteristic of the ASL model is its emphasis on the
uniqueness of sensorimotor experience to the formation of mirror neurons and
mimicry (Heyes, 2010). It suggests that the only way that can create and
influence the association between a sensory and a motor representation of
action is through the correlated sensorimotor experience. Once the
association is established, activation of the sensory component inevitably
results in activation of the motor component (Heyes and Bird, 2007). This
automaticity of sensorimotor mapping cannot be changed by any other
cognitive processes except sensorimotor experiences. This means that if
mimicry is modulated by a factor other than sensorimotor experiences, the
modulation must not be mediated by directly interfering with the propagation
of activation from the sensory to the motor component of a vertical association;
modulation of mimicry is only allowed to be mediated by either influencing the
sensory component or the motor component of a vertical association (Catmur
et al., 2009).
The ASL theory gains strong empirical support from data showing that the
magnitude of mimicry and the neural activation of mimicry can be changed
and even reversed by sensorimotor training (see 1.2.6). Moreover, the theory
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is compatible with evidence suggesting that the neural activations of mimicry
are greater when an observer has more past sensorimotor experiences of that
action (Calvo-Merino et al. 2005; 2006). For example, Haslinger et al. (2005)
presented expert pianists and nonpianist controls with sequences of matched
finger movements either similar or dissimilar to piano playing. They found that
observation of the piano-related stimuli elicited a stronger fMRI response in
classical mirror areas (IFG and IPL) in the pianists, but not in the non-pianist
controls. Similarly, a stronger fMRI response was observed in classic MNS
areas when ballet experts observed ballet sequences, than when they viewed
matched non-ballet (i.e. capoeira) stimuli. The fact that mirror system
activation is sensitive to sensorimotor expertise provides a strong indication
that mimicry is acquired through learning.
1.2.7 Neural Mechanism of Mimicry
Neural Mechanism of Mimicry per se
Substantial evidence suggests that MNS is the neural mechanism of
mimicry (Rizzolatti, 2005). Several studies on neuropsychological patients
suggest that an intact MNS is essential to functional imitation. For example,
lesions to the left inferior parietal lobe often result in apraxia—a deficit in
miming gestures and in imitation (Wheaton and Hallett 2007). Lesions to the
inferior frontal cortex also result in imitation deficits (Goldenberg et al. 2007).
Interestingly, it seems that lesions to different parts of MNS can result in
different imitation deficiency. For example, imitation of finger movements was
impaired following lesions to the left IFG, while left inferior parietal lesions
resulted in impaired imitation of hand postures (Goldenberg and Karnath,
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2006). These findings suggest that MNS is critical to imitation.
As mimicry is a tendency to copy the observed actions, neuroimaging
research investigates the neural mechanism of mimicry by using an action
observation paradigm where participants passively observe photos or videos
of human movements. In an early fMRI study by Iacoboni et al. (1999),
participants were required to complete three tasks: observe finger movements
only (mimicry condition), or copy the finger movements they saw (intentionally
imitation condition), or perform pre-specified finger movements in response to
a simple spatial cue (action execution condition). The results showed that the
brain activity was stronger during mimicry and imitation conditions than during
the action execution conditions in three MNS relevant areas: the left IFG, the
right anterior parietal cortex and the right STS region (STS is the sensory
input of MNS; see Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Further experiments by
Koski et al. (2002) and Grezes et al. (2003) obtained similar results.
Nishitani and Hari (2000, 2002) conducted two MEG studies in which they
investigated mimicry of hand and lip movements. The first study confirmed the
importance of the left IFG in the mimicry of grasping actions. In the second
study, the authors asked volunteers to observe still pictures of verbal and
nonverbal (grimaces) lip forms (facial mimicry condition), to intentionally
imitate them immediately after having seen them (intentional imitation
condition), or to make lip forms in a self-paced manner (orofacial gesture
execution condition). They found that, during facial mimicry conditions, cortical
activation progressed from the occipital cortex to the superior temporal region,
the inferior parietal lobule, left IFG, and finally to the primary motor cortex. The
activation sequence during intentional imitation was the same as during
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mimicry. Instead, when the volunteers freely executed the lip forms (orofacial
gesture execution condition), only the premotor and motor cortex were
activated.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence for the MNS as the neural
mechanism of the mimicry effect comes from Catmur et al. (2008, 2009). In
one fMRI study, they required participants to do a sensorimotor training (see.
1.2.5. sensorimotor experience) and then used the hand opening/closing task
(see 1.2.1) to measure mimicry effect. Previous studies showed that certain
sensorimotor training can eliminate or even reverse the mimicry effect (Heyes
et al., 2005). They found when the mimicry effect was reversed by the training
tasks, the activity of MNS was also correlatively reversed by the training. In
another study, they examined whether virtual lesion to the MNS influences the
mimicry effect. They used a new rTMS protocol, continuous theta-burst
stimulation, to disrupt IFG functioning during a SRC task. The results showed
that theta-burst rTMS of the left IFG abolished the mimicry effect, suggesting
that the left IFG plays a causal role in mimicry. Therefore, these findings
provide direct evidence that MNS is the neural mechanism of mimicry effect.
Neural Mechanism of inhibition of Mimicry
To some degree, mimicry is a prepotent response tendency—observing an
action automatically and unintentionally triggers the tendency to execute that
action. However, since it is obvious that mimicry is not adaptive in many
everyday situations, the question that arises is how such tendency to mimicry
is prevented from leading to overt mimicry behaviour.
Early clinical observation suggests that the inhibition of inappropriate
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response tendencies is a function of the frontal lobes. Patients with frontal
lesions sometimes have difficulties in tasks involving inhibition of prepotent
responses, such as Stroop task and the go/no-go or stop-signal paradigm
(Luria, 1980; Vendrell, 1995). With regard to the inhibition of mimicry, Luria
(1980) devised a task in which patients were required to execute one action
(making a fist) in response to the observation of a different action (showing
the finger) and vice versa. He reported that patients with prefrontal lesions
show the so-called echopractic responses: they tended to mimic the observed
action while ignoring the verbal command. Such inability to inhibit mimicry
tendency following prefrontal lesions have also been reported in patients with
a syndrome called imitation behaviour (Lhermitte et al., 1986; De Renzi et al.,
1996). Patients showed overt imitative response tendencies, even when they
were told to stop imitating. However, which prefrontal lesions cause imitation
behaviour is still controversial.
Compared to the investigations of mimicry, not many fMRI studies have
been conductied on the inhibition of mimicry so far. For example, Brass et al.,
(2001a, 2005) used a finger tapping task in which subjects were instructed to
execute predefined finger movements (tapping or lifting of the index finger) in
response to an observed congruent or incongruent finger movement (tapping
or lifting). A comparison of brain activation in incongruent and congruent trials
revealed strong activation in two areas: medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and
temporal-parietal junction (TPJ). These two regions are different from the
systems responsible for the Stroop task (e.g. dorsolateral PFC, ACC), which
suggests that inhibition of mimicry is not related to classic cognitive control
(Brass et al., 2005).
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mPFC and TPJ are two brain regions strongly engaging in theory of mind
(ToM) tasks (Frith and Frith, 1999). Considering that ToM tasks require the
ability to focus on one’s own mental states while suppressing others’
(Gallagher et al., 2000), Brass et al. (2009) proposed that the inhibition of
mimicry involves processes for self-other distinction. They did several
behavioural studies to test this idea. In the first study, Spengler et al., (2010a)
implemented the ‘finger tapping task’ and the classic ToM tasks in both
healthy participants and neuropsychological patients with prefrontal lesions or
TPJ lesions, to examine whether there is a functional association between the
inhibition of imitation and self-other distinction. The results showed a highly
significant correlation between imitative control and the abilities to mental
attribution in both health participants and patient with lesions. In order to rule
out the possibility that the correlation is mediated by classic cognitive control,
all healthy participants and patients were required to complete the Stroop task.
Even after controlling for executive functions, the results remained significant,
indicating the functional specificity of this relationship. In a second study,
Spengler et al. (2010b) implemented the same experiment design on
individuals with autism, who were traditionally believed to have impairments of
self-other distinction. Similar to those patients with prefrontal or TPJ lesions,
the results suggest that the ability of mental attribution in individuals with
autism was positive correlated with their inhibition of mimicry: the worse
individuals with autism behaved in the ToM tasks, the less they were able to
inhibit their mimicry tendency. In a third study, Spengler et al. (2010c) directly
manipulated the processes for self-other distinction when healthy participants
were performing the finger-tapping task. In half of the blocks, participants were
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asked to do the task in a self-focus condition where two mirrors were placed
on each side of the monitor, so that participants could see their face and
upper part of the body reflected in the mirror. In the other half blocks, the
mirrors were turned around with the noon-reflective side facing the subjects
(no self-focus control condition). Results showed that comparing with no self-
focus condition, participants showed reduced mimicry during self-focus
conditions, which reflects an enhanced inhibition of mimicry. The findings in
these three studies suggest that inhibition of mimicry is associated with the
processes for self-other distinction.
1.2.8 Summary of Mimicry Research in Cognitive
Neuroscience
In the second half of the introduction chapter, we reviewed the research
of mimicry effect in cognitive neuroscience. Past research adopted SRC
paradigms to investigate the relationship between action and perception and
found that mimicry effect is based on a direct link from perception to action.
Mimicry effect has impacts on cognitive functions such as emotional
recognition and person perception, and can also be modulated by other
cognitive processes such as arousal, attention, animacy and sensorimotor
experience. Several theoretical frameworks have been proposed on the
mechanism of mimicry. The most popular one suggests that mimicry effect is
based on a common-coding principle between action and perception and
mirror neurons are the neural substrate of this principle. The ASL theory
further suggests that this common-coding principle is formed by associative
sequence learning from sensorimotor experience. Neuroimaging studies
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revealed that MNS is the neural substrate of mimicry effect whereas mPFC
and TPJ are the neural substrate of inhibition of mimicry (see Figure 1-4).
Figure 1-4. Neural Substrate of Mimicry and Inhibition of
Mimicry. Substantial neuroimaging evidence suggests that human
MNS is the neural substrate of mimicry. Mimicry tasks engage the
activations of inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), inferior parietal lobe (IPL)
and superior temporal sulcus (STS). In contrast, research suggests
that the inhibition of mimicry involves a different neural system, which
includes medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and temporal-parietal
junction (TPJ).
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1.3 Summary of Experimental Chapters
As reviewed, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience investigate
mimicry in different perspectives. They both have pros and cons in research
scopes and methodologies. Specifically, social psychology primarily examines
the visible mimicry behaviour and its changes according to social contexts, but
ignores the neural mechanism underlying this behavioral mimicry and its
modulations. In contrast, cognitive neuroscience mainly focuses on the
underlying mechanism of mimicry but ignore the social significance of mimicry
and its modulation by social factors. In methodologies, social psychology uses
naturalistic paradigms to study real ‘mimicry’, but poorly controls individual
differences and different variables in the contexts. Also, naturalistic paradigms
are not sensitive to rapid and temporary modulators. On the contrary,
cognitive neuroscience uses simple and well-controlled SRC paradigms to
measure the invisible mimicry tendency. Participants have to repetitively
perform simple movement in a context-constrained lab environment. This
setting forgets the fact that mimicry per se is a social behaviour.
The purpose of the PhD project is to investigate the control of mimicry by
social signals. It aims to examine how people mimic according to different
social signals and what is the neural mechanism of the control of mimicry. In
methodologies, this project integrates those pros in social psychology and
cognitive neuroscience, and introduces the well-controlled SRC paradigms in
a social context.
Specifically, the studies in this thesis aim to address the following five
questions:
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1) Can mimicry be rapidly modulated by critical social signals
such as eye gaze?
Chapter 2 shows that direct gaze rapidly and specifically enhances
mimicry.
2) Is the control of mimicry by eye gaze due to an attentional
effect?
Chapter 3 shows that the enhancement of mimicry by direct gaze is not
due to any non-social effects. Rather, it is the social cue of eye contact
itself that drives mimicry.
3) What is the neural mechanism of this control of mimicry by eye
gaze?
Chapter 4 shows that medial prefrontal cortex is the originator of this eye
contact effect on mimicry. It works with MNS to control mimicry according
social contexts.
4) Is mimicry in social contexts stimulus-driven or strategic-based?
Chapter 5 shows that mimicry in social contexts works in a Machiavellian
fashion. Social status and niceness strategically modulate mimicry.
5) How does social priming modulate mimicry?
Chapter 6 shows that self-relatedness plays an important role in the social
priming effect of mimicry.
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Chapter 2. Eye contact enhances mimicry
of intransitive hand movements
2.1 Abstract
When two people meet in a bar, a subtle interplay of social behaviours,
including eye contact and unconscious mimicry of actions plays an important
role in how much the individuals like each other by the end of the evening.
However, it is not known how these different social signals interact. In this
Chapter, we adopt a rapid SRC paradigm, to test if eye contact can modulate
mimicry on a second by second timescale. Two experiments consistently
show that direct gaze rapidly and specifically enhances mimicry of hand
actions and this effect is not due to spatial attention. These findings reflect the
flexibility and subtlety of mimicry in social contexts and have implications for
understanding the role of eye contact as a controlling signal in human
nonverbal social behaviour.
2.2 Introduction
Chapter 1 reviewed that human mimicry is an unconscious form of
imitation which facilitates social interaction. There is a close relationship
between mimicry and affiliation. Interactions with more mimicry lead to more
liking and affiliation (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999), while interactions with an
affiliation goal are characterized by more mimicry (Lakin and Chartrand, 2003).
Motivation and emotion can also foster or inhibit mimicry (Chartrand and van
Baaren, 2009). However, all these effects (in social psychology studies) take
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place over minutes or hours; it is not known if faster, more direct modulation of
mimicry is possible.
Like mimicry, eye contact is an important signal in non-verbal
communication and social interaction (Senju and Johnson, 2009). In two-
person settings, people spend 31% of the time engaging in mutual gaze, and
each mutual gaze lasts around a second (Argyle and Ingham, 1972).
Increased eye contact is associated with increased liking and affiliation
(Mason, et al., 2005), and with better performance on tasks such as face
detection (Conty et al., 2006), gender discrimination (Macrae et al., 2002) and
identity encoding/decoding (Hood et al., 2003).
Although mimicry and eye contact both play a pivotal role in social
interaction and are both linked to liking and affiliation, the relationship between
the two remains unclear. Some theories (Csibra and Gergely, 2009) suggest
that eye contact is a critical social signal for imitation, with a controlling role,
but other approaches focus on the relationship between mimicry and affiliation
without emphasizing other social signals (van Baaren et al., 2009). Past
research on eye contact and action has found that observed gaze can
influence the kinematics of motor performance (Castiello, 2003) and neural
response to observed action (Kilner et al., 2006). However, these studies did
not directly examine mimicry.
In the present chapter, we aimed to link studies of eye contact and
mimicry, and to test if eye contact can rapidly and directly modulate action
mimicry. We adopted a SRC paradigm (the ‘hand opening/closing’ task, see
1.2.1) used by Heyes and colleagues (Heyes et al., 2005), in which
participants respond to a hand-opening or hand-closing stimulus by either
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opening or closing their own hand. Previous research found faster responses
to congruent than incongruent actions and took this congruency effect as a
measure of mimicry. In the present experiment, an eye contact priming movie
was introduced before each trial of the ‘hand opening/closing’ task, to
examine whether direct eye gaze can influence the congruency effect.
2.3 Experiment 1: Does eye contact modulate mimicry?
2.3.1 Materials and Methods
Participant
Twenty right-handed students from University of Nottingham participated
in this study (19 females, 1 male; mean age=22.6 years; SD=3.15 years).
Stimuli and Apparatus
Before each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 300 msec. Then a
2.5 seconds video of human head movement was used as the gaze priming
movie for each trial (Figure 2-1). At the onset of each video clip, participants
saw a female actor facing away from the camera, with her eyes closed and
her left hand still in front of her face. Then the actor opened her eyes,
naturally moved her head either towards the camera which resulted in a direct
gaze, or towards her left/right side which resulted in an averted gaze; her
hand remained entirely still. Subsequently, her hand opened or closed. Delay
between the end of head movement and the start of hand action was 200 or
800ms and the hand movement stimulus had a duration of 200ms. Video
editing software was used to precisely match the timing and actor motion
parameters between stimuli. All stimuli were presented on a 20" size computer
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monitor and were 18.8 cm by 12.5 cm on the screen.
Figure 2-1. Examples of the stimuli and sequence of events in
Experiment 1. At the beginning of each trial, participants observed a
gaze priming movie where a direct or averted gaze was provided by
the actress. After an unpredictable delay (200 or 800ms), they had to
perform a pre-specified hand movement in response to a hand action
stimulus by the actress, as fast as they can. Pholemus motion capture
system was used to record the reaction time of hand responses.
Design and procedure
The experiment used a rapid SRC paradigm—the ‘hand opening/closing
task’ (Heyes et al., 2005). For each block, participants were required to make
the same pre-specified response (to open or close their right hand) in every
trial, as quickly as possible after the actor’s hand in video clips began to move.
On some trials, the actor’s stimulus hand opened and on others it closed.
Therefore, within a block, the hand movement stimulus was either the same
as the pre-specified response (congruent trials, e.g. open stimulus and open
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response) or the opposite of the pre-specified response (incongruent trials,
e.g. close stimulus and open response). Participants were instructed to
respond as quickly as possible in all trials. Response movement direction was
orthogonal to stimulus movement direction to avoid spatial compatibility
confounds (Press et al., 2008).
There were 4 blocks and 240 trials in total; two blocks required hand-
close response and two blocks required hand-open response. Block order
alternated and was randomized across participants. Each block presented, in
random order, 48 stimulus trials (where actor’s hand opened/closed) and 12
catch trials (where actor’s hand kept still). Participants were instructed to
refrain from moving their hand in catch trials.
There were 3 stimulus trials of each type, defined by 2×2×2 factorial
design: direction of eye gaze (direct or averted), stimulus hand action
(opening or closing) and delay (200 or 800ms). Variable delays were used to
prevent anticipatory responses but were not analyzed further.
Reaction time (RT) was measured by an electromagnetic device
(Polhemus LIBERY system, Colchester, USA) (Figure 2-1). Two sensors were
taped on the thumb and middle fingernail of participants’ right hand and the
sensor’s spatial position was recorded at 240Hz. Finger and thumb location
data were recorded in Matlab, which also controlled presentation of the video
and still image stimuli via the Cogent toolbox. Hand aperture was calculated
as the distance between thumb and figure markers. Aperture velocity was
calculated and then smoothed with a 40 msec square window. Peak velocity
was defined as the first peak in the velocity profile which reached at least 60%
of the largest peak. This allowed us to exclude rare “wobbles” in the data and
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pick the initial fast hand opening or closing movement. RTs were calculated as
the time from the presentation of the 2nd frame of the hand movement video
to the time when the participant’s hand aperture reached its first peak
open/close velocity.
2.3.2 Results and Discussion
To remove trials in which participants did not attend to the hand stimuli,
incorrect responses (0.05%) were excluded from the analysis, as were all RTs
smaller than 100ms or greater 800ms (0.10%). To minimize the effect of
outliers, we also excluded RTs that were greater than two standard deviations
from the conditional means of each participant (0.10%).
RT data were analyzed with a two-way repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) on the factors of Congruency (Congruent vs. Incongruent
hand movement) and Direction (Directed vs. Averted gaze). The analysis
revealed a significant main effect of Congruency (F(1,19)=41.0, p<0.001) and
Direction (F(1,19)=24.2, p<0.001); Importantly, there was an interaction between
Congruency and Direction (F(1,19)=10.3, p<0.005) (Figure 2-2). Furthermore, a
post hoc t-test showed that congruent responses were faster when preceded
by direct gaze than by averted gaze (t (20) = 6.18, p<0.001), but incongruent
responses were statistically unaltered whenever preceded by direct or averted
gaze.
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Figure 2-2. Mean RT on congruent and incongruent trials, for
direct and averted gaze conditions in Experiment 1. “*” represents
the statistically significant difference between two bars and vertical
bars indicate S.E.
The results from this experiment indicated a facilitatory effect of eye
contact on mimicry and more importantly revealed a significant interaction
between eye contact and mimicry. That is, direct gaze enhanced the reaction
times for congruent trials compared to incongruent trials, while averted gaze
did not. This rapid modulation of mimicry by gaze is novel and provides a
potent mechanism for social interaction. However, this first experiment did not
control for the possibility that, in the averted gaze conditions, the participant’s
visual attention was distracted away from the centre of the display and this
change in visual attention could contribute to the observed effects. We
addressed this question in Experiment 2, in which an eye-catching white box
suddenly flashed on the screen before the hand movement to draw attention
in a new control condition.
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2.4 Experiment 2: Is this modulation due to spatial
attention?
2.4.1 Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-three right-handed students, who did not participant in Experiment 1,
participated in this study (12 females, 11 males; mean age=23.7 years;
SD=3.01years).
Stimuli
Half the trials in Experiment 2 used exactly the same gaze stimuli as
Experiment 1. The other half used three new flash-box priming conditions
(Figure 2-3). In these movies, the female actor kept her eyes closed and head
averted throughout. 2380ms after the movie started, a small white box (0.8cm
x 0.8cm) appeared in a central location or to the left or right of centre, level
with the actor’s eyes. The rapid appearance of a visual stimulus is known to
trigger an automatical attentional response (Posner, 1980). The box
disappeared after 120ms, and the whole movie lasted 2500ms, the same time
amount as the head movement in gaze priming condition. After the flashbox
disappeared, there was a delay of 200 or 800 msec before the actor began to
perform a hand opening or hand closing movement, as before. Stimulus
presentation and data recording were identical to Experiment 1.
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Figure 2-3. All types of priming stimuli in Experiment 2. In addition
to experiment 1 where three gaze priming conditions were provided
(direct gaze and right/left averted gaze), Experiment 2 added another
three flash-box priming conditions (central box and right/left peripheral
box).
Design and procedure
The procedure was similar to the procedure in Experiment 1 except for
the number of trials. In the testing part, there were 8 blocks and 320 trials in
total. Participants had to give hand closing response in four blocks and hand
opening response in the other four (order was randomized). Each block
presented, in random order, 32 stimulus trials (where actor’s hand
opened/closed) and 8 catch trials (where actor’s hand kept still). There were 2
stimulus trials of each type, defined by 2×2×2×2 factorial design: priming
(gaze or flash-box), direction (direct or averted), stimulus hand action
(opening or closing) and delay (200 or 800ms).
Direct/Central Averted / Peripheral
Gaze
Conditions
Flashbox
Conditions
Mimicry and Eye contact: Is this Modulation due to Spatial Attention?
87
2.4.2 Results and Discussion
The same procedure as Experiment 1 was implemented on raw RT data,
to remove incorrect responses (0.07%) and RT outliers (0.20%). Possibly due
to an increased ratio of male participants from Experiment 1 (1 male and 19
femals) to Experiment 2 (11 males and 12 females), the overall RT in
Experiment 2 (290-320ms) was faster than in Experiment 1 (340-390ms)
(Figure 2-4).
RT data were analyzed with a three-way ANOVA on the factors of Priming
(Gaze vs. Flash-box), Congruency (Congruent vs. Incongruent) and Direction
(Direct/Central vs. Averted/Peripheral). The analysis revealed a significant
main effect of Priming (F(1,22)=4.34, p<0.043), Congruency (F(1,22)=29.5,
p<0.001) and Direction (F(1,22)=21.2, p<0.001) and three significant
interactions, Congruency × Priming (F(1,22)=5.20, p<0.027), Direction ×
Priming (F(1,22)=7.58, p<0.008) and Congruency × Direction × Priming
(F(1,22)=4.16, p<0.047).
To explore these interactions fully, gaze priming data and flash-box
priming data were separately analyzed with a two-way ANOVA on the factors
of Congruency (Congruent vs. Incongruent) and Direction (Directed/Central vs.
Averted/Peripheral). The analysis of gaze priming data revealed a significant
main effect of Congruency (F(1,22)=18.4, p<0.001) and Gaze direction
(F(1,22)=21.8, p<0.001) and the critical interaction between Congruency and
Gaze direction (F(1,22)=10.8, p<0.003) (Figure 2-4). As before, a post-hoc t-test
suggested that congruent movements were faster when primed by direct gaze
than by averted gaze (t (23) = 5.37, p<0.001).
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In contrast, the analysis of flash-box priming data only revealed a
significant main effect of Congruency (F(1,22)=8.09, p<0.009); No other factors
reached the significant level, including the non-significant interaction between
Congruency and Flash-box direction (F(1,22)=0.174, p=0.681) (Figure 2-4).
The results from Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 with a new group
of participants and show that drawing attention to the side of the display with a
non-social cue does not impact on mimicry. Although criticism could be still
built on the trivial spatio-temporal differences between flash-box conditions
and eye gaze conditions, we believe that the results in Experiment 2 are
sufficient to suggest that the enhancement of mimicry that we observe is
specific to eye contact and is not driven by spatial attention
Figure 2-4. Mean RT on congruent and incongruent trials for (A)
Gaze conditions and (B) Flash-box conditions. “*” represents the
statistically significant difference between two bars and vertical bars
indicate S.E.
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2.5 General Discussion
These two experiments provide strong evidence that eye contact rapidly
and specifically enhances mimicry of hand actions. In both experiments,
responses to congruent actions were faster when preceded by direct gaze.
Underlying Mechanism of the eye contact effect on mimicry
To understand the origins of the eye contact effect, we first exclude
possible non-social mechanisms. The effect of eye contact on mimicry was
not a general arousal effect, because incongruent response times were
unaltered (Figure 2-4A). We also controlled for spatial attention. Previous
studies reported that observing another person’s averted gaze automatically
shifts spatial attention (Friesen et al., 2005). If the averted gaze draws
attention away from the centre of the screen, this might impact on mimicry.
However, our flash-box control condition in Experiment 2 shows that
distracting stimuli at the side of the display do not impact on mimicry (Figure
2-4B). Also, changes in spatial attention would not predict an enhancement
that is specific to congruent actions, as we found in gaze condition. Similarly,
our results reflect more than just a general increase in arousal due to eye
contact, because we found a specific enhancement for congruent actions
compared to incongruent ones. Thus, we conclude that our results reveal a
novel and powerful social mechanism whereby eye contact rapidly enhances
action mimicry.
Our data shows that direct-gaze congruent-action condition resulted in
faster reaction times than any other conditions. However, the direct-gaze
incongruent-action condition was not slower than the averted-gaze
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incongruent-action condition (Figure 2-4A). Why is the modulation of mimicry
by eye contact specific to the enhancement of congruent trials, but not to the
inhibition of incongruent trials? We suggest that this could reflect a double eye
contact effect. First, it is possible that eye contact enhances all reaction times,
as an alerting stimulus. Second, eye contact has a specific impact on mimicry,
facilitating congruent responses and slowing down incongruent ones.
Considering these two effects together predicts a rapid reaction in the direct-
gaze congruent-action condition, as found. In the direct-gaze incongruent-
action condition, this alerting effect of eye contact would counteract the
mimicry effect of eye contact, leading to no change in reaction time from the
averted-gaze incongruent action condition. Future research is needed to
support this explanation.
Implications for social cognition
Our finding has important implications for emerging ideas about
nonverbal behavior in human social interaction. Our data are congruent with
models which emphasis flexible control of imitation (Brass et al., 2009) and an
influence of eye gaze on action understanding (Castiello, 2003; Kilner et al,
2006). We go beyond these studies in showing that a specific ostensive social
cue – eye contact – enhances mimicry actions rather than incongruent actions.
Our results are also congruent with developmental studies that point to
eye contact as a critical ostensive signal which modulates social learning.
Infants are sensitive to eye contact from birth (Farroni et al., 2002) and learn
more from situations with eye contact (Csibra and Gergely, 2009). As mimicry
is a form of imitation and contributes to learning new skills, it is plausible that
some of the enhancement of social learning by eye contact in infants and
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possibly even in adults is mediated by mimicry. Our results provide clear
support for the claim that eye contact is an important ostensive signal (Csibra
and Gergely, 2009), and suggest that eye contact modulates behavior, not just
in infancy, but throughout the lifespan.
Implications for autism research
Our results may have implications for our understanding of mimicry and
imitation in autism. Clinical observations often report atypical patterns of
mutual gaze behaviour in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and use this as
part of the autism diagnosis. Some studies report a relative lack of an
increased neurophysiological response to eye contact both in ASD adults and
potential infants (Senju et al. 2005; Elsabbagh et al. 2009). Children and
adults with autism also show reduced imitation (William et al., 2004),
especially in naturalistic situations. This poor imitation has been attributed to
failure of the mirror neuron system (William et al., 2001, Oberman et al., 2005),
but could also be attributed to poor top-down control of mimicry (Hamilton,
2008). One interesting study addresses the interaction of gaze and mimicry,
showing that hand actions in typical children can be primed by the actions of a
live human model but not a robot. In contrast, hand actions in autistic children
were only primed by the actions of the robot (Pierno et al. 2008). This
suggests that live interaction, including possibly eye gaze, is important for
mimicry in typical but not autistic children. Extending this, an important
implication of our own data is that failure to make eye contact or to understand
eye contact in autism might be a causal factor in reduced mimicry behaviors.
Understanding the relationship between mimicry and eye contact in autism is
an important area for future research.
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Methodological Implications
Finally, it is also important to consider how our rapid SRC task relates to
other more naturalistic mimicry paradigms used to study the “chamaeleon
effect” (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009). Our rapid paradigm puts
participants in a very different context (van Baaren et al. 2009). However, in
both naturalistic and rapid mimicry paradigms, participants are unaware that
the experimenter is recording mimicry behaviors or that mimicry is the subject
of the investigation. Studies of mimicry in naturalistic situations look at mimicry
effects which occur over seconds (Oullier et al., 2008) and modulation of
mimicry over minutes (Lakin and Chartrand, 2003), but this makes it hard to
determine causal factors. Our approach allows us to measure response times
with millisecond precision and obtain an estimate of the speed of the eye
contact effect. The speed of the eye contact effect we report, with just 500ms
between the eye contact event and the mimicry response, suggests it is not
mediated by general changes in affiliation. Rather, we suggest that eye
contact directly impacts on the mimicry process, and this could be a causal
factor in the “chameleon effect” (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999, also see 1.1.3).
2.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, Chapter 2 has demonstrated that mimicry is a flexible
nonverbal behaviour which can be subtly modulated by social signals. Direct
gaze rapidly and specifically enhances unconscious mimicry. Our findings
suggest that eye contact is a powerful controlling signal which induces more
than just arousal and attentional effects on mimicry. Better understanding how
gaze signal subtly enhances mimicry will help researchers learn more about
human nonverbal behaviour in social contexts.
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Chapter 3. More than just attention:
Communicative gaze sequences guide
one’s tendency to mimic
3.1 Abstract
In Chapter 2, we found a behavioral gaze-mimicry interaction where
direct gaze rapidly and specifically enhances the mimicry of intransitive hand
movement. We also demonstrated that this effect is not due to a simple spatial
attention effect. However, eye gaze is a powerful signal which exerts both
social and non-social effects on the observer. Hence, the current chapter aims
to systematically investigate which aspects of eye gaze contribute to this
enhancement of mimicry. In order to dissociate the social and non-social
effects of eye gaze on mimicry, we used a two-gaze-sequence priming video
where an actress provided two gaze shifts before performing a hand
movement. We manipulated the direction and sequence of the two gazes to
induce different arousal, attentional and social effects on the subsequent hand
movements. Our results suggest that different arousal and attentional effects
by gaze sequences cannot influence one’s tendency to mimic, but only the
social messages of eye gaze modulate mimicry. These findings provide strong
evidence that the eye contact effect on mimicry is driven by the social effects
of eye gaze and help us better understand the mechanism of the control of
mimicry by social signals.
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3.2 Introduction
Eye gaze provides a foundation of communication and social interaction
(Senju and Johnson, 2009). It conveys critical information about conspecifics’
attention, interests and intentions. Past studies suggest that the mere
perception of eye gaze increases arousal (Conty et al., 2010), triggers a
reflexive shift of spatial attention towards the gaze direction (Friesen et al.,
2005), directs joint attention to the objects of other’s interest (Emery, 2000)
and conveys ostensive social messages such as communicative intention and
interpersonal interest (Kampe et al., 2003). Gaze is also a powerful controlling
signal on other social-cognitive processes. Direct gaze significantly facilitates
face detection (Conty et al., 2006), identity encoding/decoding (Hood et al.,
2003), gender discrimination (Macrae et al., 2002) and person/object
evaluation (Kampe et al., 2000; Mason et al., 2005; van der Weiden et al.,
2010).
Mimicry is another important feature of human interaction. People have a
tendency to unconsciously mimic others’ actions (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999).
This spontaneous mimicry facilitates social interaction and serves as an
unconscious social strategy in creating social bonds between people
(Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009). Although mimicry is not normally
consciously controlled, extensive research suggests that mimicry is flexible
and context-dependent (see 1.1.5 and 1.2.5). It is not only sensitive to low-
level cognitive processes like arousal (Fujimura et al., 2010) and attention
(Chong et al., 2009), but can also be modulated by high-level social factors
such as social motivation (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009). For example,
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people who have a desire to affiliate with others have stronger mimicry than
those who have a desire to disaffiliate with others (Lakin et al., 2003). People
exhibit more mimicry when they were primed with a prosocial attitude than
primed with an antisocial attitude (Leighton et al., 2010). Mimicry is also
increased when people interact with those they like, such as friends, attractive
targets, in-group members and high social status ones (Chartrand and van
Baaren, 2009).
In Chapter 2, we found behavioral evidence that mimicry can be rapidly
modulated by gaze directions in a simple hand movement task. Participants
observed a hand movement preceded by a direct or averted gaze and
concurrently performed a congruent or incongruent hand movement. Our
results showed that direct gaze significantly enhances the mimicry of the hand
movement compared to averted gaze. This result supports previous findings
suggesting that eye gaze is a powerful controlling signal and mimicry is
sensitive to social signals. However, as direct gaze is a complex signal not
only triggering non-social arousal and attentional effects but also conveying
critical ostensive social messages such as communicative intention and
interpersonal interest (Senju and Johnson, 2009), it remains unknown which
specific effect of eye gaze contributes to the eye contact effect on mimicry.
The current study aims to clarify this question.
Different from the paradigm in Chapter 2 where a single direct or averted
gaze was provided right behind the hand stimuli, here we presented gaze
shifts a distance away from the hand stimuli and used a novel two-gaze-
sequence priming video to dissociate the social and non-social effects of eye
gaze on mimicry (Figure 3-1B). Participants watched videos where an actress
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would provide two gaze shifts and a hand movement. Specifically, she would
look either at the side (an averted gaze), or the camera (a direct gaze), or her
own hand (a hand gaze) during the first and second gaze shift and then
perform a hand opening or closing movement. Therefore, according to the first
and second gaze direction, the actress would provide nine types of gaze
sequence videos before the hand movement (Figure 3-1A).
Because each type of the gaze sequence videos brings different social
and non-social effects of eye gaze, this new paradigm provides a direct way to
examine which social or nonsocial effect of gaze causes for the enhancement
of mimicry. Specifically, we hypothesized that if the eye contact effect
onmimicry is due to a general arousal effect of direct gaze, we should observe
a stronger mimicry whenever the gaze sequence includes a direct gaze (either
in the first or second gaze); if the effect results from spatial attention, we
would expect to see increased mimicry whenever the second gaze was
presented towards the space of hand side (e.g. a hand gaze or a rightward
averted gaze); if direct gaze enhances mimicry by eliciting the joint attention
towards the hand, we would see a larger mimicry in those gaze sequences
ended by a hand gaze, probably the largest one when the first gaze is a direct
gaze and the second is a hand gaze. Finally, if the enhancement on mimicry is
not from any attentional or arousal effects to the hand, but only comes from
the social messages of direct gaze such as ostensive communicative intention
and personal interest, we hypothesized that participants should have an
increased mimicry only when the second gaze is a direct gaze.
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3.3 Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty paid right-handed students participated in this study (15 females,
5 males; mean age = 21.4 years; S.D. 2.23 years).
Stimuli and Apparatus
In each trial, participants watched a video where an actress performed a
sequence of two gazes and then a hand movement (Figure 3-1). At the onset
of each video clip, the actress kept her eyes closed and held her left hand still
on the right side of the screen. Her head was facing towards three possible
directions: left sideways, straightforward, or rightward to her left hand. Then
the actress opened her eyes and provided the first gaze along her face
orientation for 500ms, which could be an averted gaze to the left side (AG-1),
or a direct gaze to the camera (DG-1), or a hand-oriented gaze (HG-1). Her
face was emotionally neutral during the first gaze. Subsequently, the actress
naturally turned her head to other directions and provided the second gaze,
which could be a new averted gaze towards right side (AG-2), or a new direct
gaze to the camera (DG-2) or a new hand-oriented gaze (HG-2). The actress
also provided a little smile along with the second direct gaze (DG-2), which
was designed to strengthen the ostensive nature of direct gaze. After the two
gaze shifts, the actress’ hand began to move. She either opened her hand or
closed her hand (stimulus trials), or remained hand static (catch trials). Delay
between the end of second gaze and the start of hand action was 200 or
800ms and the hand movement stimulus had a duration of 1000ms. Video
editing software was used to precisely match the timing and actress motion
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parameters between stimuli.
Figure 3-1. Experimental design (A) and Timeline (B) for the two-
gaze-sequence priming movie. Participants were shown a series of
4 s videos clips where an actress did two gaze shifts and a hand
movement. We adopted a 3×3 factorial design to present the two gaze
shifts, where the actress either looked at the camera or sideways or
her hand in the first and second gaze. After the two gazes, the actress
performed a hand opening or hand closing movement.
Procedure
The experiment used an established SRC paradigm (the ‘hand
opening/closing task’) to measure mimicry. For each block, participants were
required to make the same pre-specified response in every trial. They had to
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always open or close their right hand as quickly as possible after the actress’
hand in the two-gaze-sequence videos began to move. On some trials, the
actress’ hand opened and on others it closed. Therefore, within a block, the
hand movement in the movie was either the same as the pre-specified
response (congruent trials, e.g. open stimulus and open response) or the
opposite of the pre-specified response (incongruent trials, e.g. close stimulus
and open response). Participants were not instructed to mimic or to avoid
mimicry but were only instructed to respond as quickly as possible in all trials.
Thus, any differences in reaction time between congruent and incongruent
trials (called the “congruency effect”, CE) reflect implicit and unconscious
mimicry (see a methodology review paper by Heyes, 2011). Response
movement direction was orthogonal to stimulus movement direction to avoid
spatial compatibility confounds (Press et al., 2008).
There were 6 blocks and 270 trials in total; three blocks required hand-
close response and three blocks required hand-open response. Block order
alternated and was randomized across participants. Each block presented 36
stimulus trials (where actress’ hand opened/closed) and 9 catch trials (where
actress’ hand kept still) in pseudo-random order. Participants were instructed
to refrain from moving their hand in catch trials. Within a block, we adopted a
3×3×3 factorial design in which factors were “direction of first gaze” (AG-1,
DG-1 or HG-1), “direction of second gaze” (AG-2, DG-2 or HG-2) and “action
congruency” (congruent, incongruent or catch) (Figure 3-1A). Variable delays
(200/800ms) were used to prevent anticipatory responses but were not
analyzed further.
Similar to Chapter 2, reaction time (RT) was measured by an
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electromagnetic device (Polhemus LIBERY system, Colchester, USA). Two
sensors were taped on the thumb and middle fingernail of participants’ right
hand and the sensor’s spatial position was recorded at 240Hz. Finger and
thumb location data were recorded in Matlab, which also controlled
presentation of the video and still image stimuli via the Cogent toolbox. RTs
were calculated as the time from the presentation of the 2nd frame of the
hand movement video to the time when the participant’s hand aperture
reached its peak open/close velocity.
3.4 Results
To remove trials in which participants did not attend to the hand stimuli,
incorrect responses (0.06%) were excluded from the analysis, as were all RTs
smaller than 100ms or greater 800ms (0.07%). To minimize the effect of
outliers, we also excluded RTs that were greater than two standard deviations
from the conditional means of each participant (0.11%). The CE for each
participant was calculated by subtracting RT in congruent trials from RT in
incongruent trials.
First of all, in order to compare the mimicry primed by each two-gaze-
sequence video, a two-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
was conducted on participants’ CE with ‘first gaze’ (AG-1, DG-1 and HG-1)
and ‘second gaze’ (AG-2, DG-2 and HG-2) as variables. The two-way analysis
revealed a significant main effect of ‘second gaze’ on CE (F(2,38)=26.76,
p<0.001). Post hoc t-test showed that participants had a larger CE only when
the second gaze was DG-2 (Figure 3-2). However, there was no significant
main effect of ‘first gaze’ (F(2,38)=0.20, p=0.822) or no significant interaction
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between first and second gaze on CE (F(4,76)=0.34, p=0.850).
Then we performed a three-way ANOVA on participants’ mean RT with
‘congruency’ (Congruent, Incongruent), ‘first gaze’ (AG-1, DG-1 and HG-1)
and ‘second gaze’ (AG-2, DG-2 and HG-2) as variables. The three-way
ANOVA analysis revealed a significant main effect of ‘congruency’
(F(1,19)=70.92, p<0.001) and ‘second gaze’ (F(2,38)=6.02, p=0.005) on RT. On
average, responses were faster for congruent trials (M=309ms, S.E. 14.26)
than for incongruent (M=353ms, S.E. 15.83) and responses were faster for
DG-2 (M=317ms, S.E. 14.38) than for AG-2 (M=328ms, S.E. 16.00) and HG-2
(M=338ms, S.E. 15.55). Consistent with the main effect of second gaze on CE
in two-way ANOVA, the three-way ANOVA showed a significant interaction
between congruency and second gaze on RT (F(2,38)=26.76, p<0.001). In
addition, there was also a significant interaction between first gaze and
second gaze on RT (F(4,76)=10.90, p<0.001).
To further explore these two interactions, RT data were re-categorized by
‘first gaze’ or ‘second gaze’, and were separately analyzed with a two-way
ANOVA on the factors of ‘congruency’ (congruent, incongruent) and ‘gaze
direction’ (AG, DG and HG). The analysis on ‘first gaze’ data only revealed a
significant main effect of congruency (F(1,59)=136.69, p<0.001). No other
factors reached the significant level (Figure 3-3A), which was in line with the
earlier two-way and three-way ANOVA results showing that first gaze did not
have impacts on neither CE nor RT. In contrast, the analysis on ‘second gaze’
data revealed a significant main effect of congruency (F(1,59)=124.48, p<0.001)
and gaze direction (F(2,118)=4.55, p=0.013) (Figure 3-3B). This was also an
interaction between congruency and gaze direction (F(2,118)=14.90, p<0.001).
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Post hoc t-test showed this interaction resulted from a faster congruent
movements in DG-2 than in AG-2 (t (59) = 3.27, p<0.002) and HG-2 (t (59) =
4.41, p<0.001).
Figure 3-2. Mean congruency effect for each type of the two-gaze-
sequence video. Here, CE was enhanced only when the gaze
sequence contained DG-2. Asterisk represents the statistically
significant difference between two bars. Vertical bars indicate S.E.
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Figure 3-3. Mean reaction time on congruent and incongruent trials for
(A) first-gaze groups and (B) second-gaze groups. Asterisk represents the
statistically significant difference between two bars. Vertical bars indicate
S.E.
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3.5 Discussion
Like Chapter 2 showing that mimicry can be modulated by a single gaze,
the current study demonstrated that mimicry is also sensitive to a sequence of
two gaze shifts. Specifically, the results revealed that the CE was modulated
by the second gaze of the sequence (Figure 3-3B), but was not susceptible to
the first gaze (Figure 3-3A). Further analysis on the second gaze suggested
that the CE was enhanced only when the second gaze was a direct gaze (DG-
2) (Figure 3-2; Figure 3-3B). This was because participants’ hand responses
to congruent actions were facilitated when preceded by DG-2, but not by AG-2
or HG-2 (Figure 3-3B). These results replicated our previous findings in
Chapter 2 that direct gaze enhances mimicry by facilitating responses to
congruent trials.
Our findings that mimicry was exclusively enhanced by DG-2 (Figure 3-2)
provide compelling evidence that the eye contact effect on mimicry is not
driven by the non-social effects of eye gaze. We found that not every gaze
sequence including a direct gaze increased mimicry, which rejects the
explanation of a general arousal effect. Similarly, the findings that not every
gaze sequence with a rightward second gaze enhanced mimicry exclude an
explanation of a simple effect of spatial attention. Even in the situations where
a strong joint attention effect was implemented by the gaze sequence of DG-
1-HG-2, participants did not show any increased mimicry. The only
requirement for the eye contact effect on mimicry is that the actress had to
look at the participant right before the hand stimuli (DG-2). Thus, we conclude
that the eye contact effect on mimicry is not due to any non-social effects of
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eye gaze; instead, it is more likely that the social effects of direct gaze drive
the enhancement on mimicry.
But what is the specific social effect that underlies the eye contact effect
on mimicry? There are possibly two candidates. First, it is possible that the
ostensive property of eye contact drives the enhancement of mimicry. Eye
contact is a communicative signal that ostensively conveys the sender’s
communicative intention and interpersonal interest. This ostensive message
increases the observer’s social engagement and expectation (Senju and
Johnson, 2009; Senju and Csibra, 2008) and promotes their social motivation
to reciprocate and synchronize (Oberman and Ramachandran, 2007). Several
studies suggested that this ostensive property of eye contact increases
observer’s gaze following, motivation to approach, cooperation and prosocial
behaviour (Senju annd Csibra, 2008; Hietanen et al., 2008; Bateson et al.,
2006; Haley and Fessler, 2005). According to a recent cognitive model of
imitation proposed by Southgate and Hamilton (2008) in which imitation is
subject to top-down processes based on analysis of ostensive cues, it is likely
that the ostensive-communicative message from DG-2 drives the
enhancement of mimicry in the present study.
Strategic monitoring of mimicry by social cues is another mechanism that
could mediate the eye contact effect on mimicry. Humans continuously
monitor their behaviours to ensure that they are consistent with the current
situational context and produce adaptive outcomes. Mimicry has been
suggested as an important nonverbal behaviour to facilitate social interaction
and enhance liking and affiliation between interaction partners (Chartrand and
van Baaren, 2009). However, the prerequisite of this function is that the
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copying behaviors have to be somehow perceived by the interaction partner.
As eye gaze is a critical attention cue that conveys social knowledge of
other’s visibility (Birmingham and Kingstone, 2009), we argue that eye gaze
could act as a salient signal that strategically monitor when to mimic. This idea
of strategic monitoring of mimicry by social signals is compatible with recent
studies showing that mimicry is strategically increased when people need to
affiliate with others (Lakin et al., 2008). In the present study, the enhancement
of mimicry by direct gaze would help people control their mimicry in an
economical way and ultimately make their mimicry behavior more efficient and
effective. Future research is needed to validate this explanation.
3.6 Conclusion
In sum, the present study used a novel two-gaze-sequence paradigm to
dissociate the social and non-social effects of eye gaze on mimicry. We
demonstrated that the eye contact effect on mimicry is not based on any
arousal or attentional effects, but only driven by the social effects of eye gaze.
Future research is needed to clarify the specific social mechanisms underlying
this effect.
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Chapter 4. The control of mimicry by eye
contact is mediated by medial prefrontal
cortex
4.1 Abstract
Spontaneous mimicry of other people’s action serves an important social
function, enhancing affiliation and social interaction. This mimicry can be
subtly modulated by different social contexts. Chapter 2 and chapter 3 provide
behavioral evidence that direct eye gaze rapidly and specifically enhances
mimicry of intransitive hand movements. Based on past findings linking medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) to both eye contact and the control of mimicry, we
hypothesized that mPFC might be the neural origin of this behavioral effect.
The present chapter aimed to test this hypothesis. During fMRI scanning, 20
human participants performed a simple mimicry or no mimicry task as
previously chapters (the ‘hand opening/closing’ task), with direct gaze present
on half of the trials. As predicted, fMRI results showed that performing the task
activated mirror systems while direct gaze and inhibition of the natural
tendency to mimic both engaged mPFC. Critically, we found an interaction
between mimicry and eye contact in mPFC, superior temporal sulcus (STS)
and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). We then used dynamic causal modeling (DCM)
to contrast twelve possible models of information processing in this network.
Results supported a model in which eye contact controls mimicry by
modulating the connection strength from mPFC to STS. This suggests that
mPFC is the originator of the gaze-mimicry interaction and that it modulates
Control of Mimicry by mPFC: Abstract
108
sensory input to the mirror system. Thus, our results demonstrate how
different components of the social brain work together to on-line control
mimicry according to the social context.
4.2 Introduction
Human behavior depends critically on social contexts, a sensitivity based
on a series of rapid and automatic processes such as gaze perception,
emotion detection and action mimicry (Adolphs, 2009). However, little is
known about the interplay between these processes and how they interact in
the brain. In chapter 2 and chapter 3 we demonstrated behavioral evidence
that action mimicry can be directly modulated by eye contact: direct gaze
rapidly and specifically enhances the mimicry of hand movements compared
to averted gaze. The aim of current paper is to use functional magnetic
imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neural mechanism of this effect.
Mimicry refers to the unconscious tendency to copy the postures,
gestures, and mannerisms of others (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009). It has
been suggested that this spontaneous mimicry acts as a ‘social glue’ and
increases affiliation and liking between interaction partners (Chartrand and
van Baaren, 2009). As a form of imitation, mimicry has been strongly
associated with the mirror neuron system (MNS) (see 1.2.7). This brain
network spans inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and
is engaged in a variety of imitation and imitation learning tasks (Iacoboni et al,
1999; Iacoboni, 2009; Buccino et al., 2004; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). It
is claimed that this network implements a “direct-mapping mechanism” that
matches an observed action onto a motor representation of that action (Brass
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and Heyes, 2005; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
However, this direct mapping of observed to performed actions is not
impervious to other processes, but can be flexibly modulated by higher-level
cognitive processes such as intention attribution and social relevance
observation (Kilner et al., 2006; Leipelt et al., 2008; Leipelt and Brass, 2010;
see 1.2.5). Similarly, studies of mimicry in social contexts also emphasize the
importance of controlling when and who to mimic. Attractiveness, friendship
and social status can enhance mimicry while social stigma, negative mood
and outgroup membership can inhibit mimicry (Chartrand and van Baaren,
2009; see 1.1.5).
One candidate brain system for the control of mimicry by social contexts
is medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). mPFC is considered as a core region for
social cognition (Amodio and Frith, 2006). It is engaged when detecting and
evaluating direct gaze (Kampe et al., 2003; Kuzmanovic et al., 2009). Brass et
al. (2001a, 2005, 2009) suggests that mPFC is engaged when participants
must inhibit their natural tendency to mimic, and patient studies suggest
damage to prefrontal cortex can lead to over-imitation (Luria, 1980). This
evidence makes mPFC a strong candidate for controlling the interaction of
gaze and mimicry. Alternatively, the control of mimicry by gaze might be linked
to superior temporal sulcus (STS), a key centre for processing of eye gaze
(Senju and Johnson, 2009) and a sensory input site to the MNS (Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004). In the present study, we used our established SRC
paradigm to identify brain systems involved in the control of mimicry by eye
contact, using both a factorial fMRI event-related design and dynamic causal
modeling (DCM).
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4.3 Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty paid participants (five males, fifteen females; mean age 23, SD= ±
4.8) were recruited for the present study. All participants were right-handed,
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of brain damage.
They gave their informed consent to complete the experiment in accord with
the local ethics board.
Stimuli and experimental design
In each trial, participants watched a video clip where an actress
performed an eye/head movement and a hand movement (Figure 4-1). At the
onset of the video clip, the actress was facing away from the camera, with her
eyes closed and her left hand still in front of her face. Then she opened her
eyes and naturally moved her head either towards the camera which resulted
in a direct gaze, or towards her left/right side which resulted in an averted
gaze; her hand remained entirely still. Subsequently, the actress performed a
hand movement. She either opened her hand or closed her hand (stimulus
trials), or remained hand static (catch trials). All stimuli were identical to
Experiment 1 in Chapter and were presented with Cogent toolbox running
under Matlab 6.5 permitting synchronisation with the scanner and accurate
timing of stimuli presentation.
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Figure 4-1. Factorial design and example of stimuli. Participants
were shown a series of 3s video clips where an actress did a head
movement and a hand movement. Only the last frame of each video is
illustrated here. Participants were required to make the same pre-
specified response (either OPEN or CLOSE hand) in every stimulus
trial in a block, as quickly as possible after the actor’s hand in video
clips began to move. In catch trails where the actress remained her
hand still, they had to keep their right hand still but press the scanner
button box with their left hand, as soon as they see a small white box
appear on the actress’ hand. Each movie was defined with respect to
the gaze direction and congruency between the hand movement
performed by the actress and the participant’s pre-specified response.
As such, each trial fell into a 2 x 3 factorial design for direct or averted
gaze, congruent, incongruent or catch trial.
We used our established SRC paradigm (the ‘hand opening/closing’ task)
to measure mimicry. For each block, participants were required to make the
same pre-specified response in every trial. They had to always open or close
their right hand as quickly as possible after the actress’ hand in video clips
began to move. On some trials, the actress’ hand opened and on others it
closed. Therefore, within a block, the hand movement in the movie was either
the same as the pre-specified response (congruent trials, e.g. open stimulus
and open response) or the opposite of the pre-specified response
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(incongruent trials, e.g. close stimulus and open response). Past studies have
found a clear congruency effect (CE) in this paradigm and took CE as a
reliable measure of mimicry, with faster responses on congruent trials which
were facilitated by mimicry of observed congruent action and slower
responses on incongruent trials where participants must inhibit the natural
tendency to mimic the actress’s hand action (Heyes, 2011; Heyes et al., 2005;
Press et al., 2008). Our previous studies demonstrated that this CE can be
enhanced by eye contact where direct gaze significantly reduces reaction
times on congruent trials (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). Compliance with the
hand movement task was monitored from the scanner control room. For
technical reasons, it was not possible to measure precise reaction times
during fMRI, but as the behavioral result has now been replicated four times in
different participant groups (Chapter 2, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, and
two pilot studies), we are confident that it is robust.
To prevent anticipatory responding, there was a variable delay (200 or
800ms) between the end of the actress’ head movement and start of her hand
movement in the video and in addition, approximately 20% of trials in a block
were catch trials. In catch trials the hand observed in the video remained
static. Participants were instructed to refrain from moving their right hand, but
were asked to detect a small white box that appeared on the top of the still
hand and press a response button with their left hand when the white box was
detected. Thus, participants mimicked the actress’ hand movements only in
stimulus trials (congruent and incongruent), but not in catch trials. Participants
were trained on all tasks (congruent, incongruent, catch) for approximately 5
minutes prior to the fMRI measurement.
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We adopted a 2 x 3 factorial event-related design in which the factors
were “Gaze Direction” (two levels: direct or averted gaze) and “Action
Congruency” (three levels: congruent or incongruent or catch trials) (Figure.4-
1). Each trial was defined by these two factors as direct gaze with congruent
action (Direct-Cong), direct gaze with incongruent action (Direct-Incong),
direct gaze with catch action (Direct-Catch), averted gaze with congruent
action (Averted-Cong), averted gaze with incongruent action (Averted-Incong)
and averted gaze with catch action (Averted-Catch). There were 6 blocks;
three blocks required a hand-close response and three blocks required a
hand-open response. Block order alternated and was randomized across
participants. Each block presented in a pseudorandom order, 32 stimulus trials
(16 congruent and 16 incongruent) and 9 catch trials. The first trial in each
block was always a catch trial and was excluded from further analysis.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Subjects lay supine on the scanner bed, with their right hand uprightly
positioned on the abdomen and left hand positioned over the fMRI button box.
Participants’ right hand was carefully stabilized, and form-fitting cushions were
used to prevent arm, hand, and head motion. To attenuate scanner noise,
participants were provided with earplugs.
Imaging was performed using a 3T Phillips Achieva scanner, equipped
with an 8 channel-phased array head coil. 38 axial slices (field of view: 240 x
240 mm2, matrix: 80 x 80; thickness: 3 mm) parallel to bicommissural line
(AC-PC) were acquired using a T2*-weighted gradient echo planar imaging
(EPI) sequence (TR: 2500 ms; TE: 40ms; flip angle: 80°). Prior to the
functional runs, structure images were also required for each participant using
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high-resolution T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid acquisition gradient
echo (MPRAGE) sequence.
Conventional General Linear Model (GLM) Analysis
To remove sources of noise and artifact, functional data were realigned,
unwarped, corrected for slice timing, normalized to the MNI template with a
resolution of 3mm x 3mm x 3mm and spatially smoothed (8mm) using SPM8
software. A design matrix was fitted for each subject with one regressor for
each movie type (Direct-Cong, Direct-Incong, Direct-Catch, Averted-Cong,
Averted-Incong and Averted-Catch) and combined across the six blocks. Each
movie was modeled as a boxcar with the duration of that movie convolved
with the standard hemodynamic response function. In order to reduce the
influence of reaction time variability between conditions on the GLM analysis
(Grinband et al., 2008), we added an extra column in the design matrix,
modeling our previous average reaction time scores (Chapter 2, Experiment 1)
in each condition as a parametric regressor.
In order to localize brain regions engaged in the hand movement task,
two contrasts [Congruent trials > Catch trials], [Incongruent trials > Catch trials]
were calculated across all movies. To localize brain regions for inhibition of
mimicry, a contrast for the main effect of mimicry inhibition [Incongruent trials
> Congruent trials] was calculated. Two contrasts for the simple effect of the
inhibition of mimicry were also calculated, [Direct-Incong > Direct-cong],
[Averted-incong > Averted-cong]. To identify brain regions that code the eye
contact effect, a contrast for the main effect of eye contact [Direct > Averted]
was performed across all movies. Also, two contrasts for the simple effect of
eye contact were calculated across all movies of stimulus trials, [Direct-Cong
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> Averted-Cong] and [Direct-Incong > Averted-Incong]. Finally, we calculated
the interaction between mimicry and eye contact, both as [(Direct-Cong >
Direct-Incong) > (Averted-Cong > Averted-Incong)] and as the inverse
contrast [(Direct-Incong > Direct-Cong) > (Averted-Incong > Averted-Cong)].
Contrast images for all participants were then taken to the second level for a
random-effects analysis in SPM8. Brain regions were initially thresholded at a
voxel-level threshold of p < 0.001 and 30 voxels. Only regions that survive a
cluster-level FWE correction of p < 0.05 over the whole brain are discussed
and reported in Table 4-1 and Figure 4-2.
Dynamic Causal Modeling (DCM)
To explore information processing between brain areas under different
experimental manipulations, we performed an effective connectivity analysis
using DCM10 (Friston et al. 2003). DCM treats the brain as a dynamic input-
state-output system. The inputs correspond to experimental manipulations.
The state variables are neuronal activities (firing rates), and the outputs are
the regional hemodynamic responses measured with fMRI. The idea is to
model changes in the hidden states and effective connectivity, which cannot
be observed by fMRI directly, using the known inputs and outputs. Three kinds
of coupling parameters are estimated in DCM: 1) direct, extrinsic inputs to the
system (i.e., the direct effect of eye contact on mPFC); 2) ‘intrinsic’ or ‘fixed’
connections that couple neuronal states between regions (i.e., the connectivity
strength from mPFC to STS); and 3) modulatory parameters that model the
changes in fixed connectivity induced by the experimental manipulations (i.e.,
the additive change a certain manipulation, like direct gaze, has on the
strength of a connection).
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For each participant, models were constructed to define the connections
between and the inputs to three regions identified in the mimicry-gaze
interaction contrast (Figure 4-2d). These were (1) the left STS as the ‘sensory
input’ of MNS (x=-48, y=-19, z=-2, coordinates are from Table 1), (2) the right
IFG as the ‘motor output’ of MNS (x=45, y=26, z=-17), (3) the right mPFC as a
potential control region (x=6, y=44, z=34). Input data to the models was
extracted in a participant-specific manner from each of these three regions
(Figure 4-3a). In detail, the region-specific time series (concatenated over the
six blocks) comprised the first eigenvariate of all voxels within a 5-mm-radius
sphere centered on the subject-specific peak in the interaction contrast. The
subject-specific peak was constrained within a 15-mm-radius sphere centered
on the peak coordinates from the group random-effect analysis (Figure 4-3a).
Of the twenty participants, we could not identify an individual peak in the STS
in one participant, in the IFG in one participant and in the mPFC in one
participant. Thus, the data from these three participants were excluded from
the DCM analysis, leaving 17 participants in this analysis.
The three regions in each model were set to be bidirectionally connected,
according to anatomical evidence from human and monkey (Figure 4-3b). For
simplicity (Stephan et al., 2010), a new design matrix was created for DCM
analysis which modeled two critical factors: (1) the hand movement task
(stimulus trials vs catch trials) and (2) the Interaction of gaze and mimicry
([Direct-Cong > Direct-Incong] vs [Averted-Cong > Averted-Incong]) as
parametric factors on the individual trials. This allows us to consider only
these two factors as extrinsic inputs in the current study, and substantially
simplifies our original 2x3 factorial design. Holding the number of parameters
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constant for the intrinsic connectivity structure, extrinsic inputs and modulatory
effects, we compared 12=2x3x2 models in order to address three central
questions (Figure 4-3d): (1) is the eye contact effect on mimicry due to top-
down modulation from mPFC (model 1-6) or bottom-up gating from STS
(model 7-12)? ; (2) how does the interaction of gaze and mimicry modulate
processing within the network? Is it by modulating the connection strength
between mPFC and STS (models 1, 4, 7, 10) or by modulating the connection
strength from mPFC to IFG (models 2, 5, 8, 11) or by modulating the
connection strength from STS to IFG (models 3, 6, 9, 12)?; (3) whether the
hand movement task affects the connection strength from STS to IFG (models
4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12) or not (models 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9)?
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Figure 4-3. DCM inputs. (a) Region selection and time series
extraction from 17 subjects. Each red point indicates the centre of the
5mm radius sphere where data was extracted for one participant. (b)
Anatomical criteria used to define the intrinsic connectivity structure. (c)
The matrix design for DCM. Only two critical factors were analyzed in
DCM: hand movement task and Interaction (d) Model space of all 12
models considered in the DCM analysis.
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Bayesian models Selection (BMS)
To determine the most likely of the 12 models given the observed data
from all subjects, we implemented a fixed-effects (FFX) and a random-effects
(RFX) group analysis (Stephan et al., 2009). In the FFX case, one assumes
that the optimal model is identical across the population. It uses group log-
evidence to quantify the relative goodness of models, which is the
exponentiated sum of the log model evidences of each subject-specific model
(Penny et al., 2004). As the log evidence of each subject-specific model
estimated by FFX group analysis depends not only on model fit but also
model complexity, we limited ourselves to the 12 models that were equated for
the number of parameters. Usually, a difference in group log-evidence of three
is taken as statistically strong evidence (Kass and Raftery, 1995). Thus if the
group log-evidence of one model is bigger than the other models’ by three or
more, that model would be considered by FFX analysis as the optimal model
(Stephan et al., 2010).
Because the FFX analysis is vulnerable to outlier subjects, we also
implemented a RFX analysis which accounts for heterogeneity of model
structure across subjects (Stephan et al., 2009). It uses hierarchical Bayesian
modeling that estimates the parameters of a Dirichlet distribution over the
probabilities of all models considered. These probabilities define a multinomial
distribution over model space enabling the computation of the posterior
probability of each model given the data of all subjects and the models
considered. The results of RFX analysis are reported in terms of the
exceedance probability that one model is more likely than any other model.
The optimal model in RFX analysis would be considered as the one with the
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largest exceedance probability as well as above chance-level.
For the optimal model(s) selected by FFX and RFX analysis, the model
parameters (intrinsic connection strength, effects of extrinsic inputs and
modulatory effects of extrinsic inputs on connection strength) were entered
into t tests at the group level. This allowed us to summarize the consistent
findings from the subject-specific models using classical statistics.
4.4 Results
Neural correlates of the hand movement task
The two contrasts Congruent trials > Catch trials, Incongruent trials >
Catch trials both yielded strong activations in primary motor cortex,
cerebellum, IFG and temporal pole/middle temporal gyrus (MTG). Activations
also extended to large areas in parietal and temporal lobe (Table 4-1 and
Figure 4-2a).
Neural correlates of inhibition of mimicry
We examined brain regions engaged when participants must inhibit their
natural tendency to mimic the observed hand action (Incongruent >
Congruent). Regardless of gaze direction, this main effect revealed greater
activation in two regions: IPL and cuneus. We further examined the simple
effect of the inhibition of mimicry in either direct or averted gaze conditions.
Specifically, when mimicry was preceded by an averted gaze, brain areas that
showed greater response to ‘incongruent’ trials than ‘congruent’ trials (the
contrast Averted-Incong > Averted-Cong) included mPFC, temporal-parietal
junction (TPJ), middle occipital gyrus, MTG/STS, IFG, middle frontal gyrus
(MFG), IPL, cingulated and precuneus (Table 4-1 and Figure 4-2b). This result
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replicates the findings from Brass et al. (2001a, 2005, 2009) that mPFC and
TPJ have a role in inhibition of mimicry. However, no region was found to
show greater activation to ‘incongruent’ trials than ‘congruent’ trials in direct
gaze conditions (the contrast Direct-Incong > Direct-Cong).
Neural correlates of the eye contact effect
We examined the brain regions responsive to direct gaze compared to
averted gaze (Main effect, Direct > Averted). No regions survived our
thresholds in this contrast. We then separately examined the simple effect of
eye contact in either congruent or incongruent conditions. The contrast Direct-
Cong > Averted-Cong revealed increased neural activity in MTG/STS, IPL and
mPFC (Table 4-1 and Figure 4-2c). This result replicates the findings from
Kampe et al. (2003) that mPFC is engaged by eye contact. No brain region
was found in the other contrast Direct-Incong > Averted-Incong.
Neural correlates of interaction between mimicry and eye contact
Results from the interaction contrast [(Direct-Cong > Direct-Incong) >
(Averted-Cong > Averted-Incong)]) revealed activity in three areas: the mPFC,
IFG and STS (Table 4-1, Figure 4-2d). Illustrative plots of the parameter
estimates in mPFC revealed that the interaction contrast was mainly driven by
the strong engagement of mPFC in the Direct-congruent and Averted-
Incongruent conditions and weak engagement of mPFC in Averted-congruent
condition (Figure 4-4c). Further plots of the relationship between this
interaction contrast and the simple effect of eye contact and the simple effect
of the control of mimicry revealed that all three contrasts overlapped in mPFC
(Figure 4-4a). The inverse contrast [(Direct-Incong > Direct-Cong) > (Averted-
Incong > Averted-Cong)] did not yield any significant clusters.
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Table 4-1. Cortical activation for the hand movement task, inhibition of
mimicry, eye contact effect and the gaze-mimicry interaction.
MNI coordinates
Region
Number
of
voxels
T
P cluster
corrected
(FWE) x y z
Hand movement task
Congruent > Catch
179884 19.07 < 0.001 -39 -19 55
21 -52 -29
Primary motor cortex and
Cerebellum, extended to
whole parietal and
temporal lobe -24 -10 1
Inferior frontal gyrus 150 10.82 < 0.001 -42 32 -20
-48 26 -11
-45 38 1
Temporal pole/
Middle temporal gyrus
82 6.32 0.006 51 11 -38
Fusiform gyrus 75 4.08 0.038 -45 -40 -26
Incongruent > Catch
215881 21.23 < 0.001 15 -52 -26
24 -52 -32
Cerebellum and Primary
motor cortex, extended to
whole parietal and
temporal lobe -39 -19 55
Inferior frontal gyrus 79 10.13 0.003 -54 23 13
65 5.00 0.034 51 8 -41Temporal pole/
Middle temporal gyrus 45 14 -44
Inhibition of Mimicry
Main effect: Incongruent > congruent
137 5.22 < 0.001 -54 -25 46Inferior parietal lobe
-45 -31 37
-30 -25 55
Cuneus 96 3.88 0.037 6 -76 10
-3 -94 10
9 -88 19
Simple Effect: Averted-incong > averted-cong
Medial prefrontal cortex 753 8.83 < 0.001 9 44 31
9 41 22
15 53 22
121 7.64 < 0.001 63 -49 28
57 -46 13
Temporal-parietal junction
63 -46 37
451 6.77 < 0.001 18 -100 16
3 -79 10
Middle occipital gyrus
-9 -79 7
Middle temporal gyrus 138 6.34 0.002 -36 -31 10
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-51 -25 -5and Superior temporal
sulcus -42 -31 -8
112 5.96 0.005 -45 11 -14Temporal pole
-54 5 -2
Inferior frontal gyrus 113 5.40 < 0.001 42 20 -8
39 23 4
Cingulate and Precuneus 204 5.30 < 0.001 -9 -22 43
0 -19 46
21 -34 49
Middle frontal gyrus 96 5.29 0.005 24 20 49
30 23 58
Cerebellum and
Thalamus 288 5.11 < 0.001 6 -16 4
24 -22 4
-6 -16 -2
60 4.86 0.020 -39 -25 40Primary motor cortex and
Inferior parietal lobe -48 -25 40
-39 -28 28
Cuneus 155 4.44 <0.001 6 -79 37
6 -79 49
-6 -70 46
Superior parietal lobe 61 3.82 0.048 0 -49 58
-3 -49 49
Eye contact effect:
Simple Effect: Direct-cong > averted-cong
Medial prefrontal cortex 45 7.37 < 0.001 9 -10 1
47 5.64 < 0.001 15 44 13
77 7.19 < 0.001 48 -46 1
48 -40 -5
Superior temporal sulcus/
Middle temporal gyrus
51 -31 -11
Inferior parietal lobe 84 6.70 < 0.001 51 -46 49
54 -49 49
45 -70 40
Interaction
(Direct-Cong > Direct-Incong) > (Averted-Cong > Averted-Incong)
Superior temporal sulcus 53 7.12 < 0.001 -48 -19 -2
-51 -28 -2
-57 -34 4
Medial prefrontal cortex 128 6.76 < 0.001 6 44 34
15 44 16
Inferior frontal gyrus 94 6.22 < 0.001 45 26 -17
39 26 -23
24 14 -26
Note. Only regions surviving a whole-brain voxel-level threshold of p<0.001
and a FWE cluster-corrected level threshold of p<0.05 are reported.
Subpeaks more than 8 mm from the main peak in each cluster are listed.
Control of Mimicry by mPFC: Results
124
Figure 4-2. Bain regions showing increased activations for (a) the
hand movement task, (b) the simple effect of inhibition of mimicry,
(c) the simple effect of eye contact, (d) the interaction of gaze and
mimicry. Coordinates are listed in Table 1.
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Figure 4-4. Activations in mPFC. (a) Mapping of activations of the
inhibition of mimicry and the eye contact effect in current study. Areas
with red color represent the simple effect of the inhibition of mimicry.
Areas with cyan color represent the simple effect of eye contact. White
region is the overlap of the two activations. Bold black line represents
the functional border between posterior and anterior mPFC in Amodio
and Frith’ s (2006) review paper (b) Comparisons of mPFC activation
for the mimicry-gaze interaction between current study and two
related studies. Blue region represents the mPFC activation for
interaction in current study. Red region represents the mPFC
activation for the eye contact effect in Kampe et al., (2003). Cyan
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region represents the mPFC activation for the inhibition of mimicry in
Brass et al., (2001). White region was the overlap of the two past
studies. (c) Parameter estimates (SPM betas) for mPFC activations
emerged from the interaction contrast in each experimental condition.
DCM and BMS results
Figure 4-5a (right) shows the relative group log-evidences across the 12
models and the structure of the best model (model 4). The relative group log-
evidences refer to log-evidences summed over 17 subjects for 12 models
relative to the worst model. The FFX group analysis provided strong evidence
for model 4, as the difference of the relative group log-evidence between
model 4 and the second best model (model 10) was 3.52. The RFX analysis
on the same set of models gave a compatible result, with model 4 providing
the best description of the observed data. As shown in Figure 4-5b (right),
model4 was associated with the largest model exceedance probability of
0.195, which is much more than the exceedance probability of 1/12=0.083
when assuming a uniform distribution over models. As the exceedance
probability of a particular model in the RFX analysis does not only depend on
the data but also the set of models tested, we also directly compared the top
two models 4 and 10 in RFX analysis. Again BMS revealed a high
exceedance probability favoring model 4 relative to model 10 of 0.96.
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Figure 4-5. The optimal model selected by the FFX analysis (a)
and RFX analysis (b). The Left graph in each analysis showed the
parameters for the optimal model, no 4. Values are the across-
subjects mean (SD) of rate constants for intrinsic connections, direct
effects of extrinsic inputs and modulatory effects on a certain
connection, estimated by DCM10 (p<0.05 in t-test indicated by solid
lines). The right graph in each analysis showed the results of
Bayesian model selection. The relative group model evidence (a) and
model exceedance probability (b) is the highest for model 4.
The left column in Figure 4-5 illustrates model 4 with the parameter
estimates from the FFX and RFX analyses. In this top-down modulation model,
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the interaction conditions engage mPFC and enhance the connection from
mPFC to STS, while hand movement task engages STS and significantly
enhances the connection from STS to IFG. As all 12 models were equated for
the parameter number of extrinsic inputs, intrinsic connectivity structure and
modulatory effects, the difference in model evidence is only due to model fit
and not model complexity. The magnitude of these effects can be seen in the
rate constants given on each arrow (numbers in brackets are standard
deviation). The rate constant refers to the rate of change of neuronal activity
(hertz) in one area as induced by another area or by an extrinsic input. For
intrinsic connections, only the rate constants of two connections, mPFC ĺ
STS and mPFC ĺ ,)* ZHUH VLJQLILFDQWO\ GLIIHUHQW IURP ]HUR W17=8.20,
p<0.001 and t17=6.29, p<0.001, respectively). Figure 4-5 also shows the
average rate constants in mPFC induced by interaction (red line) and the
average rate constants in STS induced by hand movement task (blue line).
Consistent with conventional GLM analysis, the rate of the neuronal activity in
mPFC was significantly enhanced by 0.05 Hertz in interaction conditions and
the neuronal activity in STS was significantly increased by 0.05 Hertz when
subjects performed the hand movement task. Moreover, Figure 4-5 shows the
average rate constants for the modulatory effects on the intrinsic connections
by the interaction and the task. When eye contact interacts with mimicry, the
average rate constant of the connection strength from mPFC to STS
significantly increased from 0.30 to 0.55 in FFX analysis and from 0.29 to 0.46
in RFX analysis (note that the rate constants for intrinsic connection and
modulatory effects are additive, thus 0.30+0.25=0.55 in FFX analysis or
0.29+0.17=0.46 in RFX analysis). When subjects were engaged in the hand
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movement task, the connection from STS to IFG had a significant increase in
rate constants from near zero to 0.34-0.35. These parameters for the optimal
model highlight three important features of our data: First, the two significant
intrinsic connections from mPFC to STS and from mPFC to IFG suggest that
mPFC persistently modulates activity of IFG and STS, regardless of task or
stimuli. Second, the hand movement task involves more information
propagation between different parts of MNS, especially the connection from
sensory input part (STS) to motoric part (IFG). Third, the interaction conditions
directly influenced mPFC and enhanced the connection strength from mPFC
to STS. This supports our hypothesis that mPFC has a central role in the
control of mimicry by eye contact, and demonstrates that this control is
implemented at the input stage of the MNS (STS) rather than at the motor
output (IFG).
4.5 Discussion
Our study aimed to reveal the brain systems underlying the control of
mimicry by eye contact. The results were compatible with previous findings on
the role of the MNS in imitation tasks and the role of mPFC in the inhibition of
mimicry and eye contact effect. More importantly, we revealed an interaction
between mimicry and eye contact in mPFC, STS and IFG, suggesting these
three regions are critical in the control of mimicry by eye contact. The
subsequent DCM analysis supports a model in which mPFC is the origin of
this control and the connection strength between mPFC and STS was
increased during the interaction. We consider the implications of these results
for social cognition.
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Mimicry, the eye contact effect and the inhibition of mimicry
In accordance with a meta-analysis on action and imitation tasks (van
Overwalle and Kaeten, 2009), we report strong activations in IFG, parietal and
temporal regions including IPL and STS when participants performed the hand
movement task. In addition, we found the connection strength from STS to
IFG was significantly enhanced by the hand movement task, which supports
the crucial role of these two regions in the basic sensory-motor mapping
process.
Our results are consistent with previous studies of gaze processing.
When participants were engaged in congruent hand movements, a clear eye
contact effect emerged in mPFC, STS, and IPL. Activation of mPFC and STS
by direct gaze is consistent with previous fMRI studies in humans (Kampe et
al., 2003; Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009; Senju and Johnson, 2009) and
single-cell recordings in monkeys (Perrett et al., 1992; Emery, 2000), which
together suggest that STS and mPFC are important for gaze processing.
However, just as the behavioral results in Chapter 2 showed that reaction time
in incongruent trials did not change by gaze conditions, the current fMRI data
demonstrated that no brain regions showed more activation to direct gaze
than averted gaze in incongruent trials.
Our results are also in line with previous studies of the inhibition of
mimicry. In averted gaze conditions, trials requiring inhibition of mimicry
engaged portions of the frontal lobe (mPFC, IFG, MFG) and TPJ. This pattern
of activation resembles that previously reported by other researchers (Brass
et al., 2001a, 2005, 2009) in which they used a different stimulus-response
compatibility paradigm to study the inhibition of mimicry. Frontal lobe activity
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during inhibitory processes is also supported by early clinical findings that
inhibition of inappropriate responses (e.g. incongruent trials) is a function
performed in the frontal lobe (Luria, 1980; Vendrell, 1995). However, it is
important to note that these frontal brain regions only showed greater
activations to incongruent trials in averted gaze conditions, but not in direct
gaze conditions. In particular, Figure 4-4c shows that mPFC is activated in all
three direct gaze conditions (direct-congruent, direct-incongruent and direct-
catch), with no reliable differences between them. In our paradigm, gaze
information was available near the start of the trial whilst the type of mimicry
was not apparent until near the end of the trial. Consequently, we suggest that
in direct gaze conditions, strong BOLD signal in mPFC elicited by eye contact
dominates the later BOLD signal elicited by the inhibition of mimicry in
incongruent trials.
Moreover, it is interesting to see that mPFC regions engaged by the
inhibition of mimicry and by eye contact overlap (Figure 4-4a). These results
support Brass and colleagues’ claim that inhibition of mimicry overlaps with
higher level social-cognitive abilities both at the functional and the neural level
(Brass et al., 2009). By asking participants to complete a mimicry-inhibition
task, a mentalizing task and a paradigm assessing self-referential judgments,
Spengler et al. (2010a) found an overlap of activated brain regions in mPFC
between the mimicry-inhibition task and the other two social cognition tasks.
They also used neuropsychological evidence from patients with prefrontal and
temporo-parietal lesions to show that the inhibition of mimicry is functionally
linked to aspects of social cognitive processing. Here, we found another social
cognitive ability—gaze processing—anatomically overlapping with the
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inhibition of mimicry. Future studies can explore whether gaze processing and
the inhibition of mimicry are functionally linked in patients with prefrontal
lesions.
The role of mPFC in the control of mimicry by eye contact
The critical analysis in the present study was of the interaction between
mimicry and eye contact. Our previous study demonstrated a behavioral
interaction, with direct gaze enhancing mimicry (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3).
Here, our fMRI analysis showed the engagement of mPFC, STS and IFG in
this interaction, which is consistent with our hypothesis that mPFC is a key
mediator in how eye contact modulates mimicry. To distinguish the roles of
mPFC, STS and IFG in this interaction, we used a DCM approach that tests
the functional connectivity of these regions. The DCM analysis revealed a
best-fitting model in which the interaction of mimicry and eye contact activates
mPFC and alters the connection strength from mPFC to STS. This suggests
that mPFC is the originator of the eye contact effect, and this region
modulates sensory processes in STS which in turn impacts on IFG. In
cognitive terms, mPFC seems to impose top-down control on how actions are
processed in STS and IFG.
Inspection of the parameter estimates in mPFC (Figure 4-4) provides
hints about the underlying mechanisms. Direct-congruent and averted-
incongruent trials are two orthogonal conditions that are believed to have
distinct cognitive processes. Strong activation of mPFC in these two
conditions (Figure 4-4c) suggests that they both demand a strong level of top-
down control, with inhibition in the case of the averted-incongruent trials and
enhancement in the case of direct-congruent trials. This interpretation
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assumes that the BOLD signal does not distinguish inhibition from
enhancement but just reflects the overall amount of control. This is also
evident in the other conditions, where averted-congruent and averted-catch
have the lowest mPFC signal, because these two conditions require neither
enhancement nor inhibition. The DCM analysis revealed that in the interaction
contrast [(Direct-Cong > Direct-Incong) > (Averted-Cong > Averted-Incong)]
connectivity from mPFC to STS is increased, which suggests that the same
pattern of enhancement and inhibition acts on STS. Unfortunately, the DCM
design does not permit a simple-effect analysis to confirm this (Stephan et al.,
2010). The suggestion that mPFC can both enhance and inhibit mimicry takes
our results beyond previous research (Brass et al.,2001a) which emphasized
only an inhibitory role for mPFC.
The precise anatomical location of the mPFC cluster supports this
possibility that this cluster contains distinct neuronal populations with
excitatory and inhibitory roles (Figure 4-4a). A meta-analysis of task-related
neural activations in mPFC revealed three functional divisions within this
region (Amodio and Frith, 2006). The posterior region of mPFC is activated in
response inhibition tasks; the anterior region is responsible for facilitating
social cognition tasks involving mentalising; the orbital region has been linked
to the punishment or reward monitoring. When the location of the mPFC
cluster in our data was mapped onto these three functional divisions, we
found that it was just at the boundary between posterior and anterior mPFC
(Figure 4-4a). It was more dorsal than other studies simply testing the
inhibition of mimicry (Brass et al., 2001a) or the eye contact effect (Kampe et
al., 2003) (Figure 4-4b). As the posterior region involves response inhibition
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and the anterior region is responsible for facilitating the performance in social
cognition tasks, the boundary location supports the possibility that this region
of mPFC can both enhance and inhibit mimicry in different contexts. Further
studies will be needed to clarify how control signals originating from different
neuronal populations within mPFC related to both BOLD signal and reaction
time measures.
Broader Implications
In a broader cognitive framework, our findings support current theories
suggesting that mimicry in social contexts requires brain systems beyond the
MNS (Southgate and Hamilton, 2008; Brass, et al, 2009). In particular, it has
been suggested that basic imitation mechanisms implemented in the MNS
must be subtly controlled by other social cues (Southgate and Hamilton, 2008).
These social cues could act either on the input to the MNS or on the outputs
from the MNS (Heyes, 2011). Previous studies of the inhibition of mimicry
(Brass et al, 2005, 2009) showed that mPFC mediates modulation to the
output of the MNS. Our DCM analysis complements these findings and shows
that under different social gazes, mPFC enhances mimicry by modulating an
input to the MNS. More specifically, MNS input is modulated via changing the
connection strength from mPFC to STS. Thus, these data are compatible with
Heyes’ model which suggests mimicry can be modulated by changing either
input to or output from the MNS but not changing the sensorimotor mapping
itself (Heyes, 2011).
Moreover, numerous behavioural studies suggest that imitation is flexible
and can be influenced by higher level cognitive and affective processes, such
as mindsets (van Baaren et al., 2009), social status (Cheng and Chartrand,
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2003), social attitude (Leighton et al., 2010), strategy (Rumiati et al, 2009),
intentionality (Massen and Prinz, 2009), rationality (Gergely et al., 2002) and
eye contact (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). Several of these processes have
previously been linked to mPFC, including responses to social status (Zink et
al., 2008), rationality (Brass et al., 2007) and eye contact (Kampe et al., 2003).
Our study is the first to investigate the relationship between social sensitivity
in mPFC and the control of imitation, and specifically demonstrated that
mPFC controls mimicry online by modulating the sensory input of the MNS. In
the future, it will be interesting to test whether other higher level social
cognitive processes modulate mimicry through the mediation of mPFC and
how mPFC influences the input or output of the MNS.
The present study focused on eye contact because this is a rapidly
processed social cue (Senju and Johnson, 2009). Detection of eye contact
may be one way to initialize a communication and begin focusing on another
person’s mental state (Kampe et al., 2003). Our data provide initial evidence
that mPFC both responds to eye contact and uses this to control mimicry
behavior. This places mPFC at the core of online social interaction, with a
critical role in the subtle decision of who and when to imitate. The results
further hint that dysfunction of these social evaluation processes in mPFC
would have a detrimental impact on imitation behaviour, as seen in autistic
spectrum disorder (Southgate and Hamilton, 2008).
4.6 Conclusion
To conclude, the results of this study reveal different brain systems
underlying the inhibition of mimicry and the eye contact effect. More
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importantly, we revealed the critical role of mPFC in the interaction between
mimicry and gaze. This region acts as a key controller of mimicry by eye
contact and performs this function by modulating sensory inputs to action
systems. These findings confirm the controlling role of mPFC in social
interaction and demonstrate how different components of the social brain,
both the mPFC and the MNS, work together to rapidly control spontaneous
mimicry according to the social context.
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Chapter 5. Mimicry is strategic: likeability
and social status interact in driving
mimicry
5.1 Abstract
In the workplace, people may respond differently to a nasty boss than to
a nasty subordinate. Mimicry is one social response which facilitates affiliation
and social interaction. Past studies found that positive features of a target
such as niceness, attractiveness and high social status induce more mimicry
to the target, while negative features such as low social status and outgroup
membership reduce mimicry. The current chapter investigated the joint effect
of two critical features, likeability and social status, on mimicry and asked if
mimicry is simply driven by the summation of the two features or is more
strategically driven by affiliative consequences. Participants were introduced
to four actresses in video clips, a nice actress with high status, a nice actress
with low status, a nasty actress with high status and a nasty actress with low
status. They played a finger tapping game with each actress which measured
mimicry. The results revealed a significant interaction between likeability and
social status which supports the strategic model of mimicry: participants mimic
the nasty actress with high status the most and the nasty actress with low
status the least. These findings have important implications for understanding
the causes and functions of mimicry in the real world.
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5.2 Introduction
Mimicry is the tendency to unconsciously copy the postures, gestures,
and mannerisms of others (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009). Uncovering
causes and consequences of mimicry is important for understanding human
social behaviour. Past studies on the consequences of mimicry have found
that mimicry enhances liking, affiliation and rapport among people (Chartrand
and van Baaren, 2009) and promotes one’s prosocial orientation to others
(van Baaren et al., 2004). Mimicry also leads to a convergence in attitudes
and opinions (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009). Thus, mimicry has been
described as a ‘social glue’ to bind people together (Lakin and Chartrand,
2003).
However, the causes of mimicry are still not entirely clear. Why do people
spontaneously mimic each other? And why do they show more mimicry to
some people but less to others? Multiple studies reveal that human mimicry
behaviour can be enhanced by positive social cues. Participants show
stronger mimicry when interacting with an important or likeable target, such as
friends, in-group members, high status targets, physically attractive individuals
and those with likeable traits (Yabar et al., 2006; Stel et al., 2010b; Bourgeois
and Hess, 2008; Cheng and Chartrand, 2003; van Leeuwen et al., 2009). In
contrast, mimicry is attenuated by negative social cues. People seldom mimic
targets with nasty traits or with visible signs of social stigma (Johnston, 2002).
Negative stereotypes on the targets, such as a racist’s point of view, can also
inhibit mimicry (van Baaren et al., 2003b, 2006; Stel et al., 2010b). These
results could all be accounted for under a simple summation model, in which
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the amount of mimicry is determined by a simple, stimulus-driven mechanism
which sums up the positive and negative features of the target and mimics
more when more positive features are present.
In contrast to this summation model, it has been hypothesised that
mimicry is caused by a more sophisticated and strategic mechanism (Lakin
and Chartrand, 2003; Lakin et al., 2003, 2008). As mentioned above, a major
consequence of mimicry is to enhance liking and affiliation toward the
mimicker (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Maddux et al, 2008; Bailenson and Yee,
2005; Ashton-James et al., 2007). A strategic mimicry mechanism could take
advantage of this outcome to make people unconsciously mimic more when a
social advantage will result. Under this model, mimicry is not just a summed
response to social cues, but is strategically driven by an estimation of the
consequences of the mimicry. Where there is a stronger strategic need to
affiliate perhaps because a target has high social status, a participant would
show more mimicry.
This strategic hypothesis of mimicry was supported by some studies
where people who have a goal to affiliate with others show more mimicry
behaviours (Lakin and Chartrand, 2003). Some other evidence can be seen in
studies where being ostracized by others or surrounded by a disharmonious
social atmosphere can increase mimicry (Over and Carpenter, 2009a; Lakin
and Chartrand, 2003). However, few experiments have directly distinguished
between a feature summation model of mimicry and a strategic model of
mimicry.
In the present chapter, we aim to test these two models of mimicry.
Previous studies on the causes of mimicry have only investigated one social
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factor at a time, which makes it difficult to distinguish these two models. Here,
we directly compare two social factors, likeability and social status, and
explore their joint effect on mimicry. Undergraduate subjects were introduced
four actresses, apparently for a memory task. Likeability and social status of
each actress were manipulated via vignettes which characterized the
actresses as nice with high status, nice with low status, nasty with high status
and nasty with low status. After memorizing the vignettes, participants
performed a simple finger tapping task (Brass et al., 2000, 2005; see 1.2.1)
which provides a measure of mimicry to each of the four actresses. Previous
studies suggest that when social status is equal or unknown, people mimic
nice targets more than nasty ones (Stel et al., 2010b), and when personality is
unknown, people mimic high status targets more than low status ones
(Mastrop et al. 2011; Cheng and Chartrand, 2003; Giles and Powesland, 1975;
Brody and Stoneman, 1981; Kwaadsteniet and van Dijk, 2010).
The two different models of mimicry provide different predictions for the
combination of these two factors. If mimicry is driven by a simple summation
of positive or negative features of the stimuli, the results should show a linear
response to a combination of likeability and status, with the highest mimicry
for the nice, high status actress. In contrast, if mimicry is strategically driven
by the needs to affiliate with others, then the mimicry for the nice, high status
actress should not be the highest because it is not necessary to strategically
use mimicry to build an affiliation with a target who is already nice. Instead,
participants will mimic the nasty actress with high status more than other
actresses, as this actress is potentially influential but also presents the
greatest challenge in building affiliation, so participants have to recruit more
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mimicry to get along well with them. The present study will test these
alternatives.
5.3 Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-four undergraduates from the University of Nottingham gave their
informed consent to participate in this study (19 females, 5 males; mean age
20.1; age range 18 -21; S.D. 1.23 years), and were paid for their participation.
All were right-handed, native English speaker and naïve as to the purpose of
the study.
Actress memory stimuli
Videos of four different actresses (two aged 16 years, two age 25 years)
were used. In preparing the videos, eighteen women at age 16 and seventeen
women at age 25 were filmed, and the clips were all rated for attractiveness
and likeability by twenty-four pilot undergraduates (who did not take part in the
main experiment). The four videos with the most similar ratings on both scales
were chosen for the study, to ensure that actress characteristics were
accurately matched.
A booklet of four pages was prepared, each with a profile photo and a
vignette that described a fictitious person. In the vignette (see 5.7 Appendix),
participants were informed of the actress’ age (16 or 25) and current
education stage (school or postgraduate), which was manipulated to arouse
either a low or a high social status for the character. Age and education were
used as proxies for social status because previous studies show that older /
more educated students are regarded as higher social status than younger /
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less educated student (Hollingshead, 1957, 1975; Benoit-Smullyan, 1944;
Feldman and Dodge, 1987). The vignette also mentioned good or bad
behaviour that the actress did in the past, which was designed to invoke either
a nice or a nasty personality for the character. These vignettes created four
different actresses: a nice one with high status, a nice one with low status, a
nasty one with high status, a nasty one with low status. The structure and the
tone of the vignettes were similar to Kozak et al., (2006).
Finger tapping task
Different from studies in previous chapters, here we used another SRC
paradigm to measure mimicry—the ‘finger tapping task’ (Brass et al., 2000;
2005; Bertenthal et al., 2006; see 1.2.1). In each trial, participants first watch a
three-second video (Figure 5-1). At the onset of the video, an actress appears
with her left hand placed below her chin and her face looking away from the
camera. A white square was superimposed between her index and middle
finger. Then the actress naturally moved her head towards the camera which
resulted in a direct gaze and a little smile, like an everyday greeting. This gaze
cue was designed to maximise the potential for mimicry, because previous
chapters show that direct gaze enhances the tendency to mimic. After the
gaze stimulus, a number (1 or 2) appeared on the white box and her left hand
performed a finger tapping movement either using index finger or middle
finger. The participants task was to respond to the number stimulus (1: index
finger, 2: middle finger) as fast as possible and ignore the actress’ hand
movement.
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Figure 5-1. Examples of the procedure and stimuli. Participants
had to complete one page of memory task and one block of finger
tapping task each time (see text for details).
In congruent trials, the actress’ hand executed an identical finger
movement to the instructed movement, while in incongruent trials the
movement executed by her hand on the screen was different from the
instructed movement. In baseline trials, her hand on the screen did not
perform any hand movement, only the number appeared (Brass et al.,2000,
2005). Past studies found that observing an action automatically activates the
motor representation of that action and participants unconsciously and
spontaneously mimic the moving finger in the finger tapping task (Brass et al.,
2000, 2005; Bertenthal et al., 2006). Therefore in congruent trials they were
facilitated by the mimicry of observed action while in incongruent trials
participants had to enforce the intended action against the mimicry of
observed action; their actions were not influenced in the baseline trials. As in
previous chapters, mimicry can be assessed by calculating the congruency
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effect (CE)—the reaction time difference between congruent trials and
incongruent trials.
In order to make participants familiar with the finger tapping task, they
performed a practice session before all the testing sessions. There were 5
incongruent trials, 5 congruent trials and 5 baselines presented randomly in
the practice session. Then the task in testing sessions involved 16
incongruent trials, 16 congruent trials and 8 baselines in a randomized order.
Delay between the end of head movement and the onset of number was
either 200 or 800 ms, to make participants unable to predict the onset of the
number. Matlab software and Cogent was used for stimulus presentation and
data collection.
Procedure
Each participant was tested individually. First, participants were asked to
memorize one page of vignette about one of the four actresses. Then they
performed the finger tapping task with that actress featured in the video stimuli.
This procedure was repeated for the other three actresses (Figure 5-1). Order
of actress presentation was counterbalanced across participants, as was the
pairing of each actress’ face with each vignette. At the end of the experiment,
each participant was required to complete a memory questionnaire about
each actress’ age, likeability and social status, as a manipulation check.
Participants did multiple choices on the actress’ age and name, and rated
each actress’ likeability and physical attractiveness on a five point scales,
ranging from 1 (not very likeable/attractive) to 5 (very likeable/ attractive).
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5.4 Results
Finger tapping task
To remove trials in which participants did not attend to the number stimuli,
incorrect responses (0.05%) were excluded from the analysis, as were all RTs
smaller than 100ms or greater 800ms (0.13%). To minimize the effect of
outliers, we also excluded RTs that were greater than two standard deviations
from the conditional means of each participant (0.18%). The congruency effect
(CE) for each participant was calculated by subtracting reaction time (RT) in
congruent trials from RT in incongruent trials.
A two-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted on participants’ CE with actress’ likeability (nice, nasty) and social
status (high, low) as variables. The two-way analysis revealed a significant
interaction on CE: likeability × social status (F(1,23)=4.70, p<0.041) (Figure 5-
2a). The CE to the nasty actress with high status was the largest
(M=24.82ms), followed by the nice actress with low status (M=18.04ms) and
nice actress with high status (M=17.26ms); the nasty actress with low status
induced the smallest CE (M=6.92ms). Post hoc t-test showed the CE to nasty
actress with high status is significantly different from the CE to nasty actress
with low status (t (23) = 3.42, p<0.016) (Figure 5-2a). There was no main
effects of likeability (p=0.594) or social status (p=0.142) on CE.
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Figure 5-2. Mean congruency effect (a) and Mean reaction time on
congruent, incongruent and baseline trials (b) for each of the four
actresses. Asterisk represents the statistically significant difference
between two bars. Vertical bars indicate S.E
In order to further explore the underlying mechanism of this two-way
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interaction, we performed a three-way ANOVA on participants’ mean RT with
congruency (congruent, incongruent, baseline), actress’ likeability (nice, nasty)
and social status (high, low) as variables. First, the three-way ANOVA analysis
revealed a significant main effect of congruency (F(1,23)=13.6, p<0.001); on
average, responses were slower for incongruent trials (M=440ms) than for
baseline trials (M=426ms) and congruent trials (M=423ms). Other main effects
such as likeability (p=0.770) or social status (p=0.773) were not significant.
Second, there was a significant interaction on RT: Congruency × Likeability ×
Social status (F(1,23)=4.70, p<0.041) (Figure 5-2b), which was consistent with
the two-way ANOVA results. Post hoc t-test revealed that the significant CE
difference between nasty actress with high status and nasty actress with low
status (Figure 5-2a) was due to the significant RT difference in their
incongruent trials (t (23) = 2.25, p<0.034), as the congruent and baseline
responses in the two groups were statistically unaltered (Figure 5-2b). Other
interactions such as Congruency × Likeability (p=0.594) or Congruency ×
Social status (p=0.142) were not significant on mean RT.
Manipulation check
Participants answered all age-related questions correctly (0% error rate)
in the memory questionnaire, which indicated the success of social status
manipulation. The scores on likeability and attractiveness in the questionnaire
were all further analysed with a two-way repeated measures ANOVA (with
personality priming and social status priming as two variables). It revealed a
significant main effect of personality priming on likeability rating (F(1,11)=24.62,
p<0.001), as well as on attractiveness rating (F(1,11)=18.96, p<0.001); each
actress’ likeability and attractiveness, which were rated as equal before any
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personality priming, were rated higher when they were primed with a nice
personality and were rated lower when they were primed with a nasty
personality (Figure 5-3a). A Pearson’s correlation test also revealed a
significant positive correlation between likeability rating and attractiveness
rating (F=54.38, p<0.001). There was no main effect of social status priming
on either the likeability score (p=0.924) or attractiveness score (p=0.972).
We also examined the relationship between the likeability/attractiveness
scores and the corresponding CE to that actress. As the scores of likeability
and attractiveness were positively correlated, we used their sum (ranges from
2 to 10; 10 is most likeable and attractive) as the independent variable in the
linear regression test to see how it predicts the CE. Dummy variables were
included as the controlling of repeated measures on the same participant. The
results revealed no significant linear models for the prediction of CE by the
sum score within each type of the actress; however, when actresses with the
same status (high or low) were analyzed together (Figure 5-3b), we found a
significant linear model in the low status group suggesting a positive
correlation between the sum score and CE (R2=0.728, p=0.014) and a
marginally significant linear model in high status group suggesting a negative
correlation between the sum score and CE (R2=0.656, p=0.077). These two
linear models suggest that the more participants like the low status actress or
feel her attractive, the stronger the CE was; inversely, the more participants
dislike the high status actress or feel her not attractive, the stronger the CE
was induced.
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Figure 5-3. Mean scores of likeability and attractiveness for each
actress in different priming conditions (a) and the linear regression
test for the relationship between the sum score (likeability +
attractiveness) and CE induced either by low status actresses or
high status actresses (b). Along the horizontal coordinate in (a), 1
and 2 represents two actresses aged 28 and 3 and 4 represents
another two actresses aged 16. “Before priming” represents the
scores in the pilot study where there was no priming manipulation.
Vertical bars indicate S.E. The black dot line in (b) represents the
curve estimation of the two linear models.
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5.5 Discussion
The results of current study demonstrated that likeability and social status
interact in modulating mimicry. Specifically, likeability enhanced mimicry when
the actresses were low status but inhibited mimicry when the actresses were
high status. The results also support the second theoretical prediction that
mimicry is strategically driven by consequence, as participants mimic the
nasty actress with high status most.
Implications for social psychology
Our study aimed to distinguish two models of mimicry, a simple
summation model and a strategic model. We found that mimicry is not simply
driven by the summation of the positive features of the actress; instead, it is
strategically driven by the consequences of mimicry. Negative features, such
as a nasty personality, usually inhibit people’s mimicry to the target (Stel et al.,
2010b; Johnston, 2002), so did the nasty actress with low status in current
study (Figure 5-3b, left). However, this inhibitory effect by a negative feature is
completely reversed when the nasty actress had a higher social status. At that
point, although the actress is nasty, as long as she is high status and
dominant to participants, they have to strategically use mimicry as an effective
and efficient way to get along with this important but nasty actress. In contrast,
intermediate levels of mimicry were seen for the two nice actresses,
regardless of status.
This conclusion on the strategic nature of mimicry is consistent with a
recent study about the effect of the romantic relationship on mimicry. People
usually mimic an attractive target more than an ordinary appearance target
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(van Leeuwen et al., 2009), however, Karremans and Verwijmeren (2008)
found that participants who were in a relationship mimicked an attractive
opposite-sex target much less than those not involved. The romantic
relationship suppressed the facilitative effect of an attractive opposite-sex
target on mimicry, which they explained is a strategic way to shield current
relationship. Similarly, it has also been reported that people strategically mimic
facial expressions to maintain and regulate social relationships. Bourgeois
and Hess (2008) found that people mimic positive expressions displayed by a
target such as happiness, but never mimic negative expressions such as
anger; more importantly, they only mimic sadness when the target is close to
them (a friend or in-group member). These studies are consistent with our
conclusion that, despite being an unconscious, rapid and spontaneous
phenomenon, mimicry is not determined by a simple stimulus-driven
summation mechanism, but is deployed strategically with consideration of the
consequences of the mimicry act.
It is important to note that the actions (finger tapping) we used here to
measure mimicry were not indicative of social status. Recent research
demonstrated that people mimic status-related behaviours (such as body
expansion as a dominance behaviour and body constricted as a submissive
behaviour) differently from status-unrelated behaviours (Mastop et al. 2011).
As mimicking high-status target’s dominant behaviours may destroy
hierarchical balance (Strong et al., 1988), people only mimic the submissive
behaviours but seldom mimic the dominant behaviours; instead they
complement the dominant behaviours. In the future it will be interesting to see
how likeability and social status interact on mimicry when targets are doing
Strategic Mimicry by Likeability and Social Status: Discussion
152
status-related behaviours and whether it is still strategic-driven.
One possible criticism of our approach is the use of a simple rapid finger
tapping task rather than the more naturalistic paradigms commonly used to
study the ‘chameleon effect’ (Chartrand and van Baaren 2009). Though our
SRC paradigm puts participants in a more controlled and minimal context
compared to the natural interaction paradigm (see 1.1.1), participants in both
paradigms are unaware that the experimenter is recording mimicry behaviours
or that mimicry is the subject of the investigation. Thus, both paradigms
investigate unconscious, spontaneous mimicry. Moreover, consistent results
have been obtained using both approaches (Leighton et al., 2010; Lakin and
Chartrand, 2003). Thus the congruency effect measured by controlled
paradigm can be regarded as equivalent to the unconscious mimicry
measured by naturalistic studies (Heyes, 2011).
There are advantages to our paradigm, because it allows us to
investigate more factors in a single study, which was critical for this
experimental design. Our video stimuli and finger tapping task provide careful
control of critical features like stimulus-response timing, and of factors which
might modulate mimicry, such as eye contact (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) and
emotion (van Barren et al., 2006). Finally, the controlled paradigm allows us to
determine the underlying mechanism of the modulation. Naturalistic
paradigms only measure the increased/decreased number of mimicry
behaviours caused by a certain modulator, but without providing information
on how the modulator increases/decreases mimicry. Here the paradigm can
inform us about the cognitive processes underlying control of mimicry.
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Neurocognitive theories of mimicry
To understand the mechanism underlying the interaction, we examined
the exact RT in congruent, incongruent and baseline trials within two nasty
groups (Figure 5-2b). We found that in incongruent trials, the RT to nasty
actresses with high status was much slower than to nasty actresses with low
status; but in congruent and baseline trials, they were same. As the time
difference between incongruent and baseline trials reflects the process of
inhibition of mimicry, this substantial slower RT in incongruent trials suggests
that participants need more time and efforts to inhibit the mimicry to a nasty
target with high status than to a nasty target with low status. Thus, it is the
modulation of the inhibition of mimicry by the social status of the nasty actress
that contributes to this interaction. Slower RT on incongruent trials here
contrasts with another study where direct gaze modulates mimicry by
enhancing the RT of congruent trials (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), and suggests
that different cognitive modulation mechanisms may be at work.
Our findings also have important implications for understanding the
neurocognitive causes and control of mimicry. Research in cognitive
neuroscience suggests that the mirror neuron system provides the
mechanism of mimicry (Iacoboni et al., 1999), but recent theories emphasize
how these systems can be modulated and controlled by other components of
the social brain (Southgate and Hamilton 2009, Teufel et al., 2010). Our
results support this idea, demonstrating sophisticated and strategic control
mechanisms which make mimicry more adaptive and efficient in social
interaction. Such mechanisms might well rely on brain regions beyond the
mirror neuron system. As patients with autism, echolalia and echopraxia often
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display improper and non-adaptive mimicry (Hamilton, 2008), it is plausible
that they suffer from the dysfunction of this strategic control of mimicry and
cannot benefit from the affiliative consequence of mimicry. Future research is
needed to validate this explanation.
5.6 Conclusions
In conclusion, the current research has demonstrated that mimicry is not
just an automatic, simple stimuli-driven response; instead, it is a sophisticated
response strategically driven by affiliative consequences. Social status and
likeability interact in driving mimicry, which makes mimicry more adaptive and
efficient in social interaction. These findings help us understand the causes
and functions of mimicry and learn more about human non-verbal social
behaviour.
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5.7 Appendix
Table 5-1. Vignettes for each type of actresses
Nice
with
High
Status
Emily is a 25-year-old postgraduate student at Cambridge
University. She works very hard in the lab and will finish her
PhD in biology next year. Out of the lab, she enjoys working in
the Student Union. At the weekend, Emily likes to go to
parties, hang out with friends and spend time with her family
who live nearby. Most people find Emily to be friendly and
easy-going. Recently, Emily received an award from her
school. She tutored several undergraduates in a biology class
and helped them improve their grades. The professor learned
that Emily was helping them without asking for any pay in
return and told the university. Emily received a service award
from the university. This is not the first time Emily has been
recognized for helping others. In school, Emily’s volunteer
work helping children with their reading earned her a small
scholarship prize.
Nasty
with
High
Status
Emma is a 25-year-old PhD student at Oxford University.
She majors in Chemistry, and is also interested in political
science. Outside class, she doesn’t participate in any
intramural activities, because she considers them to be boring
and a waste of time. At the weekend, Emma prefers to spend
time alone instead of with friends or with her family. Most
people find Emma to be arrogant and unapproachable.
Recently, Emma was in severe trouble at her work. She copied
a friend’s lab report and submitted it as her own. The professor
found out and reported it to the university. Emma is now on
academic probation. This is not the first time Emma has been
caught cheating. In secondary school, she plagiarized on a
term paper and was suspended for three days.
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Nice
with
Low
Status
Kate is a 16-year-old girl. She just finished her GCSEs and
is starting her A-levels. In extracurricular activities, she plays
football for her school team and gets on well with other
players. In her daily life, she is respectful and kind to everyone
whom she meets. She remembers every friend’s birthday, and
is always keen to organize a wonderful party for them. One
thing that is quite unique about Emily is her passion for helping
animals. She devotes a great deal of time helping to raise
money for local animal shelters as well as volunteering one
day a week working at the local humane society. After her A-
level, Emily hopes to either pursue a degree in veterinary
medicine or public health.
Nasty
with
Low
Status
Rachel is a 16-year-old girl. She is starting her A-level in
chemistry. Although she is intelligent at school and has always
had good marks for coursework, most classmates think she is
arrogant and unfriendly. She often teases her classmates
when they get bad marks, while boasting about her own
success. Outside class, she spends time alone reading
novels, never going to parties with her classmates. She once
said her classmates were stupid and their parties are just
waste of time and money. She is known for her arrogance and
thinks she is the most attractive girl in the school. Because of
this, she doesn’t have many close friends. Rachel has been
telling everyone that she will go to Oxford in the future.
However, her teachers are not sure if she will get in.
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Chapter 6. Prosocial priming of mimicry
depends on who is prosocial
6.1 Abstract
People have a tendency to unconsciously mimic others. This mimicry is
flexible and can be modulated by multiple social factors. Past research in
social psychology revealed a close relationship between prosociality and
mimicry, with more prosocial priming leading to more mimicry. However, some
recent studies show that priming antisocial information such as ostracism can
also enhance mimicry. The present study aims to clarify the relationship
between pro/antisocial priming and mimicry, and to test if the self-relatedness
of the priming stimuli alters how mimicry is primed. Participants were primed
by pro/antisocial behaviors either from a first-person or third-person
perspective. Experiment 1 demonstrates that priming antisocial behavior by a
third party leads to increased mimicry. Experiment 2 replicated this effect, but
also demonstrates that priming prosocial behavior by the self leads to
increased mimicry. These findings of contrasting priming effects for first-
person and third-person pro/antisocial primes demonstrate the subtle
modulation of mimicry by social primes and hit at the underlying mechanisms.
6.2 Introduction
People have a tendency to unconscious imitate other’s actions, termed
“mimicry” (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999). This mimicry plays a critical role in
creating social bonds between people (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009) and
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making social interaction smoother (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999). Social
psychology suggests that mimicry is flexible and context-sensitive, and can be
modulated by multiple social factors such as motivation, attractiveness,
friendship and social status (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009).
Recent research revealed a close relationship between mimicry and
prosociality, with bidirectional causality (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009).
Mimicry causes people to become more prosocial in general, not just toward
the person whom they are mimicking or who is mimicking them, but to others
as well (van Baaren et al., 2004; Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009). For
example, people after a mimicry interaction sit closer to others (Ashton-James
et al., 2007), increase helpfulness toward strangers (van Baaren et al., 2004;
Fischer-Lokou et al., 2011), donate more money to a charity (Stel et al., 2008a)
and share a converging attitude with others (Maddux et al., 2008). Similarly,
prosociality leads to more mimicry. Early work demonstrated that posture
sharing was observed in classroom situations in which rapport already existed
(Bernieri, 1988; LaFrance, 1979, 1982). People with a prosocial self-construal
or high empathy ability tend to mimic others more than ones with an antisocial
self-construal or low empathy ability (van Barren et al., 2003b; Chartrand and
Bargh, 1999). Simply priming people with a prosocial goal or attitude
increases their mimicry behavior (Lakin and Chartrand, 2003; Leighton et al.,
2010). Even merely exposing people to prosocial stimuli such as prosocial
words or sentences is sufficient to enhance mimicry (Lakin and Chartrand,
2003; Leighton et al., 2010; Cook and Bird, 2011a).
In contrast, three studies recently found that in some situations, antisocial
primes can also enhance mimicry. People who experienced social ostracism
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(Lakin et al., 2008) or felt extremely distinct from the majority (Uldall et al.,
2011) mimic a subsequent interaction partner more than people in a control
condition. Over and Carpenter (2009a) showed that just witnessing someone
being excluded (a third-party ostracism priming) significantly enhances
mimicry in children. They explained that social ostracism induces a motivation
to affiliate with others and children strategically used mimicry to ingratiate
themselves with other group members. This explanation is compatible with a
battery of studies showing that witnessing social conflict activates one’s
prosocial motivations such as empathy/sympathy, consolation and helping
behavior towards the victim (Fujisawa et al., 2005, 2006; Vaish et al., 2009;
Vitaglione and Barnett, 2003). However, enhancement of mimicry by antisocial
behaviors priming seems to contradict the larger body of literature linking
mimicry to prosocial primes. It is not clear why these antisocial primes per se
failed to prime people with an antisocial goal or attitude (e.g. exclude others)
(Twenge et al., 2007; Over and Carpenter, 2009b) and thus decrease mimicry
as previous studies showed (Leighton et al., 2010; Chartrand and van Baaren,
2009). Thus, the literature on the priming of mimicry by pro or antisocial
stimuli seems very mixed.
Studies of priming in other automatic stereotypic behavior have also
yielded varied results. For example, priming of the concept of ‘elderly’ caused
participants to walk slower (Bargh et al., 1996) and priming of the concept of
intelligence caused participants to perform better on a general knowledge
questionnaire (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). However, priming of individual
exemplar of elder (e.g. 89 years old Dutch Queen Mother) and intelligence
(e.g. Einstein) can lead to the opposite effect (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998), with
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quicker walking speed and worse performance on the intelligence
questionnaire. Dijksterhuis et al., (2001) suggest these opposing effects can
be best understood in terms of how the prime is processed in relation to the
self, because the representation of social primes according to the self can
lead to either behavioral “assimilation” or “contrast” effect. It is possible that a
similar self-relatedness of primes is important in understanding pro/antisocial
priming in the context of mimicry. The present study allows us to test this
possibility.
Many previous studies of social priming on automatic behaviors
measured the impact of the prime on a single, natural setting task (e.g.
walking speed or number of mimicry actions) and all manipulations were
conducted between participants (e.g. participants were separately assigned to
different priming groups). Our approach in present study builds on the recent
finding that mimicry responses can be recorded in more carefully controlled
SRC tasks with multiple trials per participants (see a review paper by Heyes,
2011) and that these SRC tasks show the same priming effects as natural
encounters (Leighton et al., 2010; Cook and Bird, 2011a; Heyes, 2011). We
adopted a within-subjects priming design before these SRC tasks and
implemented all priming stimuli to each participant, to remove effects due to
individual differences in mimicry. Specifically, priming was induced by means
of a traditional ‘scrambled sentence task’ (Srull and Wyer, 1979) and each
participant was primed by three types of social behavior (prosocial, antisocial
and non-social). After each type of prime, we used a ‘finger tapping task’ to
measure their mimicry (see 1.2.1). In each trial, participants had to move their
index or middle finger in response to a number while viewing incongruent or
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congruent finger movements on a computer screen. Previous research found
faster responses to congruent than incongruent actions and took this
congruency effect as an accurate and reliable measure of mimicry (Heyes,
2011). Here in two experiments, we aim to examine whether and how pro/anti
social priming influences this congruence effect.
6.3 Experiment 1: Does pro/anti social priming alter
mimicry?
The first study aimed to test if priming of pro/anti social behavior has an
impact on mimicry in the context of our experimental task. Our design is very
similar to Leighton et al. (2010), though this study was conducted before we
were aware of Leighton’s findings. Participants had to complete scrambled
sentences where they were semantically primed by a series of pro/anti/non-
social behaviors between two fictional characters. We predicted that if other’s
prosocial behavior dominates one’s own automatic behaviour, we should see
stronger mimicry in prosocial conditions as shown by Leighton et al., (2010).
However, if priming other’s antisocial behavior somehow increases one’s
prosocial motivation, just as the third-party ostracism priming did (Over and
Carpenter, 2009a), we might see more mimicry in antisocial primes.
6.3.1 Materials and Methods
Participants
Nineteen students from the University of Nottingham gave their informed
consent to participate in this study (14 females and 5 males; average age 23.8;
S.D. 2.81 years), and were paid for their participation. All were right-handed,
Social Priming of Mimicry and Self-Relatedness: Does Social Priming alter Mimicry?
162
proficient in the English language, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and naïve as to the purpose of the study.
Stimuli
The priming manipulation took the form of “Scrambled Sentence Test”
(Srull and Wyer, 1979; see 1.1.1) in an A4 booklet. For each test sentence,
two words were already presented in a correct order in the answer sheet and
participants were required to use other six words out of a seven words list, to
construct a grammatically and semantically correct eight-word sentence.
Three types of scrambled-sentences were constructed (Figure 6-1): one was
designed to prime a prosocial behavior between two fictional characters
(e.g., ’John gives Laura a warm and affectionate hug’, ’Frank and Mary
cooperate to make model planes’); another was to prime participants with an
antisocial behavior between two characters (e.g., ‘Sam makes Jane weep for
a long time’, ‘Paul destroys Angelina’s new toy train on purpose’), and a third
was intended to prime neutral non-social information (e.g., ’A rainbow is made
of seven different colours’, ‘London is the capital of the United Kingdom’).
We adopted the ‘finger tapping task’ to measure mimicry (Brass et al.,
2000, 2005; Bertenthal et al., 2006). In the task, two-frame video sequences
of a hand were displayed on a computer monitor (Figure 6-1). The first frame
displayed a white blank box in the middle and around it a left hand was
naturally stretched on a plane. The second frame displayed two numbers (1 or
2) on the middle white box and meanwhile the left hand was performing an
finger tapping movement either using index finger or middle finger. The
interval between two frames varied (600, 1200, 1800ms).
Social Priming of Mimicry and Self-Relatedness: Does Social Priming alter Mimicry?
163
Figure 6-1. Examples of the priming sentences in the scrambled-
sentence task and the hand movement stimuli in the finger-taping
task. Each time participants had to complete one page of scrambled
sentences describing pro/anti/non social behaviours on a booklet and
then one block of finger tapping task on a computer where they had to
respond to a number cue in the middle of the screen and ignored a
congruent/ incongruent/still hand movement stimuli on the background.
They had to complete twelve pages of scrambled-sentence task and
twelve blocks of finger tapping task alternately.
Design and procedure
Participants were told that they were taking part in two independent tests
of language proficiency and motor control ability, and that the two tests would
be alternated to reduce boredom (Bengtsson et al., 2011). They had to
complete twelve pages of scrambled-sentence task and twelve blocks of
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finger tapping task. Each page of scrambled sentence task contained four
sentences and they were all designed to prime the same type of social
behaviors (prosocial, antisocial or non-social). Participants could use pencil to
write anything on the page for assistance but had to complete the four
sentences as quickly as possible. In order to consolidate the priming effect,
participants were also required to read their answers to the experimenter for a
correction check when they finished each page. The page sequence for
testing was randomized and different for each participant, to make sure that
they were primed by a specific social behavior in a different sequence.
Every time participants finished one page of scrambled sentence task,
they proceeded to a block of finger tapping task. Here, the finger tapping task
was identical to the one we used in Chapter 5. In each trial, participants were
instructed to move their index or middle finger in response to a number (1:
index finger, 2: middle finger) appeared in the white box while viewing
incongruent or congruent finger movements around the white box. In
congruent trials, the hand in the video frame executed an identical finger
movement to the instructed movement, while in congruent trials the movement
executed by the hand on the screen was different from the instructed
movement. In baseline trials, the hand on the screen did not perform any hand
movement, left only the number appearing. Participants were asked to
respond to the number as quickly as possible and to disregard the moving
finger in the background. Past studies found that observing an action
automatically activates the motor representation of that action and participants
unconsciously and immediately mimic the moving finger in the finger tapping
task (Brass et al., 2000, 2005; Bertenthal et al., 2006). Therefore in congruent
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trials they were facilitated by the mimicry of observed action while in
incongruent trials participants had to enforce the intended action against the
mimicry of observed action; their actions were not influenced in the baseline
trials. Mimicry is assessed by calculating the congruency effect (CE)—the
reaction time difference between congruent trials and incongruent trials. There
were 12 incongruent trials, 12 congruent trials and 12 baselines in a block of
the finger tapping task and they were in a pseudo-randomized order.
In order to make participants familiar with these two tasks, they performed
a practice session before all the testing sessions. There were three scrambled
sentences for practice, each exemplifying one type of priming (prosocial,
antisocial and non-social). A short version of the finger tapping task was also
prepared for practice, with 5 incongruent trials, 5 congruent trials and 5
baselines trials in a pseudo-randomized order. Matlab software was used for
all hand stimulus presentation and data collection.
6.3.2 Results and Discussion
To remove trials where participants did not attend to the number stimuli,
incorrect responses (0.04%) were excluded from the analysis, as were all
reaction times (RT) smaller than 100ms or greater 800ms (0.06%). To
minimize the effect of outliers, we also excluded RTs that were greater than
two standard deviations from the conditional means of each participant
(0.12%). The CE for each participant was calculated by subtracting RT in
congruent trials from RT in incongruent trials. Figure 6-2 shows both CE and
RT data for each priming group.
In order to test whether mimicry was influenced by the priming sentences
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in our experimental task, a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
was conducted on mean RT with congruency (congruent, incongruent,
baseline) and primes (prosocial, antisocial, non-social) as variables. The
analysis revealed a significant main effect of congruency (F(2,36)=26.3,
p<0.001) with a faster response in congruent trials (M=429ms) and a slower
response in incongruent trials (M=447ms); the response in baseline trials was
intermediate (M=436ms). This main effect of congruency confirmed the
success of mimicry measurement in our experimental task. In addition, the
ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between congruency and
primes (F(4,72)=3.52, p<0.011), which suggests that mimicry was modulated by
the priming sentences.
To further look into the priming effect on mimicry, a repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted on mean CE with primes (prosocial, antisocial, non-
social) as variables. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of primes
on CE (F(2,36)=4.76, p<0.015) (Figure 6-2a), which is consistent with previous
congruency × primes interaction on RT. Specifically, the antisocial priming
group induced a stronger CE (M=25.7ms) than the non-social (M=14.8ms)
and prosocial priming group (M=13.6ms). Post hoc t-test showed the CE in
antisocial priming group is significantly larger than the one in non-social (t (18)
= 2.52, p<0.022) and in prosocial priming group (t (18) = 2.81, p<0.012), but
there was no difference between the prosocial and non-social priming groups
(t (18) = 0.24, p=0.813).
These results suggest that priming pro/antisocial behaviors between two
fictional characters does have an impact on mimicry in the context of our
experimental task. In particular, priming antisocial behaviors enhances
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mimicry while priming prosocial does not.
RT (msec) Prosocial Antisocial Non-social
Congruent
trials
427
(29.9)
429
(36.5)
430
(29.0)
Incongruent
trials
441
(29.0)
455
(35.6)
445
(27.5)
Baseline
trials
434
(31.9)
436
(32.5)
437
(34.6)
Figure 6-2. (a) Mean Congruency Effect for the three types of priming
(prosocial antisocial and non-social). Asterisks represent the
statistically significant difference between two bars. Vertical bars
indicate standard error. (b) Mean Reaction Time in milliseconds (msecs)
for participants in each of the three priming groups on congruent,
incongruent and baseline trials. Italic numbers indicate standard error.
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6.4 Experiment 2: Does self-relatedness play an
important role in the priming effect on mimicry?
Experiment 1 provided the initial evidence that priming antisocial
behaviors enhances mimicry. People showed a stronger tendency to mimic
following antisocial priming than prosocial and non-social priming (Figure 6-
2a). This result is compatible with previous studies of the impact of ostracism
priming on mimicry (Lakin et al., 2008; Over and Carpenter, 2009a). However,
the results contradict the very similar study by Leighton et al. (2010), which
found stronger mimicry following prosocial priming in the same task.
One key difference between our study and that of Leighton lies in the
priming sentences themselves. Our priming stimuli in experiment one
provided examples of antisocial behavior conducted by two particular
characters (e.g. ‘Paul helps Ivy to fix her old bicycle’, ‘Jane and William
dispute the money they earn’). In contrast, Leighton’s priming stimuli used
more abstract and self-related sentences (e.g. ‘She is my friend’, ‘We are
against this’). According to Dijksterhuis’ theory (2001) that the self-relatedness
plays a key role in the process of social priming, it is likely that different self-
relatedness between Leighton’s priming sentences and ours leads to the
opposite priming results on mimicry.
In order to test this idea, we produced two new sets of scrambled
sentences in Experiment 2: one was to describe the pro/anti social behaviors
from a third person’s perspective, just like experiment 1 (e.g. ‘Greg
encourages others to be friends with Lauren’, ‘Joe cruelly bullied Stephanie
about her weight problem’), and the other was to modify the same priming
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sentences from a first person’s perspective (e.g. ‘We encourage others to be
friends with Lauren’, ‘I cruelly bullied Stephanie about her weight problem’). All
the pro/antisocial behaviors in the first-person and third-person perspective
version were identical, except that the former were self-related and the latter
were not. As previous studies suggest that perspective taking influences
priming effects on automatic behavior (Wheeler et al., 2001), we hypothesized
that this modulation applies to mimicry as well. Specifically, we predicted that
the third-person perspective group would replicate Experiment 1’s results and
the first-person perspective group would replicate Leighton’s.
6.4.1 Methods and Materials
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate students (18 females and 14 males; average
age 21.8; S.D. 2.03 years) participated in this study. None of them had
participated in Experiment 1. Half of the participants (9 females and 7 males)
were randomly assigned to the 3rd person perspective group, the other half to
the 1st person perspective group.
Stimuli, design and procedure
These were the same as those in Experiment 1, except that two new sets
of scrambled-sentence task were prepared for each perspective-taking group.
For the third person perspective group (‘non self-related’), 12 pages of new
scrambled sentences were remade: 4 pages of prosocial behavior priming
(e.g., ‘Harrison helps Julie to understand difficult maths problems’, ‘Greg
encourages others to be friends with Lauren’), 4 pages of antisocial behavior
priming (e.g., ‘Joe cruelly bullied Stephanie about her weight problem’ , ‘Pippa
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challenged Jack to a fight after school’) and 4 pages of non-social priming
(e.g., ‘Yorkshire pudding and horseradish go with roast beef’, ‘There are 366
days in each leap year’). For the first person perspective group (‘self-related’),
we adopted the same sentences but just changed the first character’s name
into “I” or “we”, for example: first-person prosocial behavior priming (e.g., ‘I
help Julie to understand difficult maths problems’, ‘I encourages others to be
friends with Lauren’) and first person antisocial behavior priming (e.g., ‘I
cruelly bullied Stephanie about her weight problem’ , ‘I challenged Jack to a
fight after school’). The non-social priming sentences in first and third person
group were the same.
6.4.2 Results and Discussion
The same procedure as Experiment 1 was implemented on raw RT data,
to remove incorrect responses (0.03%) and RT outliers (0.10%).
First, in order to examine whether self-relatedness can affect the priming
effects on mimicry, a three-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on
participants’ mean RT, with congruency (congruent, incongruent, baseline),
primes (prosocial, antisocial, non-social) and self-relatedness (3rd-person, 1st-
person) as variables. The three-way ANOVA analysis revealed a significant
main effect of congruency (F(2,60)=48.64, p<0.001) and a significant three-way
interaction: congruency × primes × self-relatedness (F(4,120)=2.59, p<0.040).
We also performed a two-way ANOVA on participants’ CE with primes
(prosocial, antisocial, non-social) and self-relatedness (3rd-person, 1st-person)
as variables. In line with the three-way interaction on RT, the two-way ANOVA
analysis revealed a significant two-way interaction on CE: primes × self-
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relatedness (F(2,60)=4.56, p<0.014). These results suggest that the priming
effects on mimicry between two perspective-taking groups were different.
In order to further examine the specific priming effect on mimicry in each
perspective-taking group, we independently conducted a repeated measures
ANOVA analysis for each group, on mean CE with primes (prosocial,
antisocial, non-social) as variables (Figure 6-3). The analysis revealed a
significant main effect of primes on CE in both 3rd-person (F(2,30)=4.962,
p<0.014) and 1st-person (F(2,30)=3.58, p<0.040) group. For 3rd-person group,
post-hoc t-test showed that the CE in antisocial priming condition was
significantly larger than the one in prosocial (t (15) = 2.48, p<0.025) and non-
social (t (15) = 3.25, p<0.005) priming condition, which replicated the results in
experiment 1. On the contrary, post-hoc t-test in 1st-person group showed that
CE in antisocial priming condition was significantly smaller than the one in
prosocial priming condition (t (15) = 2.32, p<0.035), which was compatible with
the findings of Leighton and colleagues (2010).
Taken together, the results in 3rd person group replicated experiment one
with a new group of participants; and the results in 1st person group replicated
Leighton’s findings in the context of our experimental task. Antisocial behavior
primes enhance mimicry only in the 3rd-person group whereas prosocial
behavior primes enhance mimicry only in the 1st-person group. These results
suggest that the self-relatedness of a pro/antisocial prime is crucial for its
specific priming effect on mimicry.
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Figure 6-3. Mean CE for the three types of social behavior priming
(prosocial, antisocial and non-social) in two perspective-taking
groups (3rd person and 1st person). Asterisks represent the
statistically significant difference between two bars. Vertical bars
indicate standard error.
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6.5 General Discussion
In the present study, we tested the relationship between pro/antisocial
priming and mimicry. Given the past literature showing that both prosocial and
antisocial primes can enhance mimicry, we predicted that self-relatedness of
primes is important in understanding these mixed priming effects on mimicry.
This prediction was confirmed in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we
demonstrate that pro/anti social behavior priming has an impact on mimicry in
the context of our experimental task and priming antisocial behavior by a third
party leads to increased mimicry. Experiment 2 replicated this effect, but also
demonstrates that priming similar antisocial behaviors by the self leads to
decreased mimicry. These results provide direct evidence that self-
relatedness plays an important role in the priming effects on mimicry.
The crucial question then concerns the underlying mechanisms of how
priming antisocial behavior leads to increased mimicry and how the self-
relatedness of a prime alters its priming effect on mimicry. One possibility is
that when participants received antisocial primes by a third-person, they
strategically used mimicry to enhance social cohesion (Over and Carpenter,
2009a) whereas when they received antisocial primes by the self, they
strategically reduced mimicry to sustain social disharmony. This interpretation
is compatible with our results in Chapter 5 where we showed that mimicry is
strategically controlled by social signals. According to this interpretation,
perception of antisocial behavior from the third-person perspective might act
as a hint of disaffiliation (Over and Carpenter, 2009a). This could increase
participants’ prosocial motivation, presumably in an attempt to stop the social
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conflicts and recover social affiliation, which in turn increases their tendency to
mimic others. This could also explain why prosocial primes by a third-party do
not enhance mimicry, simply because a hint of harmony from other’s prosocial
behavior informs participants of no need to implement more mimicry to create
social cohesion. In contrast, priming antisocial behavior from the first-person
perspective might act as a goal of disaffiliation, an attempt to implement and
fulfill these antisocial behaviors, which doubtlessly decreases their overall
mimicry.
Another plausible theory could be derived from the stereotypic behavior
priming study by Dijksterhuis and colleagues (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). They
found that stereotypic behavior priming can induce two contrasting effects on
automatic behavior: ‘behavioral assimilation’ and ‘behavioral contrast’. The
former elicits stereotype-consistent behaviors and the latter elicits stereotype-
inconsistent ones. Several factors have been identified so far to determine the
direction of the effect a prime leads to, and they are all associated with implicit
self-relevant process. For example, primes with abstract and generalized
stereotypic concepts or presented from the first-person perspective increases
accessibility to ‘behavior assimilation’ whereas primes with concrete and
extreme stereotypic exemplars or presented from the third-person perspective
increases accessibility to ‘behavior contrast’ (Dijksterhuis et al., 2001;
Wheeler et al., 2001). Following this logic, it is possible that the primes in the
first-person perspective might result in more “behavioral assimilation” and
consequently the prosocial primes will elicit more prosocial-consistent
behaviors such as mimicry; in contrast, the primes in a third-person
perspective might lead to more “behavioral contrast” and as a result the
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antisocial priming reversely induces more prosocial mimicry behaviors. This
behavioral assimilation and contrast mechanism can not only help us better
understand the mixed results in the previous mimicry priming literature, but
also extend Dijksterhuis’ theory from stereotypic behavior domain to other
automatic behavior domains such as mimicry.
Our results also have important methodological implications for future
priming research on mimicry. Leighton et al. (2010) found that a priming
sentence enhances mimicry when it contains prosocial words and inhibits
mimicry when it contains antisocial words. However, by using the same task,
our results revealed that priming sentences with prosocial behavior enhance
mimicry only in the first-person perspective group and priming sentences with
antisocial behaviors inhibit mimicry only in the third-person perspective
(Figure 6-3). This suggests that mimicry is not only sensitive to the
pro/antisocial words in the priming sentences, but also the perspective of the
sentences. Studies using tasks like the scrambled sentences task to provide
conceptual priming must thus consider the whole meaning of each sentence,
not just the presence of key pro/antisocial words.
Finally, it might be interesting to discuss the possible neural mechanism
for the pro/anti social priming effects on mimicry. Past research suggests that
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is an important brain region for the control of
mimicry (Brass et al., 2001a, 2005, 2009). Chapter 4 demonstrated that social
stimuli such as eye gaze modulate mimicry by influencing the neural activity in
mPFC. mPFC is also strongly involved in self-related task (Amodio and Frith,
2006). For example, implicit self-other evaluation and comparison strongly
engage mPFC (Moran et al., 2009; Rameson et al., 2010). Moreover, mPFC
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has been linked to one’s prosociality. Activity in mPFC was found to be
correlated with daily prosocial behavior (Rameson et al., 2011) and more
activities in mPFC predicted more subsequent prosocial behavior toward a
rejection victim (Masten et al., 2011). Interestingly, a recent neuroimaging
study suggests that mPFC is also the neural substrate for social priming
effects on behavior. Bengtsson et al., (2011) showed that mPFC is actively
engaged when self-esteem primes modulate one’s cognitive monitoring ability.
Given the fact that mPFC involves in all four processes of social priming,
control of mimicry, prosociality and self-relatedness, it appears likely that
processing of the prosociality and self-relatedness of a prime takes place in
mPFC and the neural activity of mPFC determines the pro/antisocial priming
effects on mimicry. Future research could investigate this.
6.6 Conclusion
In sum, the present study clarifies the relationship between pro/anti social
primes and mimicry and revealed the importance of self-relatedness in the
priming effects on mimicry. Two experiments consistently showed that priming
antisocial behavior by a third party leads to increased mimicry but priming it by
the self leads to decreased mimicry. This means that how mimicry is primed
depends on both the prosociality and self-relatedness of the priming stimuli.
Future research can investigate how this subtle modulation is implemented.
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Chapter 7. Discussion
7.1 Summary of Experimental results
This thesis uses both behavioural and brain imaging techniques to
investigate the control of mimicry by social signals. The results presented here
demonstrate that mimicry is subtly and strategically controlled by social
signals, and suggest that this strategic control of mimicry contributes to
human competence in social interaction.
Chapter 2 investigated whether eye gaze can modulate mimicry on a
second by second timescale, and found that direct gaze rapidly and
specifically enhances mimicry of intransitive hand actions. Chapter 3
replicated this enhancement effect by using a novel gaze sequence paradigm
and further demonstrated that the eye contact effect on mimicry is not based
on any arousal or attentional effects. Importantly, our results suggested that
the enhancement of mimicry is strategically driven by the ostensive-
communicative nature of the direct gaze. These findings reflect the flexibility
and subtlety of mimicry in social contexts and also suggest that eye gaze is a
powerful and strategic controlling signal on mimicry.
Chapter 4 investigated the neural mechanism of the eye contact effect on
mimicry by using fMRI. The results showed two key brain systems for social
cognition—mPFC and MNS—work together to on-line control mimicry in social
contexts. In particular, DCM analysis revealed that mPFC is the originator of
the eye contact effect on mimicry and it modulates the sensory inputs to the
MNS according to gaze directions. These findings suggest that mPFC plays a
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key role in the strategic control of mimicry in social contexts.
Chapter 5 investigated the joint effect of two critical features—likeability
and social status—on mimicry and examined if mimicry is simply driven by the
summation of the two features or is more sophisticatedly driven by the
affiliative function of mimicry. The results showed a significant interaction
between social status and likeability in driving mimicry and this interaction
optimized the affiliative function of mimicry in social interaction. This supports
a strategic nature of mimicry where participants used mimicry as a
communicative tool to affiliate with others. These findings, along with the ones
in Chapter 3, provide convincing evidence that mimicry is strategically
controlled by social signals.
Chapter 6 investigated the relationship between pro/antisocial priming
and mimicry. Previous studies showed a mixed data where antisocial priming
can both enhance and inhibit mimicry. Here, two experiments consistently
showed that priming antisocial behavior by a third party leads to increased
mimicry while priming antisocial behavior by the self leads to decreased
mimicry. These results suggest an important role of the self-relatedness in the
effects of social priming on mimicry, and also reflect the strategic nature of
mimicry, that is, people strategically increase mimicry to change the antisocial
surroundings.
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7.2 Emerging Questions
In most research, finding an answer to one question brings about several
more questions, and this work is no exception. As well as the strategic control
of mimicry by social signals was found in this thesis, these findings have
several general implications for our understanding of how and why we mimic
in the real social world, which will be considered below.
7.2.1 How Do We Mimic in the Real Social World?
The studies in this thesis suggest that mimicry is subtly and strategically
controlled by social signals and this control of mimicry is mediated by mPFC.
However, these studies were conducted under very simple lab conditions
where the type, onset and frequency of a social signal are well-controlled. It
should be more complicated in the real social world where multiple social
signals simultaneously jump into our visual field. Then, how would the brain
dynamically control mimicry according to different social signals?
When we watch an actor performing an action, we perceive not only the
action itself, but also the social signals along with the action (Figure 7-1).
These social signals can be divided into three groups: rapid changing signals
such as ostensive signals (e.g. eye gaze and smiles), occasional signals
about the social contexts (e.g. social ostracism, recent failure to affiliate with
others) and fixed signals such as personal characteristics (e.g. social status
and membership). I argue that in the temporal domain, these three different
types of social signals modulate mimicry in different fashions. First, I claim
that the fixed social signals such as a person’s characteristics strategically
determine the long-term baseline of the magnitude of mimicry towards that
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person. Take the Queen’s photo in Figure 7-1 as an example, merely from the
appearance we can recognize her social status (high status), likeability
(graceful) and membership (Caucasian, Christian, Elders). These fixed
features were then processed to determine whether there is a need to affiliate
with her (Yes! because of high status) and to estimate how much mimicry is
needed to successfully affiliate with her (perhaps intermediate amount of
mimicry, because she is too nice, see chapter 5).
Second, I suggest that the occasional social signals such as social
contexts strategically determine the short-term baseline of the magnitude of
mimicry to others. Lakin and Chartrand (2003) and Lakin et al., (2008) found
that those with a recent failure to affiliate with others or those with a recent
experience of social ostracism showed short-term increased mimicry to others.
The results in Chapter 6 also found that participants who were primed by
other’s antisocial behaviour displayed more mimicry. These findings suggest
that when people were surrounded by a disharmony social context, they
estimate a strong need to affiliate with others in the near future and therefore
strategically heighten the baseline of the magnitude of mimicry for a short
period.
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Figure 7-1. A dynamic model for strategic mimicry. This figure
illustrates how mimicry is dynamically controlled by social signals.
The photo of the Queen and black arrows symbolize the perception
of a target performing a movement; this scene not only activates the
processes of action perception, but also triggers the processes of
social signals. The blue boxes and arrows represent the process of
mimicry where the sensory information of the observed action is
transformed into the motor plan of that action. This process is
mediated by the core MNS such as IFG (motor representations) and
STS (sensory representations). The green boxes and lines
represent the strategic control of mimicry by social signals. The
works in this thesis provide evidence that mimicry is subject to
strategic top-down control processes by social signals (green boxes
and lines), for example, based on the fixed characteristics of the
target (e.g. social status), or based on the occasional social
contexts (e.g. social ostracism) or based on the rapid changing
ostensive cues given by the target (e.g. eye contact). These top-
down modulation processes could act at either the sensory input or
motor output of the mimicry process to reduce or enhance mimicry.
The hand shaking photo and red arrows symbolize the strategic-
driven nature of mimicry where mimicry is used to enhance
interpersonal relationship. How much the social signals enhance or
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inhibit mimicry process depends on the estimation of the current
need to affiliate with that actor. If there is a strong need to affiliate
with the actor (e.g. high social status such as the Queen), the
control system would strategically increase more mimicry.
Third, I suggest that the rapid changing signals such as ostensive signals
strategically determine the current magnitude of mimicry to the signal sender.
In chapter 2 and chapter 3, we found that direct gaze rapidly and strategically
enhances one’s tendency to mimic. Therefore, in the example of the Queen’s
photo (Figure 7-1), her eye contact and communicative smile would elicit
increased mimicry to her. However, she might not always send the same
signals, for example, in the next moment, she might show an averted gaze
and unhappy face. This rapid change of ostensive signals would then subtly
modulate the perceiver’s estimation of the current need to affiliate with the
gaze sender and consequently impact the magnitude of mimicry in a second-
by-second scale.
Finally, I suggest that in the real social world, the overall magnitude of
mimicry towards a target is the summation of the strategic mimicry by these
three types of social signals. The mPFC dynamically receives these social
signals along with the action from the target and consequently estimates the
current need of strategic mimicry. Subsequently, mPFC exerts top-down
modulation on the sensory input or motor output of the mimicry process to
reduce or enhance mimicry (chapter 4).
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7.2.2 The Relationship between Mimicry Effect and
Visible Mimicry Behaviour
As I reviewed in the introduction chapter, research in social psychology
mainly focuses on visible mimicry behaviours (e.g. face touching and foot
shaking in ‘the Chameleon effect’) whereas research in cognitive
neuroscience primarily investigates the underlying mimicry effect (e.g. RT
congruency effect and mirroring mechanism in MNS). However, what is the
relationship between mimicry effect and visible mimicry behaviours? It is
widely believed that mimicry effect is the neural mechanism of visible mimicry
behaviours (see 1.2.7). But since observing an action automatically triggers
the tendency to execute that action, why does not every mimicry effect turns
into a visible mimicry behaviour? For example, participants show a significant
mimicry effect in all SRC tasks in this thesis, but they showed few erroneous
movements (i.e. error rate), which can be regarded as a visible mimicry
behaviour.
It is difficult to directly answer this question because the generation of a
visible behaviour depends on the complex competition between excitatory and
inhibitory systems (or factors) of that behaviour. From this point of view,
mimicry effect could be regarded as the excitatory system of visible mimicry
behaviour, because the mirroring mechanism excites the motor system for
that action (see 1.2.3 Fadiga’s effect). Social modulators such as the
motivation to affiliate, prosocial attitude, positive mood, high social status and
ingroup membership (see 1.1.5) are excitatory factors for visible mimicry
behaviour, because previous studies showed that they increases spontaneous
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mimicry behaviour during interactions. In addition to these, this thesis
suggests that social signals such as direct gaze (chapter 2) and
communicative gaze sequences (chapter 3) could also be included as the
excitatory factors for visible mimicry behaviour, because they directly enhance
MNS (chapter 4).
For the inhibitory system of mimicry behaviour, previous studies suggest
that mPFC is the neural substrate of the inhibition of mimicry (Brass et al.,
2001; 2005). Incongruent actions engage more mPFC activity than congruent
actions in healthy participants, and difficulties in the inhibition of mimicry have
been observed in patients with lesions in mPFC (see 1.2.7). Past studies also
suggest several inhibitory factors for mimicry. For example, social stigma,
negative mood, low social status and outgroup membership significantly
reduce one’s spontaneous mimicry behaviour in social interactions. In addition
to these, this thesis found that nasty personality with low status (chapter 5)
and priming an antisocial behaviour by the self (chapter 6) are two social
factors that inhibit mimicry.
Here I would like to point out another critical factor that has strong effects
on the inhibition system of mimicry—the self-focus. Previous studies found
that increasing self-focus significantly decreases mimicry. For example,
Provine and colleagues (1986) found robust effects for contagious yawning
when participants were exposed to videos of people yawning; however when
the participants explicitly knew they were being watched during the
experiment, the contagious yawning disappeared (Provine, 2005). This
supports the idea that spontaneous mimicry behaviour can be suppressed by
conscious self-awareness. Similar effects by the self-focus were also found on
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mimicry effect. Spengler et al., (2010c) manipulated participants’ self-focus by
either using an optical mirror or using a self-evaluation task. They found that
when participants can see their own image from the mirror or had been asked
to make judgments about themselves, less mimicry effect was observed in the
SRC tasks. The authors explained that because mPFC, as the neural
substrate of inhibition of mimicry, is also a critical brain region for self-
referential process, increasing self-focus inevitably activates mPFC and thus
suppresses mimicry.
This inhibitory effect of self-focus on mimicry can help us explain some
situations where mimicry effect fails to generate a visible mimicry behaviour.
For example, the observation that people exhibit less visible mimicry
behaviours (i.e. erroneous finger/hand movements) in the SRC paradigm than
natural setting paradigm could result from the experimental instructions
provided, because the instructions of SRC paradigms often direct participants
to the awareness of self-performance (e.g. ‘as fast and accurate as you can’)
while the natural setting paradigms require participants to focus on the side of
the interaction partner (e.g. ‘describe this photo to your partner’).
In sum, although mimicry effect is the neural mechanism of visible
mimicry behaviour, it is obviously that the former would not always lead to the
latter. In real social world, many excitatory and inhibitory factors jointly
influence the MNS and mPFC. Future research is needed to investigate how
these factors are computed and weighted in the generation of a visible
mimicry behaviour.
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7.2.3 Why Do We Mimic in the Real Social World?
Four models of why people mimic
A core question in mimicry research is to clarify why people mimic. Four
different models have been proposed so far (see 1.1.6 and 1.2.6).
1) Innate model. This model suggests that mimicry is innate or at least
based on some amount of genetic predisposition at the neuron level
(Lepage and Théoret, 2007). It claims that mimicry is evolutionarily
favored and selected, because it involves important social functions such
as social affiliation (Lakin et al., 2003), action understanding (Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004) and learning through observation (Buccino et al.,
2004).
2) Simulation model. This theory claims that mimicry is part of the
fundamental simulation mechanism of the brain. It helps people
understand other’s behaviours and gives people better insight into
other’s mental states (intentions and desires) (Niedenthal et al., 2010).
People mimic others because they have to understand others.
3) ASL model. This model claims that mimicry is not evolutionarily
selected for any specific function, but is a byproduct of associative
learning processes (Heyes, 2001; 2010; see 1.2.7). As generated by
domain-general processes, once established, mimicry might be involved
in several general adaptive functions such as imitative behaviour, action
understanding and social affiliation (Brass and Heyes, 2005).
4) Strategic model. This theory claims that mimicry is a strategic
nonverbal behaviour to enhance liking and affiliation between individuals.
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A person mimicking other is because he/she wants to change the social
world for self-advantage—being liked and affiliated by others. Thus the
cause of mimicry is for maintaining a successful interpersonal
relationship (Lakin et al, 2003).
These four models share both similarities and discrepancies. For
example, the innate model suggests that mimicry is innate while the ASL
model suggests that mimicry is formed by associative learning during
development. The innate model, simulation model and strategic model
propose that mimicry is responsible for a specific social function while the ASL
model propose that mimicry involves in several general adaptive functions.
Several hybrid theories have already been proposed. For example, Del
Giudice et al.,(2009) combined elements of the innate model and ASL models,
and proposed that mimicry comes from the synergistic effect of associative
learning and genetic pre-programmes advantageous for this learning. They
claim that because mimicry is involved in important social functions, evolution
optimized infant behavioural patterns to produce efficient and reliable
associative learning for mimicry in the brain.
Our data for these models
The main purpose of my PhD project is not to verify these models;
however, some findings from this thesis can provide insights for our
understanding of these models. For example, in all experimental chapters we
found that mimicry is subtly modulated by social signals. If mimicry is innately
selected for action understanding (the ‘innate model’), there is no need to be
sensitive to different gaze directions (chapter 2) or be modulated by different
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gaze sequences (chapter 3), because the action type (hand opening/closing
movements) remained identical whenever it was preceded by a direct/averted
gaze or a communicative/non-communicative gaze sequence. Similarly, if
mimicry is part of a fundamental simulation mechanism for understanding
other’s actions and mental states (the ‘simulation theory’), it will be difficult to
understand why mimicry was significantly decreased by low status and nasty
personality (chapter 5), because we still need to simulate and understand the
actions performed by people with these traits.
Our results from chapter 4 and chapter 5 support part of the ASL theory.
The ASL theory stresses on the uniqueness of sensorimotor experience to the
formation of mimicry (Heyes, 2010, see 1.2.6). It claims that only the
sensorimotor experience can directly interfere with the vertical association
between the sensory and motor representation of an action; any other
modulations of mimicry are mediated by either influencing the sensory
component or the motor component of the vertical association (Catmur et al.,
2009). Our DCM analysis in chapter 4 showed that under different social
gazes, the mPFC enhances mimicry by modulating the sensory input to the
MNS. In contrast, the results in chapter 5 suggest that social status and
likeability drive mimicry by modulating the inhibition of mimicry, which is the
motor output of the sensorimotor mapping. These data are compatible with
the ASL model which suggests mimicry can be modulated by changing either
input to or output from the MNS but not changing the sensorimotor mapping.
The findings in all experimental chapters support the strategic account of
mimicry. We found that people strategically increased mimicry when there was
a cue or need for social affiliation, such as direct gaze (chapter 2),
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communicative gaze sequence (chapter 3), nasty target with high social status
(chapter 5) and antisocial behaviours (chapter 6). This strategic nature of
mimicry implies that mimicry specifically devotes to social affiliation.
Social cohesion model
Motivated by the findings in this thesis, here I propose a new hybrid
theory—‘social cohesion model’, which combines elements of the innate
model, ASL model and strategic model. Basically, it claims that because
people have a fundamental and pervasive drive to affiliate with others
(Baumeister and Leary, 1995), evolution selects mimicry as a strategic tool to
satisfy one’s need of social cohesion. Specifically, I adopt the claims in the
innate model suggesting that mimicry is evolutionarily selected for a specific
social function and propose that mimicry is for social cohesion. I also adopt
the claims in the ASL model suggesting that mimicry is formed by
sensorimotor experiences, and further propose that sensorimotor experiences
are facilitated by some genetic predisposition for social cohesion. Finally, I
adopt the claims in the strategic models suggesting that mimicry is a strategic
tool to enhance social cohesion and propose that the control of mimicry by
social signals is to optimize the affiliative function of mimicry.
This ‘social cohesion model’ suggests that human mimicry is not innate,
but originates from some genetically-wired mimicry-like mechanisms, such as
action synchronization. As I mentioned in 1.1.2, migrating fishes and birds
display impressive synchrony of movement; similarly, synchronization of
voices is a typical behaviour in many collective animals (e.g. birds, wolves and
non-human primates). These primitive synchronized behaviours are innately
reflexive and are believed to be evolutionarily selected as an essential survival
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skill for social cohesion (Breder and Halpern, 1946; Conradt and Roper, 2000;
Aivaz and Ruchstuhl, 2011). However, the neural mechanism of action
synchrony is still unknown.
By considering that action synchrony is a primitive and rudimentary type
of mimicry where the seeing and doing behaviours are not perfectly matched
but always performed by the same effectors, the ‘social cohesion model’
suggests that associations between sensory and motor representations are
imbalanced at birth (Figure 7-2a). Sensory neurons would have stronger
associations with motor neurons when they code the same effector’s actions
than different effector’s actions. For example, a sensory neuron of mouth
movements (e.g. an open mouth) would have a stronger default association
with a motor neuron of mouth movements (e.g. mouth opening) than a motor
neuron of hand movements (e.g. hand stretching). These stronger default
associations for the same effector’s actions are accumulated by the habits of
action synchrony in the history of evolution and are specifically selected for
social coordination and affiliation. In contrast, when it comes to the same
effector system, the sensory neurons and motor neurons are unsystematically,
randomly connected (similar to the ASL model, see Heyes, 2010) (Figure 7-2).
For example, the sensory neuron of mouth opening could be equally
connected to motor neurons of mouth opening and lip protrusion. The ‘social
cohesion model’ suggests that these imbalanced default associations have no
social function in infants because the associations between sensory and
motor representations are non-specific, but they provide an evolutionarily
favored neural pattern for social cohesion and will be further optimized by
sensorimotor experiences and social control system.
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Figure 7-2. The ‘social cohesion model’ of mimicry (modified from
Heyes, 2010). (A) Mimicry origins from a rudimentary neural system
for primitive action synchrony. This system is featured by imbalanced
associations between sensory neurons in STS (blue) and motor
neurons in IFG (orange). Sensorimotor associations are stronger
within the same effector system than between different effector
systems. (B) Mature mirroring mechanism is developed by
sensorimotor experiences, which elaborately specify the associations
between sensory neurons and motor neurons. Ostensive signals
such as eye contact facilitate the associative learning during
sensorimotor experiences. (C) Mimicry is strategically controlled by
social signals such as eye contact and social status. These signals
Discussion: Why do we mimic?
192
influence either the sensory input or the motor output of the
sensorimotor mapping, in order to optimize the affiliative function of
mimicry.
Similar to the ASL model, the ‘social cohesion model’ suggests that a
mature, functional neural mechanism for mimicry is developed by
sensorimotor experiences, which elaborately specifies the vertical association
between sensory neurons and motor neurons. However, the ‘social cohesion
model’ further suggests that the efficient and reliable associative learning
during sensorimotor experiences is promoted by some amount of genetic
predisposition for social cohesion, for example, the sensitivity to ostensive
signals. Ostensive signals are special social signals that human being evolved
to facilitate social interaction and cooperation (Frith and Frith, 2010).
Ostensive signals such as eye contact, eyebrow raise and calling name
convey communication intention and ultimately promote social affiliation.
Ostensive signals also play an important role in infant’s development (Csibra
and Gergely, 2009). Eye contact and infant-directed speech (‘motherese’)
attract infants’ attention (Senju and Csibra, 2008) and facilitate their social
learning from others (Csibra and Gergely, 2006, 2009). The ‘social cohesion
model’ suggests that these ostensive signals are important for effective
associative learning from sensorimotor experiences, because they assure that
the established sensorimotor mappings are social-cohesion-oriented.
The claim that ostensive signals are important to the development of
functional mimicry is supported by several studies. According to the ASL
model, self-observation (often without ostensive signals) contributes to the
most infants’ sensorimotor experiences (Heyes, 2010). However, several
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studies suggests that most of human spontaneous mimicry during fact to face
interaction are ‘mirror mimicry’ (i.e. interaction partners move the hand on the
same side), not ‘anatomic mimicry’ (e.g. interaction partners move the same
hand) (Bavelas et al. 1988; LaFrance and Broadbent, 1976). The neural
activities of MNS are also stronger during mirror mimicry than during anatomic
mimicry (Koski, et al., 2003). This preference of mirror mimicry implies that the
associative learning during self-observation would be modified or replaced by
the associative learning during the existence of ostensive signals, because
the latter one optimizes the social cohesion function of mimicry (i.e. mirror
mimicry facilitates social coordination and cooperation). Future research
needs to verify this claim.
The final claim of the ‘social cohesion model’ is that all modulations of
mimicry by social signals are to optimize the affiliative function of mimicry. It
argues that the associative learning is a domain-general process which could
produce some rigid, non-adaptive mimicry response. As the function of
mimicry is for social cohesion, human develops monitoring mechanisms which
strategically control the sensory input or motor output of mimicry according to
contexts, to assure and maximize its affiliative consequence. The
experimental results in this thesis confirm this idea and suggest that the
control of mimicry by social signals is in a Machiavellian fashion. For example,
social signals such as eye contact (chapter 2 and chapter 3), social status
(chapter 5) and social primes (chapter 6) strategically modulate mimicry to
maximize the affiliative consequence of mimicry. These sophisticated controls
of mimicry cannot be simply explained by the innate model and simulation
model. Moreover, previous studies suggest a strong animacy bias of
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mimicry—people display more mimicry to a biological movement when they
were told the movements were performed by a human agent than they were
told the movements were performed by an artificial device (Liepelt and Brass,
2010; Longo et al. 2008; see 1.2.5). It will be difficult for the ASL model to
explain why the belief about animacy modulates mimicry, because the low-
level perceptual features (i.e. sensory input) of the movement remain identical
in these studies and they should elicit the same motor response in the ASL
framework. The ‘social cohesion’ model attributes this animacy bias to the
‘strategy for social cohesion. It suggests that because the function of mimicry
is to satisfy human’s need for social cohesion, there is no need to strategically
use mimicry to affiliate with any artificial devices.
In sum, the ‘social cohesion’ model suggests that mimicry is evolutionarily
selected for social cohesion. It is not innate, but gradually developed with the
assistance of genetic predisposition for social cohesion. It origins from a
rudimentary neural system for primitive action synchrony and is elaborately
developed by associative learning process during sensorimotor experiences.
Finally, mimicry is strategically controlled by social signals to optimize its
function of social cohesion. While the ‘social cohesion model’ is admittedly
speculative and cannot totally rule out the possibility that the control of
mimicry by social signals is mediated by domain-general processes such as
attention, I argue that this new model has two distinct advantages: it goes
beyond simple nature–nurture dichotomies and is consistent with current
evolutionary biology; and it adopts the pros of previous models and is strongly
supported by the experimental results in this thesis.
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7.2.4 Mimicry in Autism
Finally, the results in this thesis may have implications for our
understanding of mimicry in autism. Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder
characterized by abnormalities of social interaction and impairments in
communication. A number of studies have demonstrated reduced mimicry and
MNS activity in individuals with autism compared to control participants
(Williams et al. 2004; Dapretto et al. 2006; McIntosh et al. 2006; Oberman et
al. 2005; Rogers et al. 2003; Stel et al., 2008). It has been hypothesized that a
‘broken MNS’ and corresponding mimicry impairment is a core feature of
autism (Williams et al. 2001). However, the experimental evidence for this
theory is highly controversial. Increasing studies in recent years suggest that
mimicry remains intact in autism (Bird et al. 2007; Dinstein et al. 2010; Gowen
et al. 2008; Hamilton et al. 2007; Leighton et al. 2008; Press et al. 2010;
Spengler et al. 2010b).
Instead of suggesting impairment in mimicry per se, Hamilton (2008)
recently proposed that individuals with autism might have impaired control of
mimicry. This theory is compatible with clinical observations of high levels of
echolalia (automatic repetition of speech patterns) and echopraxia (automatic
imitation of observed actions) in autistic patients where they cannot inhibit
excessive vocal and action mimicry (Russell 1997; Rutter 1974). Our findings
in this thesis suggest that the strategic control of mimicry by social signals is
essential to the function of mimicry. Subtly and strategically controlling
mimicry according to social contexts optimizes the affiliative consequence of
mimicry and contributes to human competence in social interaction. As
individuals with autism have severe deficit of social perception (e.g. eye
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contact) and impaired competence in social interaction, it is possible that the
strategic control of mimicry by social signals is compromised in autism. Future
research is needed to verify this theory.
7.3 Overall Conclusion
In conclusion, the experiments presented in this thesis demonstrate that
mimicry is flexible and sensitive to social contexts. Social signals such as eye
gaze, social status, likeability and pro/antisocial primes subtly and strategically
control mimicry, in order to optimize the affiliative consequence of mimicry.
Neuroimaing data suggest that mPFC plays a key role in the control of
mimicry by social signals; it works together with MNS to on-line control
mimicry according to social contexts. These findings reflect the strategic
nature of mimicry and provide important implications for our understanding of
the causes and functions of mimicry.
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